c) As set forth above, the Petitioner’s exhibits were
excluded due to Mr. Hiles’ failure to comply with 52 IAC 3-1-5(d). In lacking
documentary evidence to support his claim that the subject properties
assessments are wrong, Mr. Hiles’ contentions amount to little more than
conclusory statements. And conclusory statements do not constitute probative
evidence. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113,
1120 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). Thus, the Petitioner failed to make a prima facie
case that the subject properties assessments should be lowered.
d) The result would have been no different even if the Board
had considered the Petitioner’s evidence. The photographs of the property Mr.
Hiles offered show that the house is in very poor condition. Just showing a
property is in poor or in unlivable condition is not enough to establish that
the subject assessments are in error. Mr. Hiles needed to offer probative
evidence that establishes the effect of that deferred maintenance on the
subject property’s market value-in-use as of the assessment date. Without more,
Mr. Hiles’ photographs and testimony are not enough to make a prima facie case
for changing the subject properties assessments.
e) Mr. Hiles did attempt to offer some sales comparison
evidence. Specifically, he offered opinions of three realtors, two of whom
offered written opinions of value. The two written opinions were based on
purportedly comparable sales. The third realtor merely provided MLS listings
for purportedly comparable properties.
f) To effectively use any kind of
comparison approach to value a property, however, one must establish that the
properties are truly comparable. Conclusory statements that properties are
“similar” or “comparable” are not sufficient. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. The
Petitioner is “responsible for explaining to the Indiana Board the
characteristics of their own property, how those characteristics compared to
those of the purportedly comparable properties, and how any differences
affected the relevant market value-in-use of the properties.” Id. at 471.
g) The realtors and Mr. Hiles
failed to offer the type of evidence contemplated by Long. Only a small amount
of information was provided regarding the purportedly comparable properties,
and none of the realtors provided any adjustments for differences between the
listed or sold properties and the subject properties.
h) Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that the
realtors’ letters of opinion were prepared in accordance with USPAP or followed
generally accepted appraisal principles. Additionally, both of the realtor’s
opinion letters are dated November 21, 2013, and neither realtor offered an
explanation to relate their opinions of value to the March 1, 2012, valuation
date. See Whitley Products, Inc., 704 N.E.2d at 1113, 1119 (explaining that
unsupported conclusory statements are not probative evidence). Accordingly, even
if the exhibits presented by the Petitioner had been admitted into the record,
they do not constitute probative evidence of what the 2012 assessments should
be.
i) Thus, even had the Petitioner’s exhibits been admitted,
the Petitioner still failed to make a prima facie case that the 2012
assessments were incorrect.
j) Where the Petitioner has not
supported their claim with probative evidence, the Respondent’s duty to support
the assessment with substantial evidence is not triggered. Lacy Diversified
Indus. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215, 1221-1222 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2003).
