c. The Petitioner contended the
primary industrial land rate of $18,000 per acre determined by the PTABOA is
the same rate used for primary industrial land inside the city of Scottsburg
and is too high for the subject property because the subject parcel floods and
it is a swamp. But the Petitioner failed to prove what the market value-in-use
for the subject property should be. Stating the rate of $18,000 per acre is too
high is merely a conclusory statement. It is not probative evidence and does
not help prove the actual market value for the land.
d. According to the Petitioner,
local farmer Jackie Roll stopped farming the subject parcel in the 1970’s
because he failed to raise a profitable crop due to poor drainage. Even if that
is true, the Petitioner failed to explain how that fact relates to proving the market
value for March 1, 2011.
e. The Petitioner testified that
the higher elevation of the road and the Vienna Bridge deck caused water to
come up to the floor of the improvement. He also testified that the Zimmerman
property across the road and three comparable properties do not flood. The
frequency of the flooding was not stated. More importantly, the Petitioner did
not quantify the decrease in market value based on the flooding. Such evidence
does not help prove the assessment must be changed without evidence and
analysis to quantify the effect of the flooding on the market value-in-use of
the subject property.
f. Next, the Petitioner presented
evidence of three other sawmills and claimed their assessments should be similar
to the subject property. A party to an appeal proceeding may introduce evidence
of assessments of comparable properties located in the same taxing district or
within two miles of the boundary of the taxing district. The determination of
whether the properties are comparable shall be based on generally accepted
appraisal and assessment principles. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18.
g. In order to rely on this
evidence in an assessment appeal, a party must first show that the properties
being examined really are comparable to each other. Conclusory statements that
a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property are not probative
of actual comparability. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471. Instead, one must identify
the characteristics of the property under appeal and explain how those characteristics
compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Similarly,
one must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative
market values-in-use. Id.
h. In this case, the Petitioner
failed to offer a meaningful comparison of the purportedly comparable
properties to the subject property. In fact, other than stating the comparables
are saw mills, the Petitioner offered no other evidence comparing them to the
subject property. Further, the PTABOA changed the classification of the subject
property from agricultural land to undeveloped land due to Petitioner’s claim
there was no agricultural activity on the property. With this kind of evidence,
the Board will not conclude these are comparable properties because they were
classified as woodlands and the subject property was classified as industrial
and undeveloped.
i. The Petitioner claimed that
the assessment of the subject property should be reduced by classifying a
portion of the parcel as woodlands and applying the appropriate influence
factor of 80% based on the swamp. But his request fails to conform to the definition
of woodland.
j. Woodlands is a particular land
type used to assess agriculture land. 2011 Real Property Guidelines, Chapter
2, at 89-90:
Type 6—Woodland
Woodland is land supporting trees
capable of producing timber or other wood products. This land has 50% or more canopy
cover or is a permanently planted reforested area. This land use type includes
land accepted and certified by the Indiana Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) as forest plantation under guidelines established to minimize soil erosion.
An 80% influence factor deduction applies to woodland. A wooded parcel of land
less than 10 acres may be assessed using the agricultural soil productivity
method upon evidence of timber production or other agricultural use. In addition,
smaller than 10 acre parcels not contiguous with other wooded parcels under the
same ownership may qualify as ―agricultural. Of assistance to the assessor in
determining the classification is evidence of enrollment in programs which assign
a ―farm number‖ or programs designed to foster timber production management.
The determining factors are provided in Indiana Code section 6-1.1-4-13, the
Manual, and Guidelines. Of particular interest to the assessing official is the
reason for the purchase of the land. While not controlling in the assessing
official’s determination, the following factors may be of assistance: (1) the
acreage is designated by the DNR as qualifying for one of their classified
programs. The DNR has established a 10 acre minimum for its programs; and (2)
the owner can show an active timber management program in place which will
improve the marketability of the forest for an eventual harvest; and (3) the
owner possesses a DNR management plan to further enhance the forest quality; and
(4) the owner can show that regular forest harvests have occurred over a long
time period.
Here, the Petitioner did not establish
that there has been any agricultural activity on the subject property since the
1970’s. Also, he stated that the property does not qualify for a classified
forest and that he did not intend to harvest timber from the woods on the
parcel. The Petitioner failed to provide probative evidence that the subject
proper should be classified as woodland.
k. When taxpayers fail to provide
probative evidence supporting their position that an assessment should be
changed, the Respondent’s duty to support the assessment with substantial
evidence is not triggered. See Lacy Diversified Indus. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t
Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215, 1221-1222 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003); Whitley Products, 704
N.E.2d at 1119.
l. In this appeal, the Petitioner
failed to provide probative evidence of comparable properties for classifying a
portion of the land as woodland in order to support his position for a change
in the assessment. While the Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for
reducing the subject property’s assessment, the Assessor conceded that the
property was worth only $88,500 for 2011. The Board accepts the Assessor’s concession.
