Here, the Petitioners, through
their tax representative Ms. LeVeque, randomly offered sales and assessment
comparisons in an attempt to prove that the assessment of the subject property
is too high. First, regarding the purportedly comparable sales, the Petitioners
recognize that one can estimate the value of a subject property by analyzing the
sales of comparable properties. A party offering such evidence must show that
the properties are generally comparable to each other, and also must show how
any relevant differences affect the relative values. See Long, 821
N.E.2d at 470-71 (holding that, in applying the sales-comparison approach, the
taxpayers needed to explain how any differences between their property and the
properties to which they sought to compare it affected the properties’ relevant
market values-in-use). Ms. LeVeque’s analysis of comparability was limited to
conclusory statements as to whether each purportedly comparable property was
inferior or superior to the subject. Her evidence lacked the type of analysis
contemplated by Long.
42. Another way to show a
property’s market value-in-use is through assessments of comparable properties.
See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18. But Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18 does not
automatically make evidence of other assessments probative. Instead, the party relying
on those assessments must apply generally accepted appraisal and assessment practices
to show that the properties are comparable to the property under appeal. Again,
conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another
property do not suffice. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. One must identify
the characteristics of the property under appeal and explain how those
characteristics compare to the characteristics of the other properties. Id.
at 471. Similarly, one must explain how any differences between the other
properties and the property under appeal affect the properties’ relative market
values-in-use. Id. This Ms. LeVeque did not achieve.
43. Here, the Petitioners’
representative failed to discuss how the properties she submitted as comparable
property were similar to the subject property or how they differed. The Petitioners’
evidence did little to quantitatively or qualitatively show how the differences
between the properties affected their relative values. Furthermore, the
Petitioners’ evidence lacked credibility based on the fact that mistakes were
made by the Petitioners’ representative. The Board therefore finds that the
Petitioners failed to raise a prima facie case that their property was
over-valued for the 2011 assessment year.
44. Where a Petitioner has not
supported its claim with probative evidence, the Respondent’s duty to support
the assessment with substantial evidence is not triggered. Lacy Diversified
Indus. LTD v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215, 1221-22 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 2003).
http://www.in.gov/ibtr/files/Harris_50-005-11-1-5-00017.pdf
