26. The most effective method to
establish value can be through the presentation of a market value-in-use
appraisal, completed in conformance with USPAP. Kooshtard Property VI, 836
N.E.2d at 506 n.6. Consequently, regardless of who has the burden of proof for each
parcel, the Respondent, through Ms. Moore’s appraisal, offered substantial,
probative evidence regarding the market value-in-use of both parcels. The
appraisal valued the subject property in conformance with USPAP. Ms. Moore
estimated the value of the subject properties as one economic unit, which was
$325,000 as of March 7, 2013. She also developed a value for each lot
separately. Specifically she valued Lot 33 at $120,000 and valued Lot 34 at
$225,000 as of March 7, 2013. And she sufficiently related her appraisal to
March 1, 2012. She almost exclusively used comparable properties that sold in
2012 in her sales-comparison approach. Thus, Ms. Moore stated that “even though
the appraisal was written in 2013, my comparable sales are for 2012, and I did
put a 2013 in there to show the stability in the market place on the lake.” Accordingly,
the Board finds that Ms. Moore sufficiently related her value to March 1, 2012.
Through this USPAP conforming appraisal, the Respondent offered substantial evidence
of the correct market value-in-use for the subject properties. Thus, the Board now
turns to the Petitioners’ evidence and arguments for each parcel.
27. The Petitioners offered
purportedly comparable sales in an attempt to prove that the subject property
was over-assessed. A party offering such evidence must show that the properties
are comparable to each other, and also must show how any relevant differences affect
the properties’ relative values. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470-71 (holding
that, in applying the sales-comparison approach, the taxpayers needed to
explain how any differences between their property and the properties to which
they sought to compare it affected the properties’ relevant market
values-in-use). The Petitioners failed to explain how their purported
comparable properties were the same as the subject property or how they
differed. The Petitioners merely relied on the fact that the sales of their
purportedly comparable properties averaged out to be less than the assessed
value of the subject property. The sales comparison evidence presented by the
Petitioners lacked the type of analysis contemplated by Long.
28. Another way to show market
value-in-use is through comparable assessments. See Ind. Code §
6-1.1-15-18. This statute, however, does not automatically make evidence of other
assessments probative. The party relying on those assessments must apply generally
accepted appraisal and assessment practices to show that the properties are comparable
to the property under appeal. Again, conclusory statements that a property is “similar”
or “comparable” to another property do not suffice. See Long, 821 N.E.2d
at 470. Instead, one must identify the characteristics of the property under
appeal and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of
the other properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, one must explain how any
differences affect the relative market values-in-use. Id.
29. Here, the Petitioners simply
offer purportedly comparable property sales and assessments with no related
analysis. Other than describing the view of Lake Freeman, the Petitioners failed
to go into detail about how the properties are similar to the subject property
or how they differ. The Petitioners’ evidence did little to quantitatively or
qualitatively show how the differences between the properties affected their
relative values. In fact, the Petitioners did not even offer a conclusion as to
the value of the subject property. They just argue it is over-assessed. Their
evidence is insufficient to prove that the current assessments are wrong.
30. The Petitioners also argue
that the appraisal obtained by the Assessor erred by using comparables all
located along Lake Freeman, and it failed to adequately account for this fact.
But it is well within an appraiser’s expertise to choose the sales he or she
deems most comparable to the subject property and apply adjustments to account
for any differences. Without probative evidence to the contrary, the
appraiser’s comparables and the lack of adjustments appear to be reasonable.
31. The Petitioners claim that
the view from the subject property is hindered by bushes and the use is
hindered by being located on the canal instead of on Lake Freeman. Even assuming
these facts are true, the Petitioners were required to do more than simply conclude
that the value of the property suffers as a result. To make a case, they were required
to offer probative evidence of a more accurate value. See Talesnick v. State
Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 756 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001). The
Petitioners failed to offer such proof. Consequently, they failed to make a
case for reducing the assessments.
32. In this appeal, the only probative
evidence regarding the market value-in-use was offered by the Respondent. This
evidence indicates that the values were even higher than they were assessed.
The Board, however, declines to raise the assessments because the Respondent
did not request any increase and because the Respondent stated that the 2012 assessments
were not in error.
