The best that can be ascertained is that the Petitioner in this appeal is the owner of a campground where renters of plats therein have parked what is defined by law as a recreational camper or trailer, (hereafter "camper"). Although there has been no evidence that these items are truly campers as defined by statute as contrasted to a mobile home, both parties have treated these items as campers. Under normal circumstances a camper that is periodically hauled from one location to another and used as a recreational vehicle is treated as personal property under the law. See 50 IAC 4.2-15-2(i)(2), repealed Feb 26, 2011. Under this law the camper is required to be annually licensed and is assessed as personal property.
However, under certain circumstances, a camper may relinquish its personal property status and transition to real property. This was the case where an owner of a camper parked the same at a campground or vacation area and left it there for a period of time so that from all appearances, it became permanently affixed to the plat. See 50 IAC 4.2-15-2(i), repealed Feb 26, 2011. Under this circumstance, a camper assumed the same characteristics of a mobile home which had also been parked at a location for a period of time so that by all reasonable appearances it had become permanent.
From the facts gleaned from the evidence in this case, (and from the record in Pet. No. 12-013-06-1-5-00001) this is the scenario that exists in this appeal: campers have been situated on the Petitioner’s campground for a period of time so that they have assumed a permanent appearance. However, it is not the assessment of these campers that is at issue, but decks and sheds that have been constructed by the owners of the campers and affixed to the ground immediately adjacent to their campers. And further, it is not the true tax value of these fixtures, but who is the proper party to be assessed.
Although the Petitioner has loosely argued that these subject decks and sheds constitute personal property, (and therefore not subject to assessment to the owner of the underlying real property) he has never offered any cognizant, legal argument that would support such a result. Adding further confusion, there is some inference in the record that the Respondent-Assessor may have in the past treated and assessed these decks and sheds as personal property. In fact, the Respondent-Assessor presented evidence concerning the elimination of the Form 101 which dealt specifically with personal property. Resp't Ex. B. Contrary to both parties’ arguments, however, the General Assembly’s 2008 changes to Ind. Code § 6-1.1-1-11 that resulted in the elimination of the Individual Tangible Personal Property Assessment Return (“Form 101”) have no bearing on this case. The changes resulting in the elimination of the Form 101 were effective January 1, 2009, while the case at bar concerns a March 1, 2008, assessment.
Historically common law has always provided that structures that are affixed to the ground such as decks and sheds constitute real property. This has been recognized by a long list of Indiana cases holding the same. Merrell v. Garver, 54 Ind. App. 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 1913) and Harrington v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 525 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1988). There may be exceptions to this axiom, but the Petitioner has not apprised the Board of any exception that would remove these decks and sheds from this tenant. Further, as far back as 1989 the Department of Local Government Finance, (hereafter "DLGF") has recognized this as reflected in its Real Property Assessment Manual, wherein these items have been listed in the real property cost tables and treated as real property. Regardless of how the Respondent-Assessor may have treated and assessed these decks and sheds in the past, and irrespective of the Petitioner's claims otherwise, based upon the record before it the Board finds that these items comprise real property.
Turning to the real issue at hand - who is the proper party to be initially assessed - the Board understands Petitioner's lament. As noted above, the Petitioner alleges that in the past and under similar circumstances the Respondent-Assessor treated these items as personal property. Second, in the Board's previous decision it found that the assessment for that year should be directed to the owners of the campers. Last, Petitioner complains that he is being made to pay taxes on items that he never built, never claimed ownership to and has no interest in.
Nonetheless, the only objective of the Board in this case and in its prior determination is to discern who can legally be assessed. Under normal circumstances, the Board would turn to statutory provisions that address the specific scenario. Next, the Board would look to the DLGF, which is the agency responsible for promulgating and implementing rules and regulations that provide direction in the assessment field.
In its prior determination, the Board found it had not been presented with any statute, DLGF rule or regulation directly on point. The only argument from the Respondent-Assessor in the previous appeal came in the form of double hearsay testimony describing a letter authored by the previous county assessor, (not present as a witness) in which the previous county assessor related statements made by an employee of the DLGF, (also not present as a witness). The Board determined this evidence to be unreliable. There being a total void of legal authority, the Board drew analogy to 50 IAC 4.2-15-2(i)(1), which provided guidance as to how mobile homes and their decks, sheds and other appurtenances should be assessed. This rule instructed that decks and sheds constructed by the owners of the mobile homes should be assessed to their owners. Based upon this rule, the Board concluded that decks and sheds constructed by the owners of campers that had affixed their campers to a plat for a period of time so that they had taken on the appearance of a mobile home, should be assessed similarly, (to the owners of the campers).
The Board in its prior determination made it abundantly clear that had it been provided with any admissible, reliable evidence or argument to the contrary its decision would have been opposite: "The DLGF may, in fact, intend that the exterior features and yard structures owned by the owner of a camper … be assessed to the owner of the land on which they sit. . . . Had the Respondent pointed the Board to a regulation that addressed such improvements, the Board may have decided differently. Similarly, if the Assessor had provided a legal memorandum from the DLGF or some official guidance document, the Board would have given significant weight to the DLGF's interpretation of their rules." (Pet. No. 12-013-06-1-5-00001, at 8).
Again, it must be emphasized that the Board is not determining the true tax value of any property in this appeal. Instead, the Board is only being called upon to determine who should be initially assessed. It is the General Assembly, which has delegated regulatory authority to the DLGF which has overriding authority over this issue. Any credible indicator of DLGF intent is paramount. In this appeal, the Respondent-Assessor has provided the Board with some evidence and argument as to the DLGF's intent. Specifically, the Assessor offered evidence of two separate DLGF presentations. The first presentation was given by Field Representative Steve McKinney in February 2009, and the other presentation was given by Field Representative Joe Lukomski, Jr. in September 2009. Both presentations state that decks, sheds, and other structures built around year-round recreational vehicles located at campgrounds should be assessed "as real property to the owner of the land." As the Assessor's witness noted, these presentations appear on the DLGF's website at http://www.in.gov/dlgf/files/0901-McKinneyPresentation-PersonalProperty(FINAL).pdf and http://www.in.gov/dlgf/files/0909_-_Lukomski_Presentation_-_Special_Use_Property_Assessing_(FINAL).pdf. Although parts of this testimony may be hearsay, the Board can take notice of the information posted at the DLGF website. This unrefuted information is far more credible than what was offered by the Respondent-Assessor in the previous appeal. The Board, therefore, concludes that this is the DLGF's official position on the matter. Resp't Ex. C, D at 75.
Ind. Code §6-1.1-2-4(a) provides:
The owner of any real property on the assessment date of a year is liable for the taxes imposed for that year on the property, unless a person holding, possessing, controlling, or occupying any real property on the assessment date of a year is liable for the taxes imposed for that year on the property under a memorandum of lease or other contract with the owner that is recorded with the county recorder before January 1, 1998.
The DLGF has determined that decks, sheds, and other structures built around year-round recreational vehicles located at campgrounds should be assessed as real property to the owner of the campground. The Petitioner provided no evidence of any lease or contract entered into between himself and the owners of the campers that would have shifted responsibility for real property taxes. Therefore, the Petitioner in this case is subject to the assessment for March 1, 2008.
The previous Board decision referenced may be found here:
http://www.in.gov/ibtr/files/Martin_12-013-06-1-5-00001.pdf
