c) First, the Board turns to the
Petitioners’ purchase of the subject property. The Petitioners testified that
they purchased the subject property for $37,000 in 2006. However, the
Petitioners purchased the property six years before the relevant valuation date
and they offered no evidence to relate their purchase price to the March 1,
2012, valuation date. Thus, the Petitioners’ purchase price has no probative
value. While the Petitioners’ $440-per-month rental income appears to be
timelier, they offered no evidence as to how that income converts to property
value. Thus, the Petitioners’ evidence regarding
the rental contract has no probative value as well.
d) The Petitioners did, however,
offer an appraisal. Specifically, an appraisal conducted by Mr. Reith, a
certified appraiser, performed in accordance with USPAP. Mr. Reith estimated
the subject property’s value at $25,000 as of December 31, 2011. An appraisal
performed in conformance with generally recognized appraisal principles is often
enough to establish a prima facie case that a property’s assessment is
overvalued. See Meridian Towers, 805 N.E.2d at 479. Further, the
appraisal’s effective date is only two months removed from the assessment’s
valuation date. Thus, the Board finds that the Petitioners raised a prima facie
case for reducing the assessment to $25,000.
e) Once the Petitioner
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the assessing official to
rebut the Petitioner’s evidence. See American United Life Ins. Co. v. Maley,
803 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004). The assessing official must offer evidence
that impeaches or rebuts the Petitioner’s evidence. Id.; Meridian Towers, 805
N.E.2d at 479.
f) The Respondent first attempted
to impeach the Petitioners’ appraisal. Specifically, she claimed that the
appraiser chose invalid sales in his sales-comparison analysis. However, the
Respondent failed to offer any actual evidence that the appraiser was biased or
that the appraisal was flawed. It is well within an appraiser’s expertise to choose
sales he deems most comparable to the property under appeal and apply adjustments
to those comparable properties to value the differences between them. Absent
evidence to the contrary, the comparable properties the appraiser chose, or the
adjustments he made in a USPAP-compliant appraisal will be deemed reasonable. Conclusory
statements that the appraiser used invalid sales are not sufficient to rebut the
Petitioners’ case here. See Hometowne Associates, L.P. v. Maley, 839
N.E.2d 269, 278 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005) (“In none of these exchanges, however, did
Mr. McHenry offer evidence rebutting the validity of Mr. Russel’s calculations.
Rather, he merely made conclusory statements”). The Respondent, therefore,
failed to rebut or impeach the Petitioners’ evidence that their property was
over-valued for the 2012 assessment year.
g) The Respondent also tried to
rebut the appraisal offered by the Petitioners by offering a competing
sales-comparison analysis. The Respondent argued hers was superior to the
Petitioners mainly because they were properties that sold in valid “arms-length
transactions.” However, the Respondent failed to make a meaningful comparison
of the properties. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or
“comparable” to another property do not constitute probative evidence of the
comparability of the properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the
proponent must identify the characteristics of the subject property and explain
how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly
comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the proponent must explain
how any differences between the properties affect their relative market
values-in-use. Id. Aside from stating that her comparable properties were
valid “arms-length transactions,” the only other comment the Respondent made when
comparing the properties to the subject property was that the comparables were located
in Mentone, like the subject property. This is not a meaningful comparison.
h) The Respondent did make a few
adjustments to the sale prices on her comparable properties to take into
account for differences. But those adjustments were not explained. While the
appearance of her analysis may not differ significantly from those made by a
certified appraiser in an appraisal report, the appraiser’s assertions are
backed by his education, training, and experience. The appraiser also typically
certifies that he complied with USPAP. Thus, the Board, as the trier-of-fact,
can infer that the appraiser used objective data, where available, to quantify
his adjustments. And where objective data was not available, the Board can
infer that the appraiser relied on his education, training and experience to
estimate a reliable quantification. There is no evidence that the Respondent is
a licensed appraiser in Indiana. Moreover, she did not certify that her
analysis complied with USPAP. The Board therefore finds that the Respondent’s
sales-comparable analysis is insufficiently reliable to be probative of the
property’s market value-in-use.
i) The Respondent did not support
the assessment with substantial evidence.
j) In the alternative, the Board
finds the credability of the appraisal offered by the Petitioners to outweigh
the Respondent’s evidence of value.
