c) The Respondent first argued that the assessment increase
was due to a change in the quality grade of the improvements and a change in
the amount of finished attic space. In other words, she claimed that in
determining the property’s assessment, the Guidelines were more correctly
applied than in the previous year. But while these changes would certainly
result in an assessment increase, that explanation does nothing to prove the
property’s market value-in-use on March 1, 2012. Further, arguments merely
about how the Guidelines were applied are not sufficient to make a case.
O’Donnell, 854 N.E.2d at 95; Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Ass’r, 841 N.E.2d 764, 768
(Ind. Tax Ct. 2006).
d) The Respondent also argued that the assessment is correct
because it complies with mass appraisal and annual trending requirements.
However, regarding the Respondent’s claim that an assessment is acceptable if
it is within 10% of the property’s market value-in-use, it appears that she may
have confused that with the requirements of a mass-appraisal ratio study. An
appeal of an individual assessment is an entirely different matter. Further,
the Respondent failed to provide any authority for her contention that an
individual assessment is correct if it falls within a 10% range.
e) In any case, the Respondent’s evidence does little to
prove the value of the subject property. Regarding her offering of a
purportedly comparable sale, the Respondent recognizes that one can estimate
the value of a subject property by analyzing the sales of comparable
properties. A party offering such evidence must show that the properties are
generally comparable to each other, and also must show how any relevant
differences affect the relative values. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470-71 (holding
that, in applying the sales-comparison approach, the taxpayers needed to explain
how any differences between their property and the properties to which they sought
to compare it affected the relevant market values-in-use). Here, the Respondent
failed to provide meaningful evidence to indicate how the subject property was
comparable to her purported comparable property. Moreover, she offered nothing
to explain or account for any differences between the two properties, and how
those differences affected the respective values. Her evidence lacked the type
of analysis contemplated by Long.
f) The argument relating to neighboring assessments
similarly lacks probative value. True, a party may introduce evidence of assessments
of comparable properties located in the same taxing district or within two
miles of the boundary of the taxing district. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18. But
just as with the sales-comparison approach, the determination of whether the
properties are comparable must be based on generally accepted appraisal and
assessment principles. Once again, the Respondent failed to offer a meaningful
comparison of the parcels in terms of characteristics that would affect their
respective market values-in-use.
g) Because the Respondent did not offer probative evidence
to support the assessment, she failed to meet her burden of proof. The 2012
assessment is reduced to the 2011 total assessed value, which was $164,300. The
Petitioner, though, sought an even lower assessment. The Board now turns to the
Petitioner’s evidence.
22. The Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for
reducing the assessment below the 2011 value.
a) The Petitioner failed to offer any market-based valuation
evidence of his own. His request appears to be based on the current land
assessed value, and the March 1, 2008, improvement assessed value. See Resp’t
Ex. 3. Those values do not constitute probative evidence of the market
value-in-use on March 1, 2012.
b) The Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for
lowering the 2012 assessment below the 2011 assessed value.
