22. The Petitioner
claimed an exemption under Ind. Code § 21-34-8-3(1), which, among other things,
exempts “All … the … property acquired under authority of this article [Ind. Code
§ 21-34] or used for the purposes provided for in this article.” The Respondent
does not appear to contest that 13% of the subject property meets that statute’s
express criteria. Indeed, the parties stipulated that Purdue is a state
educational institution established under Ind. Code § 21-23-2. Article 34
allows a state educational institution to “acquire” property through a lease or
sublease of less than 40 years that the institution’s board of trustees
determines necessary to “carry[] on the educational research, the public service
programs, or the statutory responsibilities of the state educational
institution. . . .” I.C. § 21-34-3-4(a) and (b). That is precisely what Purdue
did when it leased part of the subject property for a maximum period of
slightly more than 15 years to use as classrooms.
23. Instead, the
Respondent contends that in addition to proving the elements laid out in Ind. Code
§ 21-34-8-3(1), the Petitioner needed to show that it owned the subject
property for an exempt purpose independent from the purposes for which Purdue
leased the property. According to the Respondent, the Indiana Supreme Court
recognized such a requirement for all exemptions in Oaken Bucket. The
Board disagrees.
24. In Oaken
Bucket, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed a taxpayer’s claim that the portion
of a building it leased to a church was entitled to an exemption under Ind.
Code § 6-1.1-10-16(a). As the court explained, that statute provides an
exemption where a property is “owned, occupied, and used” by a person for
educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. Oaken
Bucket, 938 N.E.2d at 657. The case turned on whether the taxpayer has
shown that it owned the property for a charitable or religious purpose.
25. The Board found
that the lease was a standard business arrangement and that the taxpayer failed
to show that it owned the property for anything other than investment purposes.
The Tax Court reversed. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Board, explaining
that while the tenant was a religious organization and therefore possessed an exempt
purpose, the taxpayer failed to show an exempt purpose of its own separate and distinct
from that of its tenant. Id. at 658.
26. As the Respondent
points out, the court discussed the link between exemption and the provision of
a public benefit. And it explained that a property owner does not show that he
owns property for public benefit—instead of for his own private benefit—simply
by renting it to a beneficent organization. See id. at 659-60 (quoting Travelers’
Ins. Co. v. Kent, 151 Ind. 349, 50 N.E. 562, 563-64 (1898) and State ex.
rel. Hammer v. MacGurn, 187 Mo. 238, 86 S.W. 138, 139 (1905)). But the
court explained those things in the context of the taxpayer’s claim under Ind.
Code § 6-1.1-10-16(a), which requires a property to be “owned” for exempt
purposes. The court did not purport to address any other statutory exemptions.
It certainly did not purport to apply an “owned, occupied, and used” test to
claims under other exemption statutes that do not include those elements.
Indeed, doing so would conflict with the Supreme Court’s own rules for statutory
construction. See Whitacre v. State, 274 Ind. 554; 412 N.E.2d
1202, 1206 (1980) (“We will not interpret a statute which is unambiguous on its face
or add something to a statute which the legislature has purposely omitted.”).
27. The Respondent,
however, points to Ind. Code § 6-1.1-10-38 for the proposition that the legislature
intended for a uniform analysis to be applied to all exemption claims. That argument
flies in the face of the section’s plain language, which provides, “This
chapter does not contain all of the property tax exemption provisions. The
property taxation exemption provisions include, but are not limited to, the
following sections[]” and then lists 16 sections from titles 20, 21, and 36 of
the Indiana Code. I.C. § 6-1.1-10-38. If anything, by directing readers to
other parts of the Indiana Code, Ind. Code § 6-1.1-10-38 evidences the
legislature’s intent that each type of exemption must be analyzed under its own
statutory elements.
28. The DLGF’s memo
does not help the Respondent either. The DLGF issued the memo to clarify that
property owned by Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana is exempt. The memo
notes that Ivy Tech is a state college, which is included in the definition of
a state agency. The memo further notes that property owned by a state agency is
not only exempt from taxation under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-10-2, but that Ind. Code
§ 6-1.1-11-9(b) prohibits such property from even being assessed. See Resp’t
Brief, Ex. A. Thus, like Oaken Bucket, the DLGF's memo does not
purport to address the requirements for an exemption under Ind. Code §
21-34-8-3(1).
