Excerpts of the Board's Determination follow:
The Petitioner claimed that his
land value was assessed too high in 2010 and 2012 compared to other parcels in
his area. In support of his contentions, the Petitioner submitted assessment
data for seven nearby properties each in 2010 and 2012. For 2010, the
Petitioner erroneously calculated that the comparable land was assessed at an
average rate of $5.97 per square foot (or $6.96 per square foot as explained in
footnote 2), whereas the Petitioner’s land was assessed at $18.37 per square
foot. Using a similar calculation for 2012, the Petitioner concluded the
average assessed land value for the comparables was $8.52 per square foot while
the Petitioner’s land was assessed at $18.37 per square foot.
31. Indiana Code section
6-1.1-15-18(c) states: “To accurately determine market-value-in-use, a taxpayer
. . . may in a proceeding concerning property that is not residential property,
introduce evidence of the assessments of any relevant, comparable property.” The
statute further states that preference is given to properties in the same
taxing district or within two miles of a boundary of the taxing district and
that “the determination of whether properties are comparable shall be made
using generally accepted appraisal and assessment practices.” Id.
32. Here, the Petitioner failed
to establish the comparability of the selected parcels. The only comparable
qualities the Petitioner offered were the fact that the subject property and
the comparables were located near each other, and the fact that the subject
property and the comparables were similarly zoned as commercial general or
commercial arterial. Pet’r. Ex. 4-5. However, the subject property is a
convenience market with gas stations and the comparable properties include the
following: two commercial structures (comparables 1, 6), a fast food restaurant
(comparable 2), a commercial warehouse (comparable 3), a full-service bank
(comparable 4), a vacant lot (comparable 5), and a 40 unit apartment building
(comparable 7). Pet’r Ex. 5. And the size of the lots range from .155
acres to 1.33 acres. Pet’r Ex. 5. The Petitioner is “responsible for
explaining to the Indiana Board the characteristics of their own property, how
those characteristics compared to those of the purportedly comparable
properties, and how any differences affected the relevant market value-in-use
of the properties.” Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471. Despite presenting such a
variety of comparables, the Petitioner failed to address any of the considerable
differences between the subject property and the comparables.
33. The
Petitioner also argued that the subject property should not have had an
influence factor applied to the land. The
Board notes that the Petitioner failed to provide any market evidence of what the value
should be. Instead, he merely alleged that the county assessor should remove
the 100% positive influence factor applied to the Petitioner’s land. He
provided no support, other than his opinion, for this assertion. Unsubstantiated
conclusions do not constitute probative evidence. Whitley Products, Inc. v.
State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998).
34. For 2010, the Petitioner
failed to show that the assessment was not a reasonable measure of true tax value.
See 50 IAC 2.3-1-1(d)4 (stating that “failure to comply with the … Guidelines
… does not in itself show that the assessment is not a reasonable measure of ‘True
Tax Value[.]”). The Petitioner presented no market evidence to show that the assessment
is not a reasonable measure of the true tax value. See Eckerling v. Wayne Township
Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (stating that when a taxpayer chooses
to challenge an assessment, he must show that the assessor's assessed value
does not accurately reflect the property's market value-in-use. Strict
application of the regulations is not enough to rebut the presumption that the
assessment is correct). The Petitioner must show through the use of
market-based evidence that the assessed value does not accurately reflect the
property’s market value-in-use. Here, the Petitioner did not. Therefore, the
Petitioner has failed to raise a prima facie case. See Eckerling, (stating
that focusing strictly on the assessor’s methodology without showing that the methodology
used failed to accurately reflect the property's market value-in-use is insufficient
to show that the assessment was in error).
35. The Petitioner similarly
failed to show that the assessment was not a reasonable measure of true tax
value for 2012. The 2011 Manual states:
Any evidence relevant to the true
tax value of the property as of the assessment date may be presented to rebut
the presumption of correctness of the assessment. Such evidence may include an
appraisal prepared in accordance with generally recognized appraisal standards;
however, there is no requirement that an appraisal be presented either to
support or to rebut an assessment. Instead, the validity of the assessment
shall be evaluated on the basis of all relevant evidence presented. Whether an assessment
is correct shall be determined on the basis of whether, in light of the
relevant evidence, it reflects the property's true tax value.
2011 REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT MANUAL
at 3.
36. Again, the only evidence for
2012 the Petitioner introduced was a list of comparable properties that were
located near the subject property and zoned similar to the subject property.
None of the Petitioner’s comparables were convenience markets in the same neighborhood
as the subject property.
37. Finally, the Petitioner
contended that properties with similar potential zoning uses should be assessed
similarly. The Petitioner presented no authority in support of this argument. Indiana’s
assessment scheme is based on a property’s market value-in-use, not some hypothetical
use that zoning regulations might permit. 50 IAC 2.3-1-1; 50 IAC 2.4-1-1. The
Petitioner’s conclusory assertions are insufficient evidence of the market
value-in-use of the property. Whitley, 704 N.E.2d at 1119.
38. The Petitioner failed to make
a prima facie case that the land was over-valued for 2010 or 2012.
39. When a taxpayer fails to
provide probative evidence supporting the position that an assessment should be
changed, the Respondent’s duty to support the assessment with substantial
evidence is not triggered. See Lacy Diversified Indus. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t
Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215, 1221-1222 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003); Whitley, 704
N.E.2d at 1119.
http://www.in.gov/ibtr/files/Fleetwood_53-005-10-1-4-00027_etc.pdf
