Excerpts of the Board's Determination follow:
29. The Turpins rely on two
things to support their claim: (1) what Ms. LeVeque describes as the price the
Turpins bought the property for in August 2006, and (2) sale prices for various
other properties containing manufactured homes.
30. A property’s sale price can
be compelling evidence of its market value-in-use. But the Turpins bought their
property more than 4½ years before the valuation date at issue in this appeal.
And they failed to explain how their purchase price related to the market value-in-use
as of the required valuation date.
31. Also, it is unclear what the
Turpins actually paid for the property. It appears that they bought the land
from their parents and then hired a contractor to place the manufactured home
on a foundation. Neither of the Turpins actually testified. Their tax
representative, Ms. LeVeque, asserted that they paid a total of $82,524 for the
property. But she had no personal knowledge of that fact and offered little
evidence to corroborate her assertions. At most, they offered a portion of a
loan document and an e-mail from Ms. Turpin to Ms. LeVeque saying that the loan
amount was for “the property and the manufactured home.” Pet’rs Ex. 2.
But the contractor drew the entire loan balance, and nothing in the record indicates
that the contractor was involved in buying the land.
32. In fact, the evidence about
what the Turpins paid for the land was vague at best, consisting of Ms. LeVeque’s
hearsay testimony that Ms. Turpin “believe[d]” the price was “around $10,000.” LeVeque
testimony. And the Turpins bought the land from their parents. Under those
circumstances, the Board will not simply assume that the sale was at arm’s
length or that the price is a reliable indication of value.
33. The Board turns to the Turpins’
sales evidence for other properties containing manufactured homes. A property’s
value may be estimated directly by comparing it similar properties that have
sold in the market. Indeed, that is what the sales comparison approach—one of
the three generally accepted appraisal approaches—does. But to use that
approach in an assessment appeal, one must show that the sold properties are comparable
to the property under appeal. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar”
or “comparable” to another property do not suffice. Long v. Wayne Township Assessor,
821 N.E.2d 466, 470 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Instead, one must identify the characteristics
of the property under appeal and explain both how those characteristics compare
to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties and how any differences
affect the properties’ relative market values-in-use. See id. at 471.
34. The Turpins offered summary
data for 16 properties containing manufactured homes with between 1,232 and
1,736 square feet that sold in Marshall County during the five years leading up
to the Board’s hearing. They also offered MLS listing sheets for a subset of nine
sales from that larger group and a property record card for a tenth sale.
35. The Board need spend little
time discussing the summary for the larger group of sales. That summary shows
little more than the sale price for each property and the fact that the property
contained a manufactured home.
36. The MLS sheets and property
record card contain more data, and Ms. LeVeque compared the properties
described in those documents to the Turpins’ property in terms of at least some
relevant characteristics. As the Assessor pointed out, however, Ms. LeVeque ignored
one essential characteristic—location. See Poracky v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs,
635 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1994) (quoting JANATA PROPERTY TAXATION
234 (2d.ed. 1993) (“The location of [property] is of paramount importance with
regard to its value.”). Ms. LeVeque brushed aside that concern by claiming that
the value of a manufactured home does not differ based on where it is located.
That might be true if one looks at the home by itself. But Ms. LeVeque’s sales
included both land and improvements without anything to show the portion of the
sale price that was attributable to each component.
37. And while Ms. LeVeque made
broad claims about the relative inferiority or superiority of the sold
properties to the Turpins’ property in terms of individual characteristics such
as home size and age, lot size, and the presence of porches, garages or other
improvements, she neither quantitatively adjusted the sale prices nor applied
qualitative analysis techniques to account for those differences. She did not
show that her analysis complied with generally accepted appraisal principles.
Ultimately, Ms. LeVeque did not do much more than offer a good deal of raw
data, which did not prove a value, or even a likely range of values, for the
Turpins’ property.
38. The Turpins failed to
establish that their evidence proves a more accurate market value-in-use for
the subject property as of March 1, 2011.
http://www.in.gov/ibtr/files/Turpin_50-005-11-1-5-00033.pdf
