The
assessment for 2009 was for the parcel with approximately nine acres. For 2010
the parcel contained only 4.95 acres. The difference of approximately 4 acres
is because the Petitioner sold more of the land. See Resp’t Exs. A, B, C. Both
parties agreed the amount of land assessed for 2009 was substantially more than
the amount of land assessed for 2010. We conclude it was not the same
property. Therefore, the Petitioner has
the burden of proving that the 2010 assessment is not correct and what the
correct value should be.
…
In
this case the subject property is bare, vacant land. Neither party provided an
appraisal. They primarily focused on the sales of surrounding land in
attempting to prove the value of the subject property. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1
and 7, as well as Respondent’s Exhibits I and J (maps showing the subject
property and surrounding area) help with understanding the testimony about
these sales. Respondent Exhibit J is particularly significant because it shows
significantly different topography for various parts of this area. This
surrounding area includes prime buildable land, low ground, bottom ground, and
creek/creek bed areas. And the subject property itself has the same kind of
variation: the 1.89 acre part has prime buildable land, but the 3.48 acre part
(rounded to 3.05 on this map) is almost entirely bottom ground and creek/creek
bed. Therefore, in order to develop a credible valuation for the subject
property based on comparable sales from this area, a meaningful analysis that
accounts for these differences in topography is required. See Blackbird
Farms Apts., LP v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 765 N.E.2d 711, 715 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 2002) (holding that taxpayer failed to establish comparability of parcels
of land where, among other things, taxpayer did not compare the topography and
accessibility of parcels). The Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements
for any legitimate comparison and conclusion about the value of the subject
property. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470-471.
Both
parties discussed land value per square foot. According to the Petitioner, the
1.899 acre part of the property is assessed at $6.00 per square foot. It is not
clear how that value was derived or if it is accurate for 2010, but for the
moment we will assume that is the case. On the other hand, according to the
Respondent, the 2010 assessed value for the entire parcel (4.95 acres) is $2.32
per square foot. Nobody explained this difference in a meaningful way. If the
valuation of the 3.05 acre part of the parcel is low enough, perhaps the $6.00
per square foot and the $2.32 per square foot both are accurate. After
considering all the evidence presented by both sides, it remains unclear how
the PTABOA’s 2010 land value on Form 115 was determined. More importantly,
however, the accuracy of both numbers makes no difference to our final
determination. Nothing in the record proves that either of those values per
square foot is wrong and nothing in the record proves what a more accurate
market value-in-use might be.
The
Petitioner pointed out that the other parcels now have buildings on them and
the subject property does not. The Petitioner offered no evidence or argument
that the 1.89 acres is in any way unsuitable or unusable for building purposes.
The Petitioner offered no substantial evidence in support of the conclusory
testimony that the lack of a building on the subject property shows it has less
value. Such unsubstantiated conclusions do not constitute probative evidence. Whitley
Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 1998).
The
lack of a building alone does not prove the vacant land of the subject property
is less valuable than the land of other parcels in the same area with
buildings.
Finally,
the 2012 assessment for parcel 001-21800-73 (new parcel number for the 1.899
area that formerly was part of parcel 001-21800-03) is simply not relevant or
probative evidence in this case.
In
this appeal, the taxpayer failed to provide probative evidence supporting its
position that the assessment should be changed. The Respondent’s duty to
support the assessment with substantial evidence therefore was not triggered. See
Lacy Diversified Indus. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215,
1221-1222 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003); Whitley, 704 N.E.2d at 1119.
