The relevant facts concerning the initiation of the appeals process are undisputed. The Notice of Assessment of Land and Structures (Form 11) to the Petitioners is dated September 14, 2011. A taxpayer who disagrees with the assessed value on that document can begin the appeal process by filing a written notice within 45 days. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-1(c). These appeal instructions were included on the Form 11 and clearly provided information about the 45-day filing requirement. September 14 to October 29 would have been 45 days. The Petitioners, however, did not file any document initiating this appeal until November 14, 2011, when they filed a Form 130 Petition. This filing was approximately two weeks later than the time allowed by statute. The Petitioners acknowledged they “missed the date.”
The failure to file a written document initiating the appeal process within the time allowed by Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-1(c) was a fatal mistake. It made the Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-3 review process to the Indiana Board unavailable. See Williams Industries, 648 N.E.2d at 717-718; Reams, 620 N.E.2d 759-760. The Respondent correctly pointed out that this untimely filing precludes the relief sought by the Petitioners.
Even if the Board reached the merits of this appeal, the Petitioners failed to make a prima facie case for changing the assessed value.
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The Petitioners’ case relied heavily on the assessed value of nearby properties.
Pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-18(c), “To accurately determine market value-in-use, a taxpayer or an assessing official may … introduce evidence of the assessments of comparable properties located in the same taxing district or within two (2) miles of a boundary of the taxing district…” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18. The “determination of whether properties are comparable shall be made using generally accepted appraisal and assessment practices.” Id.
Furthermore, in order to use this argument as evidence in a property assessment appeal, the proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of the two properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. The Petitioners were responsible for explaining the characteristics of their own property, how those characteristics compared to those of the purportedly comparable properties, and how any differences affected the relevant market value-in-use of the properties. Id. at 471. In this appeal, the Petitioners failed to offer any meaningful comparison of the alleged comparable properties to their own. Accordingly, the other assessments do not help to prove a more accurate assessed value for the subject property. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471.
A neighboring property sold for $28,000. The sale occurred on September 18, 2012. The Petitioners failed to explain how the neighboring property is comparable to their own or relate the 2012 sale price to a value as of March 1, 2011. Therefore, this sale does not help to prove a more accurate valuation for the subject property.
