Thus, because the assessment increased by more than 5% between the 2009 and 2010 assessment dates, the Assessor has the burden of proving the parcel was correctly assessed. If the Assessor fails to meet that burden, the subject parcel’s assessment must be reduced to its 2009 level. Mr. Whysong, however, has the burden of proving that he is entitled to any further reduction.
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The Assessor did little to support the subject parcel’s assessment. Her witness, Phyl Olinger, pointed to the sale prices for two nearby properties from which she abstracted land values. One may show a property’s value through sales information for comparable properties; indeed, that is precisely what the sales-comparison approach contemplates. See MANUAL at 3 (explaining that the sales-comparison approach ―estimates the total value of the property directly by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the market.‖). For sales data to be probative, however, the sold properties must be shown to be sufficiently comparable to the property under appeal. Conclusory statements that a property is "similar" or "comparable" to another property do not suffice. See Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 470 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Instead, one must identify the characteristics of the property under appeal and explain how those characteristic compare to the characteristics of the sold properties. Id. at 471. One must similarly explain how any differences between the sold properties and the property under appeal affect the properties’ relative market values-in-use. Id. Aside from offering Beacon property data sheets for the sold properties and showing their proximity to the subject parcel, however, Ms. Olinger did not meaningfully compare the sold properties to the subject parcel.
Even if Ms. Olinger had meaningfully compared the sold properties to the subject parcel, she used sales from 2005 and 2006 without explaining how those sale prices related to the subject parcel’s market value-in-use as of March 1, 2012. For that independent reason, Ms. Olinger’s sales data lacks probative value. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471. Because the Assessor failed to meet her burden of proof, Mr. Whysong was entitled to have the subject parcel’s assessment reduced to its March 1, 2009 level of $5,600.
But Mr. Whysong sought an even lower value. And as explained above, he bore the burden of proving that he was entitled to any further reduction. The Board therefore turns to Mr. Whysong’s evidence.
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Based on the subject parcel’s listing history, Mr. Whysong argued that the parcel would not sell for any more than $2,000, if it sold at all. Where a property has been marketed in a commercially reasonable manner for an appropriate length of time without selling, the seller’s asking price tends to show the ceiling on that property’s market value. The Board therefore turns to the specifics of the subject parcel’s listing history. In 2006 the parcel was listed with an asking price of $3,500, which Mr. Whysong and his realtor later reduced, first to $3,200 and then to $3,000. Mr. Whysong, however, did not explain how the listings from 2006 relate to the property’s market value-in-use as of March 1, 2010—the relevant valuation date for this appeal.
But Mr. Whysong also listed the property with an asking price of $5,000 beginning on January 1, 2009 and continuing past the March 1, 2010 valuation date. While far from overwhelming, that listing history is at least some evidence that the parcel was worth no more than $5,000 as of the March 1, 2010 valuation date. Because the Assessor did not offer any probative evidence to support a higher value, the Board finds that the subject parcel’s assessment should be reduced to $5,000 for the March 1, 2010 assessment date.
