c) In this case, the Petitioners offered evidence of their
purchase price, and two appraisal reports prepared by certified appraisers in
accordance with USPAP. The Petitioners purchased the property for $700,000 in
June 2011. Regarding the appraisals presented by the Petitioners, the first
appraisal indicates the value should be $715,000 as of June 3, 2011. The second
indicates a value of $750,000 as of August 3, 2012. According to the
Petitioners, the difference in values stems from the fact that significant
repairs were made to the property between the issuance of the two appraisals.
The record is silent as to exactly when those repairs began, and when they were
completed. Because the Petitioners requested a 2012 assessment of $750,000, the
Board will assume that all of the repairs were completed before March 1, 2012, and
that the entire increase in value resulting from those repairs had been
realized at that point.
d) That being the case, the first appraisal, completed by
Susan M. Dumford, lacks probative value, because it does not value the property
as it existed on March 1, 2012. Similarly, the Petitioners’ purchase price also
lacks probative value. However, the appraisal completed by Robert H. Dorsam is
probative evidence. Mr. Dorsam valued the property as it evidently existed on
March 1, 2012. And while the valuation date of his appraisal is not exactly
precise to the assessment date, it is sufficiently close to give a strong
indication of the property’s value as of March 1, 2012. Thus, through the
Dorsam appraisal, the Petitioners made a prima facie case that the assessment should
be reduced to $750,000.
e) Once the Petitioners establish a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the assessing official to rebut the Petitioner’s evidence. See
American United Life Insurance Co. v. Maley, 803 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2004). To rebut or impeach the Petitioner’s case, the Respondent has the same
burden to present probative evidence that the Petitioner faced to raise its
prima facie case. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan v. Jennings County Ass’r,
836 N.E.2d 1075, 1082 (Ind. Tax Court 2005).
f) The Board first turns to the Respondent’s efforts to
impeach the Petitioners’ appraisals. Because only the Dorsam appraisal was
found to be probative, the Board will focus on only those arguments. The
Respondent argued the purported comparable at 969 East Northshore Drive that
sold in May of 2012, is after the assessment date for this appeal. She argued
the sale of the property at 1177 East Northshore Drive is the result of a
divorce. Moreover, she argued that the effective date of the entire appraisal
is after the relevant timeframe for 2012 assessments.
g) First, regarding the date of the comparable sale, the
Respondent failed to point to any authority restricting certified fee
appraisers to the same date requirements for comparable sales that assessors
must follow. As an expert in the field, a certified appraiser has the knowledge
and experience to select comparable properties that he deems reasonable to
prove the market value of a subject property as of a specified date. Although
the appraisal date is a few months after the relevant valuation date that point
is not significant. The Respondent offered no substantive evidence to contradict
the Board’s finding that the value indicated in the appraisal is a reasonable estimate
of the property’s value on March 1, 2012.
h) While it is possible that a divorce could have influenced
the sale price, the Respondent offered no evidence that it actually did, or,
more importantly, what a more accurate valuation would have been. Further, the
fact that there may be a question regarding one of the sales in the
sales-comparison approach does not render the entire appraisal unreliable.
i) The Respondent argued that before the Petitioners
purchased the subject property, it was listed for sale for as much as $1.2
million. But the Respondent failed to explain why the listing price should
carry more weight than the ultimate selling price in determining the property’s
market value-in-use. In any event, neither the listing price nor the selling
price is probative here because, as explained above, extensive repairs were
made to the property between the purchase and March 1, 2012. Thus, this argument
does not rebut the evidence presented by the Petitioners.
j) Finally, the Respondent pointed to four sales to support
the current assessment. The Board assumes that the Respondent offered these
sales because she thought the properties are comparable to the subject. The
properties she offered sold for $350,000-$505,000. The subject property’s
current assessment is $881,600. The Respondent offered no adjustments to
qualify or quantify the differences. Consequently, this evidence does nothing
to rebut the Petitioners’ case or support the current assessment.
k) For the reasons set forth, the Petitioners made a prima
facie case that the 2012 assessment should be reduced to $750,000. The
Respondent failed to impeach or rebut the Petitioners’ case.
