The Petitioners failed to make a prima facie case for
reducing the subject property’s 2011 assessment.
…
c) Because the Respondent objected to the appraisal, a final
determination cannot rest entirely on it. In other words, even though the
appraisal appears to support a significantly lower value for the subject
property, the Board cannot change the assessment unless other evidence that is
not hearsay also would support such a change. The non-hearsay evidence in the
record includes the Petitioners’ comparable analysis. This evidence, however,
does not prove that the current assessment is wrong nor does it support a
specific lower value.
d) The Petitioners attempted to support their position by
comparing the subject property’s assessment to the assessments of purportedly
comparable properties. Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-18 allows parties to introduce
assessments of comparable properties to prove the market value-in-use of a
property under appeal. But where an appeal involves a residential property,
those comparable properties must be located in the same taxing district or
within two miles of the taxing district’s boundary. Ind. Code §
6-1.1-15-18(c)(1). Here, all of the comparable properties presented by the Petitioners
are within the same taxing district as the subject property.
e) Even if one assumes that the comparable properties meet
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18’s taxing-district requirements, other properties’
assessments do not necessarily prove the market value-in-use of a property
under appeal. The party relying on those assessments must show that the other
properties are comparable to the property under appeal and how relevant
differences affect their relative values. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18(c)(2)
(requiring the use of generally accepted appraisal and assessment practices to
determine whether properties are comparable); see also Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471
(finding sales data lacked probative value where they did not explain how purportedly
comparable properties compared to their property or how relevant differences affected
the properties’ relative market values-in-use).
f) Granted, the Petitioners chose properties in the same
taxing district, but the comparison of the properties ended there. They did not
explain how any relevant differences between the properties affected their
relative values. Perhaps most importantly, the Petitioners explained that all
of the comparable properties were much larger than the subject property, and
this alone would affect value.
g) The Petitioners presented sales information for their
comparable properties as well in an attempt to show that the subject property
was over-assessed. In making this argument the Petitioners essentially rely on
a sales comparison approach to establish the market value-in-use of the
property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the sales comparison approach
“estimates the total value of the property directly by comparing it to similar,
or comparable, properties that have sold in the market.”) In order to effectively
use the sales comparison approach as evidence in a property assessment appeal,
however, the proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being
examined. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to
another property do not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of
the properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the proponent must identify
the characteristics of the subject property and explain how those
characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable
properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the proponent must explain how any
differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use.
Id. The Petitioners did not do this. No adjustments were made on the
properties. Further, the majority of the sales were from 2008 and the
Petitioners failed to show how they related to the relevant valuation date.
h) To further elaborate on the Petitioners’ appraisal, even
had the appraisal not been objected to, there were still multiple flaws. The
appraisal had an effective date of January 1, 2010, with no explanation of how
it would relate to the subject property’s valuation date. Further, the sales
used in the appraisal were from 2009. Again, nothing in the appraisal related
these sales to the relevant valuation date. Therefore, the appraisal would not
be sufficient evidence on its own even without the hearsay objection. The
hearsay objection was properly made and served an important purpose here. The
Petitioners were allowed the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Fisher on his
training and on the work he completed for his appraisal. The Respondent, however,
was not provided with the same opportunity to question Mr. Antonelli. The Respondent
most likely would have questioned Mr. Antonelli on the same items Mr. Fisher
was questioned on. Thus, it is important to have the appraiser present to answer
various questions and properly justify the completed appraisal.
i) The Petitioners failed to make a prima facie case that
the 2011 assessment is incorrect
