Monday, November 5, 2012

Assessed Value of Madison County Officials' Properties Alleged to have Fallen

From the Anderson Herald-Bulletin:

Madison County records show the assessed value of property owned by four prominent Madison County politicians has dropped by a combined $316,800 since 2009, leading critics to charge they’ve benefited from personal and political ties to county Assessor Larry Davis.
...

According to online assessment records and property tax bill information available in the County Auditor’s office, Gardner’s personal home and seven investment properties were valued at $365,100 in 2009. His property tax liability on the properties was $6,350, auditor records show.

By 2011, the value of those same properties was $294,600, a reduction of $70,500. And his property tax liability was $5,144, a net reduction of $1,206, records show.

Gardner said he appealed assessments on property he owns, including his personal house as far back as 2009 when Cheryl Heath was county assessor.
...

Like Gardner, Gaskill and his wife, Kelly, own their personal home and seven investment properties.

In 2009 the combined assessed value of those properties was $914,000, according to assessor and auditor records. Their total property tax liability was $14,407, according to auditor records.

By 2011, the assessed value of those properties was $695,100, a drop of $218,900. And the Gaskills’ property tax liability declined to $10,822 for a net reduction from 2009 of $3,585.

Records also show that the assessed value of Shelton’s home dropped significantly from 2009 to 2011, while the value of homes owned by County Councilmen Mike Phipps (running for reelection Tuesday) and David McCartney showed modest reductions in assessed value during that period.

In 2009, records show Shelton’s home with an assessed value of $91,100. In 2010, online documents indicate there was an error in the assessment, and the assessed value of Shelton’s home was reduced $27,400 to $63,700. As a result of the changes, however, Shelton’s annual property tax liability went down from $911 in 2009 to $559 in 2011, a reduction of $352.

Similarly, the assessed values of Phipps’ and McCartney’s homes went down from 2009 to 2011. Phipps’ dropped from $152,600 to $133,100 in that time; the value of McCartney’s property jumped from $64,400 in 2009 to $72,600 the following year before dropping to $59,900 in 2011.
...

http://heraldbulletin.com/local/x880886088/County-officials-property-taxes-fall

Mt. Vernon School District has Property Tax Referendum on Ballot

From the Greenfield Reporter:


Voters in the Mt. Vernon school district will have their chance on Election Day to decide if the school district receives a three-year infusion of additional property tax monies.

Approval of a property tax referendum would give the district an extra $650,000 per year for the next three years to pay off the interest on a potential $3.4 million loan from the state. The increase would be based on property values.

Tax Court Affirms Board Determination Finding Assessor's Purchase Evidence More Credible than Taxpayer's Appraisal

On appeal, MHPI contends that the Indiana Board’s final determination must be reversed for two alternative reasons. First, MHPI claims that the Indiana Board’s final determination is contrary to law because it utilized an improper framework in reviewing its property tax appeal. Alternatively, MHPI claims that the Indiana Board should have completely rejected or significantly discounted the Assessor’s December 2004 sales evidence because MHPI demonstrated that it never would have paid over $4.2 million for the property had it known that Indiana’s re-trending process would cause the property taxes to "sky rocket." (See Pet’r Reply Br. at 5-6; Pet’r Br. at 10-12.)

I.

A final determination of the Indiana Board is contrary to law if it violates any statute, constitutional provision, legal principle, or rule of substantive or procedural law. See John Malone Enter., Inc. v. Schaeffer, 674 N.E.2d 599, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). MHPI maintains on appeal that the Indiana Board, in evaluating the record evidence, violated its own standard of review because it did not determine whether MHPI made a prima facie case or whether the Assessor rebutted its prima facie case. (See Pet’r Reply Br. at 1-2.) MHPI is incorrect.

A petitioner makes a prima facie case during the administrative hearing process when it submits evidence that is "sufficient to establish a given fact and which, if not contradicted, remains sufficient." See Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005) (citation omitted), review denied. The respondent must then rebut the petitioner’s prima facie case to prevail. See id. While the Indiana Board’s final determination does not explicitly state that MHPI made a prima facie case or that the Assessor rebutted MHPI’s prima facie case, the Indiana Board’s final determination implicitly indicates that it reached those conclusions. Indeed, the Indiana Board explained that because the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the value of MHPI’s mobile home park, it needed to weigh the evidence and determine which was most persuasive and reliable. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 105.) After analyzing the evidence, the Indiana Board then explained why it found the Assessor’s overall evidentiary presentation more persuasive than MHPI’s evidentiary presentation. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 105-09.) Accordingly, the Indiana Board did not violate its own standard of review in reviewing MHPI’s appeal and, therefore, the Court concludes that MHPI has not shown that the Indiana Board’s final determination is contrary to law.

II.

The next issue before the Court is whether the Indiana Board’s determination that the December 2004 sales evidence was probative as to the market value-in-use of MHPI’s property is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence. Probative evidence is "evidence sufficient to establish a given fact that, if not contradicted, will remain sufficient." Meadowbrook N. Apts. v. Conner, 854 N.E.2d 950, 953 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005) (citation omitted). Indiana’s assessment manual provides that a taxpayer may rebut the presumption of correctness afforded to assessments through the presentation of sales information regarding the subject or comparable properties. 2002 REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT MANUAL (2004 Reprint) (hereinafter "Manual") (incorporated by reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.3-1-2 (2002 Supp.)) at 5. Conversely, an assessing official may also support the correctness of an assessment through the presentation of such evidence. See Kooshtard Prop. VI, LLC v. White River Twp. Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 501, 506 n.6 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005), review denied.

The administrative record reveals that the manufactured home market was robust between 2004 and 2005. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 456, 463, 473-74, 497.) In fact, the market was characterized as one in which investor demand routinely outweighed supply. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 473-74, 497.) The demand for such property did not begin to decrease until 2008. (Cert. Admin. R. at 190.) MHPI purchased the mobile home park in an arm’s length transaction in December 2004 for just over $4.2 million. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 300-01.) Furthermore, despite the imminence of Indiana’s re-trending process that required assessing officials to adjust real property assessments to reflect the six-year difference in effective valuation dates, MHPI assumed, when it purchased the property, that its assessment and associated property tax liability
would remain relatively constant. (See Pet’r Br. at 10-12 (footnote added).) See also IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-4.5 (2006) (amended 2009); Manual at 2; 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 21-3-3-3(a)-(b) (2006) (see http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac). MHPI’s incorrect assumption cannot dispel the record evidence, which not only indicates that the December 2004 sales evidence reflected both the robustness and stability of the manufactured home market for the 2006 tax year, but also shows what MHPI believed the property to be worth at the time of purchase. Accordingly, while MHPI’s current complaints regarding its "sky rocketing" property taxes are indicative of buyer’s remorse, they do not require the complete rejection or substantial discounting of the December 2004 sales evidence. Consequently, the Court must conclude that the Indiana Board did not abuse its discretion in either considering that the December 2004 sales evidence or in finding it probative as to the mobile home park’s market value-in-use for the 2006 tax year.

http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/11051202tgf.pdf

Tax Court Affirms Board Determination Assessor's Appraisal Entitled to More Weight than Taxpayer's Evidence

...

Therefore, "[w]hen there are competing opinions as to how a property should be valued, the Indiana Board must determine which opinion is more probative." Trimas, 923 N.E.2d at 502. Once the Indiana Board makes such a determination, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Indiana Board simply because it or, like here, one of the parties disagrees with the Indiana Board’s decision. See Grider v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1239, 1243 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003). In other words, Millennium’s sales comparison and income approach arguments merely invite this Court to reweigh the evidence; that task, however, is not within this Court’s prerogative on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Trimas, 923 N.E.2d at 498-99; Hubler, 938 N.E.2d at 315 n.5 (defining "an abuse of discretion"). The Indiana Board’s final determination explains why it found the Assessor’s Appraisal to be more persuasive than Millennium’s, and based on its review of the administrative record, the Court finds no basis for reversing the Indiana Board’s conclusion.
Therefore, the Court holds that the Indiana Board did not abuse its discretion in finding the Assessor’s Appraisal more persuasive than Millennium’s Appraisal despite their differences.

See the full determination here:

http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/11051201tgf.pdf

Friday, November 2, 2012

Board Rejects Argument that, Having Established a Property's Value for One Year, the Burden Would Shift to the Assessor to Prove a Change for Any Subsequent Year

[N]either of the assessments at issue here represents an increase of more than 5% over what the Assessor had determined for the previous year.  Thus, on its face, Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2 does not shift the burden of proof the Assessor. 

Wesleyan, however, argues that all three assessment years (2008-2010) must be viewed together, and that, had the Assessor properly valued Wesleyan’s real property at $3,006,060 (the amount reflected in Bovee’s appraisal) on March 1, 2008, that assessment would have carried forward in succeeding years.  Consequently, argues Wesleyan, if the Assessor sought a different value for the ensuing assessment years, she had the burden of proof to show what an appropriate trending factor would be.

In making that argument, Wesleyan apparently recognizes that, for evidence to be probative in an assessment appeal, the party offering the evidence must explain how it relates to the property under appeal’s value as of the appropriate valuation date.  O’Donnell v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 854 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006).  And that valuation date varies depending on the assessment date under appeal.  For March 1, 2009 and March 1, 2008 assessments, the valuation dates were January 1, 2008 and January 1, 2007, respectively.  See 50 IAC 21-3-3(b)(2009) (“The valuation date is January 1 of the year preceding the year of the assessment date.”).  For March 1, 2010 assessments, the valuation date was March 1, 2010.  I.C. § 6-1.1-4-4.5 (f); 50 IAC 27-5-2 (c).

Thus, Wesleyan apparently seeks to shift to the Assessor the burden of relating Wesleyan’s evidence to the appropriate valuation dates for these appeals.  Wesleyan, however, reads things into Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2 that simply are not there.  Thus, to the extent that Wesleyan relies on Bovee’s appraisal, it is Wesleyan’s burden to show how that appraisal relates to the valuation dates for the March 1, 2009 and March 1, 2010 assessment dates at issue in these appeals.

The Board first notes that Lichtenberg and Bovee mostly arrived at similar numbers in valuing the entire business enterprise (i.e., the real estate, intangible business assets, and FF&E)—Bovee valued the entire enterprise at $---------- as of January 1, 2007, while Lichtenberg offered the following values:
·         January 1, 2007:  $----------
·         January 1, 2008:  $----------
·         March 1, 2010:    $----------

To the extent that the appraisers differed in their methodologies for valuing the business enterprise as a whole, the Board generally finds Bovee’s opinion to be more credible.  First, while both appraisers valued the property retrospectively, Bovee used information from around the January 1, 2007 valuation date.  Lichtenberg, on the other hand, initially valued the property as of March 1, 2010, mostly using data from well after 2007, and trended his conclusions back to January 1, 2007.  Bovee’s opinion therefore more closely mirrors the likely decision-making of an informed investor both on the March 1, 2008 assessment date and the January 1, 2007 valuation date applicable to that assessment.

Similarly, Bovee largely provided more support for various subjective judgments underlying his valuation of the business as a whole than did Lichtenberg.  For example, while both appraisers found wide ranges of sale prices under their respective sales-comparison analyses, Bovee offered a more detailed and reasoned comparison between Wesleyan’s facility and his comparable sales.  He also gave detailed explanations to support his adjustments to those sale prices, including adjustments for sales that were part of portfolio transactions.  Lichtenberg did less to support his qualitative analysis.  And he did little to explain his decision not to adjust the sale prices from his two comparable sales that were part of the same portfolio transaction.  Instead, he simply indicated that the sale prices were buyer allocations.  That does not mean that those allocated sale prices necessarily required an adjustment, but Lichtenberg’s summary treatment of the issue does not inspire confidence.

The gulf between the two experts’ opinions, however, stems mostly from how they valued the intangible assets, which in turn led them to allocate significantly different portions of Wesleyan’s overall business value to real property.  Bovee valued Wesleyan’s assembled workforce and permits at $---------- and therefore assigned a significant portion of the entity’s overall NOI to those costs, leaving a relatively modest amount to capitalize in determining the real property’s value.  Lichtenberg, by contrast, assigned only 15% of the business’s overall NOI to intangible assets, leading him to allocate most of the facility’s NOI to real estate and to value the intangible assets at only $----------.

The Board’s decision is complicated by the fact that there appears to be no single generally accepted approach to allocating a business’s overall value between tangible and intangible assets.  The methodologies employed by Lichtenberg and Bovee both seem plausible.  While Morlan and Bovee made much of the fact that Lichtenberg’s entrepreneurial- or proprietary-profit capitalization approach is not universally accepted, Tellatin’s book shows that at least some of the profession has accepted that methodology.  Similarly, Bovee testified without impeachment or rebuttal that his methods for valuing Wesleyan’s assembled workforce and permits are supported by USPAP Standards 9 and 10 and are used in valuing intangible assets in various types of legal proceedings.

Ultimately, the Board finds Bovee’s allocation analysis to be the better reasoned and supported of the two.  Lichtenberg simply deducted an estimated 15% of the overall NOI.  Yet Lichtenberg did little to support why he chose that amount.  He established a range of 10% to 20%, the low end of which he drew from his estimate of entrepreneurial incentive under his cost approach, and the high end of which he took from a seminar in which the authors apparently found that skilled nursing facilities typically rent for an amount between 80% and 85% of NOI.  But Lichtenberg offered little or no support for his conclusions about entrepreneurial incentive.  And he did not attempt to parse out the types of facilities on which the seminar’s vague aggregate data was based.  Lichtenberg then settled on the middle of that range, which happened to equal the minimum amount that HUD deducts for proprietary profit when making federally insured loans on nursing home real estate.

Granted, Lichtenberg’s conclusions under the cost-approach, in which he directly estimated the real property’s value, were generally consistent with his ultimate allocation of the business’s overall value between real estate and other assets.  But there are significant problems that detract from the reliability of Lichtenberg’s cost-approach analysis.  As already explained, Lichtenberg did not support his choice to include entrepreneurial incentive equaling 10% of hard costs.  Also, as Morlan pointed out, Lichtenberg summarily dismissed the presence of any functional or external obsolescence.  Morlan, however, persuasively explained that a building the age of Wesleyan’s likely would have at least some functional obsolescence due to its lack of energy efficiency.  Bovee, too, pointed out that the building was constructed in phases, with each phase creating a new plant design, duplicated interior and exterior walls, and new roof lines.  And the Board is persuaded by Bovee’s opinion that retrofitting costs related to such additions generally cannot be recaptured on a dollar-per-dollar basis.  Similarly, Morlan laid out the external economic issues impacting nursing homes in cities affected by the decline in the automobile industry, casting some doubt on Lichtenberg’s summary conclusion that the property did not suffer form any external obsolescence.

That is not to say that Bovee’s allocation analysis was perfect.  He made several assumptions in his relief-from-royalty analysis, most significantly in choosing hotel franchise rights to serve as a proxy for Wesleyan’s licenses, permits and approvals.  And he did not describe the licenses, permits and approvals at issue in any detail.  Similarly, Bovee did little to support the capitalization rates that he used in determining what portions of the enterprise’s overall NOI to attribute to intangible assets and FF&E, although the Board notes that his 25% rate for the intangible assets was the same rate that Lichtenberg used in his analysis.  On the whole, though, the Board finds Bovee’s allocation analysis to be better supported and more persuasive than Lichtenberg’s analysis.

Of course, Bovee estimated the value of Wesleyan’s property as of January 1, 2007.  So Wesleyan needed to explain how Bovee’s valuation opinion related to the property’s market value-in-use as of the January 1, 2008, and March 1, 2010, valuation dates at issue in these appeals.

Wesleyan offered surprisingly little explanation.  As related above in the Board’s discussion about the burden of proof, Wesleyan took the position that, had the Assessor properly valued the Wesleyan’s property in 2008, that correct value would have rolled forward to the next two assessment dates.  And in Wesleyan’s view, any change necessitated by trending was for the Assessor to determine.  As already explained, that misconstrues Wesleyan’s burden of proof.  It also ignores case law holding that each tax year stands alone and that evidence of a property’s assessment in one year is not necessarily probative of its true tax value in another year.  Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (citing Glass Wholesalers, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 568 N.E.2d 1116, 1124 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991)) (“Finally, the Court reminds Fleet Supply that each assessment and each tax year stands alone. . . .  Thus, evidence as to the Main Building's assessment in 1992 is not probative as to its assessed value three years later.”).

Wesleyan’s heavy reliance on its mistaken interpretation of who has the burden of proof aside, the record contains at least some evidence that addresses the relationship between the value of Wesleyan’s property as of January 1, 2007, and the property’s value as of later dates.  Morlan testified at length about the state of the economy heading into and through the recession.  And the general tenor of his testimony was that things were getting worse, both nationally and in cites like Marion that were heavily reliant on the automobile industry.  Granted, Morlan was not very specific as to dates and he did not attempt to directly relate Bovee’s appraisal to a different valuation date.  Nonetheless, the valuation date for the March 1, 2009 assessment date is just one year after the date as of which Bovee estimated the value of Wesleyan’s property.  And the Board is persuaded that the property was worth no more than $3,006,100 as of January 1, 2008.

Of course, Lichtenberg came to a different conclusion.  He estimated that the property’s market value-in-use increased slightly more than 50% between January 1, 2007 and January 1, 2008.  Morlan, however, persuasively discredited Lichtenberg’s conclusions in that regard.  As Morlan explained, a 50% increase in real estate value in one year at the front end of a deep recession is hard to fathom, especially without more support than Lichtenberg supplied.  Indeed, Morlan generally felt that Lichtenberg failed to adequately explain how his opinion of the property’s market value-in-use as of March 1, 2010, related to the property’s value at either of the earlier valuation dates.  Morlan found that lack of explanation especially troubling given the state of the national and local economies during the four-year period between Lichtenberg’s engagement and the earliest valuation date in his report.  The Board is persuaded by Morlan’s testimony on those points.

Morlan’s testimony, however, does not suffice to relate Bovee’s valuation opinion to March 1, 2010.  Morlan testified that the economy in general, and the nursing home industry in particular, was starting to come back in 2010.  Thus, the inference that the Board relies on for the January 1, 2008 valuation date—that the property’s value was unlikely to have increased since January 1, 2007—is not available for the March 1, 2010 valuation date.  Granted, Lichtenberg found a close correlation between the property’s January 1, 2007 and March 1, 2010 values.  But Wesleyan can hardly rely on Lichtenberg’s opinion on that point given how thoroughly its own witness discredited that opinion.

In reaching its conclusion, the Board recognizes that the Assessor made almost no change to the property’s value between the three assessment years at issue—the March 1, 2008 and March 1, 2009 assessments were identical ($5,604,300), and the March 1, 2010 assessment which was actually $200 less ($5,604,100).  But there is nothing in the record to show what the Assessor considered in making her annual adjustments.  And Wesleyan’s own witness testified to the significant economic changes between 2008 and 2010.  Under those circumstances, the Assessor’s failure to significantly change the property’s assessment between assessment years does not suffice to explain how Bovee’s appraisal relates to the market value-in-use of Wesleyan’s property as of March 1, 2010.


See the Related Case here:

http://www.in.gov/ibtr/files/Wesleyan_Health_Care_Ctr_27-002-08-1-4-000015_Redacted.pdf

Council Fails to Override Mayor's Line-Item Veto of Indianapolis Budget

From the Indianapolis Star:

The mayor’s aim with his largest line-item veto — holding back $31.8 million in income taxes earmarked for the county general fund — was to force the council into new talks about a long-term budget deal. He intends to save the money to help close a projected budget gap in 2014.

Ultimately, Ballard is leaving it up to the council after Jan. 1 to decide how much each county office must share in the cuts. He trimmed 14.5 percent from the county general fund.

Offices headed by elected county officials, all of them Democrats, would be among those affected.

“To say I’m disappointed is an understatement,” council President Maggie Lewis said at a news conference after Thursday night’s meeting. “Bipartisanship takes both Republicans and Democrats. . . . Obviously, we’re going to have to continue the conversation.”

But during the meeting, the Democrats expressed little willingness to play along with Ballard.

They lobbed repeated criticism at the mayor and aggressively questioned his budget chief. They invited a parade of county officials to speak about dire consequences that would result from the deep cuts.

Prosecutor Terry Curry wondered aloud if cutbacks in his office’s child support collection and domestic violence divisions would be necessary.

“The bottom line,” Curry said, “is that any further reduction in our budget is obviously unacceptable and intolerable.”

The council voted 16-10 along party lines to override that veto, with three Republicans absent. The vote fell short of the 20 needed for an override.
...

CIB Moves to Appeal PILOT Assessment in Indianapolis

From the Indianapolis Star:

At its meeting Thursday afternoon in the Indiana Convention Center, the tax-exempt CIB initiated its appeal of a quickly drafted property assessment used by the council last month as the basis for a $15 million payment in lieu of taxes, or PILOT.

CIB leaders said they couldn’t afford the $15 million hit. They also said the council improperly added the charge to the CIB’s $63.9 million operating budget for 2013 to skirt the chance of a mayoral veto.

“Clearly, you never want to have to go down this path,” CIB President Ann Lathrop said after the meeting. “But it is incumbent upon us to be thoughtful about the future needs of this board.”

Two of the CIB’s nine members were absent: Lewis, a council appointee, and Jay Postesta, a mayoral appointee. Lewis said she was tied up with her full-time job.

The CIB approved a resolution calling for the tax assessment appeal, which starts with Marion County Assessor Joseph O’Connor. That process likely will take months, especially since O’Connor hasn’t yet sent the CIB formal notice of its assessment.

The CIB also directed Lathrop to seek guidance from the Indiana Board of Accounts about how the PILOT will affect the CIB’s budget and to preserve other legal options.

A lawsuit, however, likely would need another vote.

...

Terre Haute to Sell "Surplus" Property for Development as Skilled Nursing Home

From the Terre Haute Tribune-Star:

A north-side city park may soon be converted into a skilled nursing and rehabilitation facility designed for “baby boomers.”

Mainstreet, a Cicero-based real estate development company, is looking to construct a 75- to 80-bed skilled nursing/assisted living facility near Union Hospital on property that is currently known as Memorial Park, a city-owned public park.

This summer, the Terre Haute Board of Public Works and Safety declared the park “surplus” property, allowing the city to place it up for sale.

City officials have stated they expect the sale of the 5.7 acres to bring the city approximately $1 million. Mayor Duke Bennett has stated that the sale of unspecified city property would provide $1 million to help balance the city’s flagging general fund.

Tim Cook, an attorney representing Mainstreet before the Terre Haute City Council Thursday night, would not comment on a possible sale price.

The sale of the property is not required to go through an open bidding process because the project is deemed an “economic development project” that will fit in with surrounding property uses, said Cliff Lambert, executive director of the Terre Haute Department of Redevelopment, which is helping facilitate the property sale.

Sale prices in such cases are determined by averaging multiple appraisals, city officials have said.
...

Mainstreet is seeking a 10-year real property tax abatement on its investment in the new facility, which is estimated to be around $10 million, according to an economic impact study provided by Mainstreet. The abatement would save the company about $750,000 over 10 years, Cook said.

The new facility would employ nearly 100 people at rates 5 to 10 percent greater than the market average for those positions, he said.
...

http://tribstar.com/business/x2082759015/City-to-sell-surplus-northside-park-to-Illinois-based-company

TRIN, Inc Offered Tax Credits for Expansion in Ashley

From the Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette:


TRIN, Inc., an automotive parts supplier, announced plans today to expand its operations here, creating up to 75 new jobs by 2016.

The company, which manufactures automotive interior switches and sensors, will invest $19 million to upgrade its manufacturing capabilities and add 46,000 square-feet to its existing facility located at 803 H.L. Thompson Jr. Drive in Ashley. Construction at the site is set to begin this month.
...

The Indiana Economic Development Corporation offered TRIN, Inc. up to $455,000 in conditional tax credits and up to $95,000 in training grants based on the company's job creation plans. These tax credits are performance-based, meaning until Hoosiers are hired, the company is not eligible to claim incentives. The town of Ashley will consider additional property tax abatement at the request of the DeKalb County Economic Development Partnership.
...

Lake County Auditor and Treasurer's Offices Open Veteran's Day for Property Tax Payments

From the Northwest Indiana Times:


The Lake County auditor and treasurer's office will be open for extended hours and will forgo closing their offices Veterans Day to accommodate last-minute taxpayers.
Treasurer John Petalas reminded property owners Friday the final installment of the 2012 property taxes is due Tuesday, Nov. 13.
He said his office will be open from 8:30 a.m. to 7 p.m. that day.
Petalas and County Auditor Peggy Katona said they will keep their offices open for business from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Veterans Day, Nov. 12, although other county government agencies will be closed in observance of the holiday.
"While we respect the solemnity of the day and honor our veterans for the sacrifices made, it is essential that we have skeleton crews on site to accommodate the hundreds of taxpayers who will be arriving on that day," Petalas said.
Petalas said the extra hours are needed to service the hundreds who typically line up in the final days outside his offices in the Lake County Government Complex, 2293 N. Main St., Crown Point, or the satellite county courthouses at 401 Broadway in Gary and 232 Russell St. in Hammond.
Petalas and Katona said their staffs will be available to address any problems owners have with their tax bills.
He said those who aren't disputing their taxes can avoid lines be paying at these banks: American Savings FSB, Centier Bank, Chase Bank, Citizens Financial Bank, DeMotte State Bank, First Financial Bank, BMO Harris Bank N.A., Horizon Bank, Lake Federal Bank FSB, MainSource Bank, Peoples Bank and Tech Credit Union.
Petalas said American Savings, Chase, First Federal, First Financial, Harris and MainSource are closed Veteran's Day. Centier will only be open until noon on Veteran's Day.
Petals said his staff cannot accept credit card payments in person, but people can use major credit cards for tax payments by going to www.lakecountyin.org.
A fee is charged by the credit card company, not county government, for the online payment service. He said residents also can use the cheaper e-check system.
Petalas warns residents to be patient if they call his office with questions during those final days. The office's telephones generally are swamped at that time, and callers often are put on hold for an extensive period, he said.

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Express Software & Services Offered Conditional Tax Credits for Expansion in Indianapolis

From the Indianapolis Star:

Express Software & Services today announced it will expand its Indianapolis operations and double its staff by 2016.

With 33 current employees, the information technology and software company said it will invest $234,000 to upgrade its offices at 1 N. Pennsylvania St. and add another 33 jobs. Hiring already has begun for IT and software development positions.

The Indiana Economic Development Corp. has offered Express Software & Services up to $205,000 in conditional tax credits and up to $30,000 in training grants based on the job creation plans.

http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012211010346

Property Taxes Due November 13th

From the Muncie Star-Press:

The fall installment of property taxes in Delaware County is due Tuesday, Nov. 13.

County Treasurer John Dorer said that taxes are normally due on Nov. 10, which falls on a Saturday this year, and the Delaware County Building will be closed on Nov. 12 for Veterans Day.

Taxpayers can pay at local banks, credit unions or the treasurer’s office on the first floor of the county building. The county building is open 8:30 a.m.-4 p.m. Monday through Friday.

Payment may also be made online by going to the treasurer’s page on the county website, www.co.delaware.us. A link will be available on the county treasurer’s page to pay online by debit or credit card. Credit card companies charge a 2.5-percent fee.

http://www.thestarpress.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2012311010013

Similarly, from the Madison Courier:

The fall installment of property taxes is due Tuesday, Nov. 13.

Fall taxes usually are due Nov. 10, but this year that is on a Saturday. The Jefferson County Courthouse will be closed the following Monday, Nov. 12, for Veterans Day, so the deadline will be the next day.

For those who want to pay next week, the Courthouse will be closed Tuesday, Nov. 6, for Election Day.

Tax bills may be paid at the county treasurer's office on the first floor of the Courthouse or at any of the Jefferson County branches of MainSource Bank and River Valley Financial Bank; and the Farmers Bank of Milton branch on Clifty Drive.Taxpayers paying at a bank should take their bill with them.

MainSource will be closed Nov. 12 for Veterans Day. River Valley's branch in Walmart will be open Veterans Day, but its other branches will be closed. Farmers Bank will be open Veterans Day.

None of the banks will be closed for Election Day on Tuesday.

Anyone with questions can call the treasurer's office, 265-8910.

http://madisoncourier.com/main.asp?Search=1&ArticleID=73017&SectionID=178&SubSectionID=964&S=1

Allen County Reminds Home Owners to Verify Homestead Deduction Before January 1

From the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel:

Allen County homeowners who have not verified that their homestead deduction is properly in place should do so before Jan. 1 as required under a 2009 state law.

The verification form has been included in spring tax statements each of the past three years, but the County Auditor's office also offers a searchable database. Taxpayers who find their properties on the list should complete the verification form found there if that property is their primary residence. Searches can be conducted by name or address. Auditor Tera Klutz said 78 percent of county homeowners have already completed this process.
The database can be found at www.allencountyauditor.us. Questions should be directed to the Auditor's office by calling 449-7241 or by email at acauditor@allencounty.us

Courier Corp Seeks Abatement for Equipment Investment in Kendallville

From the Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette:


Courier Corp. is investing $13 million in a four-color inkjet web press for its Kendallville plant.

No new jobs are in the company’s short-term plan.
...

The company applied for a 10-year abatement on taxes that will be assessed on the new machinery. Kendallville Mayor Suzanne Handshoe supports the request, which is set to be voted on next week at a City Council meeting.

That support, Folger said, “was instrumental in our making the decision to put the equipment in Kendallville.” Pennsylvania was also competing for the investment.

Porter County Assessor Urges Property Owners Who Haven't Received Notice of Assessment to Contact Office

From the Chesterton Tribune:


County Assessor Jon Snyder said any property owner who has not received their assessment notice to please contact the assessor’s office at (219) 465-3460 or jsnyder@porterco.org.

Snyder said there could be many reasons as to why assessments did not make it to their respective owners and it is something very common. The owner could have moved away without leaving a forwarding address, he said, or the property could have changed from being a residential property to a rental or commercial property, or vice versa.

There may have been Form 11s of multiple parcel properties that were accidentally left out when mailed. Another circumstance could be simply just a human error that resulted in an incorrectly printed address.

“It could be a mistake on our part,” Snyder said.

When the taxpayer contacts the assessor office about the missing notice, the staff will work to fix the problem.

Snyder said Forms 11 can also reach taxpayers by e-mail.

The assessor’s office has said Nov. 13 is the general day that appeals on assessments are due. However, Snyder said the date does not apply to those who received their notices late. As according to state statute, a taxpayer has 45 days to appeal an assessment once he or she is mailed the Form 11 notice.

Appeals can be made by walking into the assessor’s office at 155 Indiana Ave, Ste, 211 Valparaiso, between the extended hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and filling out a Form 130 or by going online at www.portercountyassessor.com

Revenue Finds that Tractor Used for Hauling Feed; Moving Hay Bales; and Mowing to Prevent "Pink Eye" Among Cattle Not Exempt

Taxpayer operates a farm, which includes planting corn and raising cattle. In 2008, Taxpayer purchased a tractor at an auction in Indiana. The Indiana Department of Revenue ("Department") conducted a sales/use tax audit of the auction house. Pursuant to the audit, the Department discovered that Taxpayer did not pay sales tax at the time of the purchase. Subsequently, Taxpayer submitted additional information, including a completed Agricultural Equipment Exemption Usage Questionnaire ("Questionnaire"), claiming that his purchase/use of the tractor qualified for the agricultural exemptions.

Based on Taxpayer's information, the Department's audit determined that Taxpayer's tractor qualified for nine (9) percent exemption. Thus, the Department assessed Taxpayer sales/use tax on the remaining ninety-one (91) percent purchase/use of the tractor. Taxpayer, to the contrary, claimed that all his usage of the tractor should be exempt.

At the hearing, Taxpayer's representative asserted that all the above mentioned uses of the tractor qualified for the agricultural exemptions pursuant to Section I.B., examples 1, 2 and 4 of the Department's Sales Tax Information Bulletin 9 (July 2012), 20120725 Ind. Reg. 045120427NRA.

Taxpayer also submitted several photos and two excerpts of articles discussing "Causes of Pinkeye" and "Management Tips for Round Bale Hay Harvesting, Moving, and Storage" to support his protest. Taxpayer's representative asserted that "[f]eeding of round bales directly to the cattle in the winter should be exempt." Taxpayer's representative further argued that "[u]se of the tractor with a bushhog attached should be exempt" because "[t]his usage of the bushhog is to mow the pasture field to prevent the exempt animals from contracting pinkeye or other eye infections caused by tall stems. It should not be considered general farm maintenance and does not pertain to mowing right of ways and the like." Additionally, Taxpayer's representative maintained that "[m]oving round bales from the field to the barn should also be exempt. The storage of the hay out of the weather is the last step in the process of harvesting hay."

Upon reviewing Taxpayer's supporting documentation, the Department must respectfully disagree. Pursuant to the above mentioned statutes and regulations, all purchases of tangible personal property by persons engaged in the direct production, extraction, harvesting, or processing of agricultural commodities are taxable, unless the use of the tangible personal property satisfies the "double-direct" test; the equipment at issue must be involved in the direct production of the agricultural commodity and must have a direct effect upon that commodity. Taxpayer's documentation demonstrates that he used the tractor for hauling feed to livestock (round bales in winter) before actually feeding the cattle and, thus, his use of the tractor, at best, was pre-production. Taxpayer's use of the tractor to check on cattle was not production. Similarly, Taxpayer's use of the tractor for moving round bales was not production because Taxpayer did not sell the bales.

Finally, Taxpayer may argue that he needed the tractor with an attached bushhog to maintain the pasture (or farm) to prevent the cattle from eye irritation caused by tall weeds and grasses, which may cause "pinkeye" disease. However, Taxpayer's use of the tractor in this manner did not have an immediate effect on the cattle. Thus, Taxpayer did not directly use the tractor with an attached bushhog for mowing in the direct production. The fact that the tractor was purchased for use on the farm does not necessarily make it exempt from sales tax. 45 IAC 2.2-5-4(e).

In short, Taxpayer's documentation failed to demonstrate that his use of the tractor – for (1) hauling feed to livestock to be sold ("Round Bales"), (2) checking on livestock, (3) "Moving Round Bales," and (4) "Mowing with Bushog" – were directly used in his direct production. Thus, the Department's audit properly allowed Taxpayer nine (9) percent of exemption on his purchase of the tractor.


Tax Court Schedules Two Hearings for November

Indianapolis Racquet Club, Inc. v. Marion County Assessor (View)
Wednesday, November 07, 2012 9:30 AM - 10:30 AM
49T10-1201-TA-1

Taxpayer challenges the Indiana Board of Tax Review's final determination that it failed to provide probative evidence that raised a prima facie case that its properties, 3 parcels, were overvalued for the March 1, 2002 Assessment.

Location:
State House, Room 413
Indianapolis, IN 46204



Johnson Co. Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals, et. al. v. KC Propco LLC d/b/a Kindercare Learning Center (View)
Friday, November 16, 2012 10:00 AM - 11:00 AM
49T10-1112-TA-92

County challenges the Indiana Board of Tax Review's final determination granting an exemption for property that it alleges is not owned, occupied, and used for education purposes.

Location:
Franklin College
Richardson Chapel
Franklin, IN 46131


http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx?fromdate=11/1/2012&todate=11/30/2012&display=Month&view=DateTime

Tax Court Posts Oral Argument in Asplundh Tree Expert Co


10/31/2012 10:00:00 AMTaxAsplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue n/an/an/a

http://mycourts.in.gov/arguments/default.aspx?court=tax

Two Appeals Filed in Tax Court in October

10/02/12Autobanc Corp. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue N/A49T10-1209-TA-59
10/02/12D.D.A. Associates LLC v. Noble County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals N/A49T10-1209-TA-60


http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/taxsumm.html

Tax Court Grants Summary Judgment for Revenue; Taxpayer's Request for Refund Untimely

The Department asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Ms. Gibson’s 2007 refund claim was untimely filed pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-8.1-9-1.3 (See Resp’t Br. at 7-8 (footnote added).) Ms. Gibson, however, argues that principles of equity rather than the strict letter of the law should guide the Court in resolving this matter. Specifically, Ms. Gibson explains that she simply made an honest mistake in attempting to comply with Indiana’s ever-evolving tax laws and that she should not be penalized for that mistake. (See Pet’r Br. at 1.) According to Ms. Gibson, line 2 on Form IT-40, the “Tax Add-Back” line, has not materially changed since 1993 and, as a result, she received insufficient notice regarding the 1999 amendment of Indiana Code § 6-3-1-3.5. (See Hr’g Tr. at 5-8; Pet’r Br. at 1-2, Exs. 1-8.) See also note 1. Ms. Gibson further argues that this lack of notice was even more egregious because the Department did not identify her reporting error for twelve years. (See Hr’g Tr. at 7-8; Pet’r Br. 1.) Ms. Gibson contends that a finding in favor of the Department imposes an unreasonable penalty upon her (i.e., the loss of thousands of dollars) in light of the facts and circumstances that led to her mistaken overpayment of income tax. (See Hr’g Tr. at 5-6; Pet’r Br. 1.) Ms. Gibson, therefore, requests that the Court award her all of the income tax overpayments made for the 1999 through 2007 tax years. The Court, however, cannot grant Ms. Gibson’s request.

Indiana Code § 6-8.1-9-1, in relevant part, provides that:

If a person has paid more tax than the person determines is legally due for a particular taxable period, the person may file a claim for a refund with the department. . . . [I]n order to obtain the refund, the person must file the claim with the department within three (3) years after the latter of the following:

(1) The due date of the return.
(2) The date of payment.

IND. CODE § 6-8.1-9-1(a) (2011) (amended 2012). There is no dispute that Ms. Gibson’s 2007 IT-40 was due on April 15, 2008. Consequently, Ms. Gibson needed to file her refund claim for the 2007 tax year on or before April 15, 2011. Ms. Gibson, however, did not file her 2007 refund claim (via her 2007 amended IT-40) until April 26, 2011, exactly eleven days too late.

Furthermore, the Court need not determine whether the changes to line 2 of the IT-40 provided Ms. Gibson with sufficient notice as to the 1999 amendment of Indiana Code § 6-3-1-3.5 because the IT-40 instruction booklets for the 1999 and 2000 tax years clearly provided notice as to the amendment. (See Resp’t Mot. Summ. J., Ex. G.) See also http://www.in.gov/dor/3488.htm. Moreover, the IT-40 instruction booklets for the 2001 through 2010 tax years contain the following statement with respect to line 2 and the adding back of property taxes: “Do not add back any property taxes on this line.” (See Resp’t Mot. Summ. J., Ex. G.) See also http://www.in.gov/dor/3488.htm.

Ms. Gibson’s situation reflects some of the challenges Indiana citizens have in understanding the changes to, and complexities of, our tax system. While the Court is sympathetic to Ms. Gibson’s plight, it must apply the laws as they are written. See Scopelite v. Indiana Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 939 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010) (stating that the Court will not read provisions into statutes where they do not exist) (citation omitted). Furthermore, it is a well-established principle that courts of equity aid the vigilant, not those who have slept upon their rights. See SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Cnty. Airport Auth., 831 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied. Therefore, the Court must affirm the Department’s denial of Ms. Gibson’s 2007 refund claim because Ms. Gibson has not shown that the refund claim was timely filed or that her delayed filing was excusable.

http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/11011201tgf.pdf