On its Form 132 petitions, Steelworkers claimed that the subject parcels were exempt under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-10-25 as a “Local Union 501-C5.” Form 132 petitions. But that statute, which exempts property owned by 12 specific organizations, does not mention labor unions. Instead, it provides the following:
(a) Subject to the limitations contained in subsection (b) of this section, tangible property is exempt from property taxation if it is owned by any of the following organizations:
(1) The Young Men's Christian Association.
(2) The Salvation Army, Inc.
(3) The Knights of Columbus.
(4) The Young Men's Hebrew Association.
(5) The Young Women's Christian Association.
(6) A chapter or post of Disabled American Veterans of World War I or II.
(7) A chapter or post of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
(8) A post of the American Legion.
(9) A post of the American War Veterans.
(10) A camp of United States Spanish War Veterans
(11) The Boy Scouts of America, one (1) or more of its incorporated local councils, or a bank or trust company in trust for the benefit of one (1) or more of its local councils.
(12) The Girl Scouts of the U.S.A., one or more of its incorporated local councils, or a bank or trust company in trust for the benefit of one (1) or more of its local councils.
(b) This exemption does not apply unless the property is exclusively used, and in the case of real property actually occupied, for the purposes and objectives of the organization.
I.C. § 6-1.1-10-25. Thus, Steelworkers is not entitled to an exemption for its property under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-10-25.
At the Board’s hearing, however, Steelworkers claimed that it was entitled to an exemption because it used the subject parcels for educational and charitable purposes. While Steelworkers did not cite to any statute to support its claims, the legislature has provided an exemption for buildings and the land on which those buildings sit if the buildings are owned, occupied, and predominantly used for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. See I.C. § 6-1.1-10-16(a) and (c); I.C. § 6-1.1-10-36.3.
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Turning to the facts in these appeals, Steelworkers offered little evidence to show that it used the subject parcels for charitable or educational purposes, much less that it predominantly used the parcels for those purposes. Steelworkers pointed to three facts: (1) that it is a non-profit entity that is exempt from federal income taxation under section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, (2) that it holds the parcels open for use by members of the community, and (3) that it provides training in accounting and other subjects that its members and officers operate the union and effectively represent its membership.
First, the mere fact that Steelworkers is a non-profit entity that it is exempt from income tax under the Internal Revenue Code does not automatically mean that Steelworkers owned, operated, and used the subject parcels for charitable purposes within the meaning of Ind. Code § 6-1,1-10-16(a). Instead, the question is whether Steelworkers used the subject parcels to relieve human want through activities different from the everyday purposes and activities of man in general. See Nat’l Ass’n of Miniature Enthusiasts (“Name”) v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 671 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1996) (finding that entity that was exempt from federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code did not relieve human want by operating a museum to enhance the public’s knowledge of miniatures).
Steelworkers apparently believes that union activities by themselves inherently qualify as charitable. The Indiana Tax Court, however, rejected a similar notion in 6787 Steelworkers Hall, Inc. v. John R. Scott, Assessor of Porter County, 933 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010). In that case, the Tax Court upheld the Board’s determination that a union’s banquet hall did not qualify for an exemption. Among other things, the Union claimed that, “by definition, the purposes for which unions are formed and operated are charitable.” 6787 Steelworkers Hall, Inc. v. John R. Scott, Assessor of Porter County, 933 N.E.2d 591, 596 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010). But as the Tax Court explained, the union did not cite to any authority for the proposition that unions are inherently charitable. Id.
Thus, Steelworkers needed to do more than simply claim that it conducted union activities at the subject parcels; it instead needed to show the specific activities that it conducted, how those activities differed from the ordinary purposes and activities of man in general and relieved human want, and that any charitable activities predominated over non-charitable activities. Mr. King’s general testimony about Steelworkers training its members how to conduct union activities, such as handling grievances, negotiating contracts, and running the union’s finances, does not meet that hurdle.
Similarly, the fact that Steelworkers might have been open to the possibility of community groups using one or both of the parcels does not suffice to show a predominant charitable use. There is no evidence that of any of those groups actually used the subject parcels during the years in question, or ever for that matter. Indeed, when asked to list charitable groups that used the parcels, Mr. Bricker testified “Right now we don’t have anybody actually coming and using the hall, but we can make it available for them.” Bricker testimony.
Nor did Mr. King’s testimony about the training in accounting and other subjects that Steelworkers offered to is members show that the subject parcels were used predominantly for educational purposes. While Mr. King described some of the training as “theoretically … full-blown accounting,” and therefore at least arguably related to public-school offerings, the training was offered exclusively to union members. Thus, like the classes in Roller Skating Rink Operators’ Ass’n, Steelworkers’ training primarily served the private interests of its members and therefore did not meet the public benefits test. Indeed, Steelworkers’ claims are even less compelling than the trade association’s claims in Roller Skating Rink Operators, where the trade association provided significantly more detail comparing the substantive content of its classes to the content taught in tax-supported institutions. In any event, Steelworkers did not offer evidence to show, even roughly, what percentage of time the subject parcels were used to provide training compared to the percentage of time the parcels were used for other purposes. So even if the training qualified as an educational purpose, Steelworkers did not meet the predominant-use test. See I.C. § 6-1.1-10-36.3(a) (“For purposes of this section, property is predominantly used or occupied for one (1) or more stated purposes if it is used or occupied for one (1) or more of those purposes during more than fifty percent (50%) of the time that it is used or occupied in the year that ends on the assessment date of the property.”)
