The Library admits that no notice was provided to the public
pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-17-3 with respect to the Town Council’s
September 13th meeting. (See Pet’r Br. at 4.) On appeal, however, the Library
presents the Court with two arguments to support its claim that the DLGF
erroneously determined that such notice was required.
I.
The Library first argues that the DLGF
erroneously determined that notice of the Town Council’s September 13th meeting
was required because under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-17-20(e), the Town Council did
not adopt the Library’s budget, it merely reviewed it. (See Pet’r Br. at 14
(asserting that the Library adopted its own budget on August 17th), 15
(implying that the Town Council is not an adopting entity because it does not
have the authority to increase the Library’s budget); Pet’r Reply Br. at 2
(asserting that the Town Council becomes an adopting entity only if it modifies
the Library’s originally adopted budget).) To support its argument, the Library
points to the fact that before it submitted its budget to the Town Council, it
filed its budget with the Speedway Town Clerk pursuant to Indiana Code §
36-3-6-9(b). (See Pet’r Br. at 3, 14-15; Pet’r Reply Br. at 1-2.) That
statutory provision states that “[t]he board of each entity listed in subsection
(a) shall, after adoption of its proposed budget and tax levies, submit along
with detailed accounts, to the city clerk before the first day of September of
each year.” I.C. § 36-3-6-9(b) (emphasis added). The Library maintains that if
some other entity actually adopted its budget, there would have been no reason
for the legislature to use the words “after adoption”’ in Indiana Code §
36-3-6-9(b). (See Pet’r Br. at 15; Pet’r Reply Br. at 2.) The Library’s
argument fails for three interrelated reasons.
First, to the extent
the Library filed its budget with the Speedway Town Clerk pursuant to Indiana
Code § 36-3-6-9(b), that statutory provision did not apply. As previously
stated, Indiana Code § 36-3-6-9(b) provided that “[t]he board of each entity listed
in subsection (a) shall, after adoption of its proposed budget and tax levies, submit
them, along with detailed accounts, to the city clerk before the first day of September
of each year.” I.C. 36-3-6-9(b) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) must therefore
be read in relation to subsection (a). See State v. Adams, 583 N.E.2d 799, 800
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that a statute must be read as a whole, and
not sections or parts of it piecemeal), trans. denied. Indiana Code §
36-3-6-9(a), in relevant part, states:
Except as provided in subsection (d), the city-county
legislative body shall review the proposed operating and maintenance budgets
and tax levies and adopt final operating and maintenance budgets and tax levies
for each of the following entities in the county:
(1) An airport authority operating under IC 8-22-3.
(2) A public library operating under IC 36-12.
(3) A capital improvement board of managers operating under 36-10.
(4) A public transportation corporation operating under IC
36-9-4.
(5) A health and hospital corporation established under IC
16-22-8.
(6) Any other taxing unit (as defined in IC 6-1.1-1-21) that
is located in the county and has a governing body that is not comprised of a
majority of officials who are elected to serve on the governing body.
I.C. § 36-3-6-9(a) (emphasis added). See also I.C. §
36-3-6-9(d) (explaining that because the Library is outside Unigov’s
jurisdiction, it would not submit its proposed budget to the city-county
legislative body referenced in subsection (a).) Given this language, it is
clear that Indiana Code § 36-3-6-9(b) did not apply to the Library; instead, it
applied to the public library that has its budget and tax rates approved by the
City-County Council of Indianapolis and Marion County (i.e., the
Indianapolis-Marion County Public Library). See supra at p. 3.
Second, Indiana Code
§ 6-1.1-17-20(e) unambiguously instructed the Town Council to review the
Library’s proposed budget and adopt a final budget, not review or adopt. See
I.C. § 6-1.1-17-20(e). Thus, while the Town Council may have simply approved or
accepted the Library’s budget and tax levy “as submitted,” that act constituted
more than just a “review” of the Library’s budget. It constituted the Town Council’s
adoption of a final budget for the Library. See, e.g., Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue
v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ind. 1994) (explaining that the plain and
obvious meaning of an unambiguous statute may not be enlarged or restricted). See
also WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 29 (2002 ed.) (defining “adopt” as
“to accept formally”; “to take over . . . esp. with little or no change in
form”; “to endorse and assume official responsibility for”).
The final reason the
Library’s argument fails is because when the Town Council received the
Library’s proposed budget and tax rates, it was required to conduct a hearing
thereon. See I.C. § 6-1.1-17-20(c) (indicating that the Library was required to
submit its proposed budget and tax levies to the Town Council at least 30 days
before it held a budget approval hearing thereon). In turn, notice of that
hearing was statutorily required. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-17-3(a) (2010).
II.
Alternatively, the Library argues that no notice of the Town
Council’s September 13th meeting should be required because the Library had
already complied with and satisfied the notice requirements. More specifically,
the Library explains that:
The whole purpose of the publication process is to give
citizens notice of what is going on in their communities, let them know when and
where they can then go an[d] be heard in their opinions. These goals were met
by the publications [on] July 14 and 21, 2010. The citizens of the taxing unit
were advised of the date, time, place and purpose of the public budget hearing
being held on August 4, and August 17, 2010 to consider the [Library’s] budget.
. . . So if the concern is that the public did not have an opportunity to
comment on and/or object to the budget, tax rates and levies[,] that concern is
alleviated.
(Pet’r Br. at 15-16.) Moreover, the Library explains that
the Town Council’s September 13th meeting was a regularly scheduled meeting
with a posted agenda. (Pet’r Br. at 15.) This argument, however, is no more
availing than the Library’s first one. As just explained, the Town Council was
required to provide the public with notice of its September 13th meeting. Thus,
the fact that the Library provided notice of its August 4th hearing and its
August 17th meeting misses the point. See Town of Beverly Shores Plan Comm’n v.
Enright, 463 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Ind. 1984) (explaining that notice statutes “are
generally strictly construed and notice in accordance with their provisions
held to be mandatory”). See also generally IND. CODE § 6-1.1-17 (demonstrating
that because taxpayers have multiple opportunities to object and be heard on a
political subdivision’s proposed budget, notice will also occur on multiple occasions).
Furthermore, the record evidence does not show that notice was provided for the
Town Council’s September 13th adoption meeting nor does it show that the agenda
for that meeting was posted. (See generally Cert. Admin. R.)
