Both
parties agreed the Respondent has the burden to prove the assessment is correct
because the disputed 2011 assessment increased by more than 5%.
…
An
appeal can be initiated within 45 days after the Notice of Assessment (Form
11). Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-1(c). In this case the Form 11 was dated December 9,
2011. This notice informed the taxpayers their deadline was January 23, 2012.
It even informed the Petitioners they would not be able to file an appeal based
on their tax bill. The Petitioners filed a Notice to Initiate an Appeal (Form
130) on January 13, 2012. Some copies of the Form 130 show a second date stamp,
June 22, 2012. This later date is clearly not when the appeal process was
initiated because the PTABOA determination is dated May 10, 2012. Neither party
explained the later date stamp. Furthermore, in this case the time for
initiating the appeal process has nothing to do with the tax bills that were
mailed on April 6, 2012. The Respondent’s specious argument on this point simply
disregards the express deadline stated on the Form 11 and the earlier file mark
on the Form 130. The Form 130 clearly was filed within the time allowed.
Appeal
petitions to the Board can be filed not later than 45 days after the Form 115
is mailed. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-3(d). The PTABOA’s Form 115 is dated May 10,
2012. The Board did not receive the Petitioners’ Form 131 until June 26, 2012.
The envelope in which it was mailed, however, is postmarked June 22, 2012. The
postmark date on an appeal sent by first class United States mail is considered
prima facie evidence of the date of filing. 52 IAC 2-3-1(c). May 10 to June 22
is less than 45 days. Therefore, the Petitioners’ Form 131 was filed within the
time allowed.
…
A
substantial amount of the Respondent’s case related to how the mass appraisal
system and annual trending is supposed to work, as well as how the Respondent
met those responsibilities. The Respondent implied that the subject assessment
draws validity from the fact that the disputed assessment is within an
acceptable range for mass appraisals. An appeal of an individual assessment,
however, is an entirely different thing. The Respondent provided no authority
or substantial explanation for the conclusion that there is an acceptable range
for establishing the value of property for the purposes of this appeal.
Accordingly, this argument is of no probative value when determining whether
the current assessment is correct.
According
to the Respondent, the disputed assessment was computed using the cost
approach. The assessor, however, offered no details about how it was applied.
The back of the property record card, which presumably showed the calculations
used in the cost approach, was not entered into the record. The Respondent
merely offered conclusory statements that the cost tables are “good and
accurate” as support for her assessed value. This sort of evidence, however,
does not prove that the assessed value actually is a correct market
value-in-use for the subject property. See Whitley Products, Inc. v. State
Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998).
The
Respondent correctly pointed out that the gross rent multiplier is the
preferred method for valuing rental properties with fewer than four units. Ind.
Code § 6-1.1-4-39(b). But the Respondent presented no GRM calculation in
support of the assessment. Instead, she testified that using a GRM of 72
results in a property value of $43,200 and a GRM of 65 produces a value of
$39,000. The Respondent, however, offered no explanation as to how a value of
either $43,200 or $39,000 supports the current assessment of $30,900. The range
of GRM numbers (from 72 down to 20) used in the Respondent’s examples were not
explained or substantiated in any way. Furthermore, the Respondent acknowledged
she did not know the rental income for the subject property. She used an
assumed income of $600 per month, based on income received by other rental
properties. The Respondent did not identify these other properties or show how
they are comparable to the Petitioners’ property. Merely offering conclusory
statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property
does not constitute probative evidence. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. The
Respondent was “responsible for explaining to the Indiana Board the
characteristics of [the] property, how those characteristics compared to those
of the purportedly comparable properties, and how any differences affected the
relevant market value-in-use of the properties.” Id. at 471. In this
appeal, the Respondent failed to offer any meaningful comparison between the
subject property and those that were the basis for the assumption about monthly
income. Where the other properties are not specifically identified and no
meaningful comparison is even attempted, this kind of evidence has no probative
value. Id. Therefore, the Respondent’s speculative testimony about
various values purportedly based on GRM methodology has no probative value.
