II. Employed by County or
Elected Official
UAW first asserts that the
trial court erred in concluding that the deputies working in the Officials’
offices are employees of the Officials. Specifically, the trial court
determined “that the Commissioners [do] not have general employment authority
over all of the elected officers’ deputies and employees.” (Appellant’s App. p.
18). UAW argues that, taken together, Indiana Code section 36-2-2-13 (Section
13) and Indiana Code section 5-4-1-1 (Section 1) “conclusively establish that
the General Assembly considers the deputies and employees who work [for the
Officials] to be employed by the Commissioners on behalf of [the] County.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 23).
A. Indiana Code § 36-2-2-13
UAW has presented an apparent
issue of first impression regarding the interpretation of Section 13, which
states, in part:
(a) The executive may employ a
person:
(1)
to perform a duty required of a county officer by statute; or
(2) on a commission or
percentage basis;
only if the employment is
expressly authorized by statute or is found by the executive to be necessary to
the public interest.
I.C. § 36-2-2-13. When a
statute is unambiguous on its face, this court applies its clear and plain
meaning. Ind. Mun. Power Agency v. Town of Edinburgh, 769 N.E.2d 222,
226-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Where a statute is reasonably susceptible to
multiple interpretations, we endeavor to effectuate the legislative intent and
give credence to the statute as a whole. Id. We presume the General
Assembly knows “of existing statutes in the same area” and will construe
statutes relating to the same general subject matter “so as to produce a
harmonious result.” Schafer v. Sellersburg Town Council, 714 N.E.2d 212,
217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We further presume that the
General Assembly intends statutory “language to be applied in a logical manner
consistent with the underlying policy and goals of the statute.” Shepherd,
733 N.E.2d at 990.
UAW focuses on the phrase “only
if the employment is expressly authorized by statute” and posits
that, because statutes expressly authorize the Officials to appoint deputies
and employees, the actual “authority to employ these deputies and employees is
conferred on the Commissioners by [Section 13].” (Appellant’s Br. p. 21).6 We
disagree with UAW’s reading of the statute and decline to find that such an
interpretation is reasonable. See Ind. Pub. Emp. Ret. Fund v. Bryson,
977 N.E.2d 374, 377-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, trans. denied.
Finding no ambiguity, without enlarging or restricting its plain and obvious
meaning, Section 13 clearly states that, in the absence of public necessity, a
statute must explicitly authorize the Commissioners to employ a person.
If, as UAW claims, Section 13
afforded the Commissioners carte blanche power to fill any statutorily
created position, other statutes in the same article and chapter—which identify
specific jobs that the Commissioners may employ—would be superfluous. See,
e.g., I.C. § 36-2-2-14 (county administrator); I.C. § 36-2-2-30 (attorney);
I.C. § 36-2-16-10 (county animal disease control emergency coordinator). Also,
a myriad of statutes that grant appointment power to other officers would be
meaningless if, under Section 13, the Commissioners could usurp their hiring
and firing authority. See I.C. Ch. 36-2-16 (listing elected officials
who may appoint deputies and other employees). Moreover, UAW’s interpretation
of Section 13 fails to contemplate the overall structure of the County
government. The role of the Commissioners is to act as “a general overseer or
manager.” Roberts v. State ex rel. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 278
N.E.2d 285, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). In this capacity, the Commissioners may
exercise only the power “expressly conferred . . . by the Constitution and the
statutes of the state, or such powers as arise by necessary implication from
those expressly granted, or such as are requisite to the performance of the
duties which are imposed on it by law.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh Cnty.
v. Sanders, 30 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind. 1940). Accordingly, the Commissioners
may employ personnel to manage the County’s operation, but if a position
statutorily reserved for a County officer’s performance is not explicitly
designated as employable by the Commissioners, Section 13 curtails the
Commissioners’ employment authority unless justified by public necessity.
B. Indiana Code § 5-4-1-1
UAW further claims that the
language of Section 1 establishes that deputies are employees of the County.
Section 1 requires all officers and deputies to take an oath affirming they
will “faithfully discharge the duties” of the office. I.C. § 5-4-1-1(a). Section
1 also states:
(c) This subsection applies to
a deputy of a political subdivision. An individual appointed as a deputy
is considered an employee of the political subdivision performing ministerial
functions on behalf of an officer and is not required to take the oath
prescribed by subsection (a). However, if a chief deputy assumes the duties of
an office during a vacancy under IC 3-13-11-12, the chief deputy must take the
oath required under subsection (a) before entering on the official duties of the
office.
I.C. § 5-4-1-1(c) (Appellant’s
emphasis). The trial court concluded that Section 1
does not vitiate the more
specific statutes giving employment authority to the independent elected
officers. Instead, it was passed as part of legislation declaring that deputies
of officers of a political subdivision do not hold a “lucrative office” under
Article 2, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. . . . [I]t is an insufficient
basis on which to conclude that the General Assembly intended that the deputies
and employees of elected officers are “employees” of the Commissioners for all
purposes.
(Appellant’s App. p. 19
(internal citation omitted)). We agree with the trial court.
It is well-established that
“[a] statute should be examined as a whole, avoiding excessive reliance upon a
strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words.” State
v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind. 2008). Here, UAW relies on “just
one sentence of a more complex statute” that has been isolated in context. Warrick
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Warrick Cnty. Council, 706 N.E.2d 579, 580 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), trans. denied. Based on the context of the surrounding
provisions, Section 1 simply serves to set forth the oath and bond requirements
for various categories of public employees. We find nothing to indicate that
Section 1 was intended to identify the County as the ultimate employer of the
deputies of all elected officers.
In its reply brief, UAW claims
Section 1 is unambiguous, and “the alleged ‘focus’ of [Section 1] cannot
contravene its plain language.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 12). We find no merit
to UAW’s plain language rationale because Section 1(a) clearly states that the
oath is required of “every officer and every deputy,” and Section 1(c) very
plainly pertains to those who are employed by the County as opposed to
appointed by an officer. It is a longstanding presumption that the General
Assembly does not intend statutory language “to be applied illogically or to
bring about an unjust or absurd result.” City of Carmel v. Steele, 865
N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind. 2007). Adopting UAW’s interpretation would render Section
1(a) and 1(c) redundant, and, as we have established, the County is authorized
to hire employees to carry out the management of county government and may also
make appointments under limited circumstances. Accordingly, the logical
interpretation of Section 1 is that an “employee of the political subdivision”
refers to one hired by the County to perform “ministerial jobs that would be
performed without contravention of the statutes” and are necessary for the
“maintenance of certain county functions.” Roberts, 278 N.E.2d at
291-92.
We find further absurdity in
UAW’s contention that an excerpt from Section 1 carries greater significance
than the words of numerous other statutes which state the deputies and
employees actually belong to the officer. See, e.g., I.C. §
36-2-2-5(a)(2) (“[E]ach county officer . . . shall prepare an itemized estimate
of the amount of money required for the officer’s . . . office” including “the
expense of employing deputies.”); I.C. § 36-2-8-4 (“A county officer or a
deputy or employee of a county officer is entitled to payment for
services only after he has rendered those services.” (emphasis added)). We thus
conclude that Section 13 and Section 1 do not render the County the employer of
the Officials’ deputies and employees.
III. Independent Employment
Decisions
Second, UAW asserts that the
trial court erred in concluding that the CBA “improperly impinges” on the
Officials’ independence. (Appellant’s Br. p. 29).
A. County’s Employment
Authority
UAW first posits that Section
13 and Indiana Code section 36-1-4-14 (Section 14)—which states the County “may
hire and discharge employees and establish a system of employment for any class
of employees based on merit and qualification”—together “confer the power to
employ, hire and discharge deputies and employees of the Assessor and the
Recorder to the Commissioners.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 30-31). UAW disagrees with
the trial court that the County functions as “little more than the landlord and
payroll service.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 29). In response, the County Group claims
that the Officials have “the right to appoint their employees. And by
implication they then have the right to remove their employees.” (Transcript p.
16).
By statute, the Assessor may
“appoint the number of full-time or part-time deputies and employees authorized
by the county fiscal body.” I.C. § 36-2-16-8 (Section 8). Similarly, the
Recorder “is entitled to appoint one (1) first or chief deputy, and also may
appoint the number of other full-time or part-time deputies and employees
authorized by the county fiscal body.” I.C. § 36-2-16-4 (Section 4). UAW
understands these statutes to confer to the Officials only the power to “name
officially” and maintains that Section 4 and Section 8 “do not negate the
express authority conferred to the Commissioners through [Sections 1, 13, and
14].” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 30-31). If the legislature had intended to grant to
the Officials “unfettered independence and authority[,]” UAW insists that
Section 4 and Section 8 would explicitly include a right to terminate.
(Appellant’s Br. p. 31). In contrast, the County Group claims that “the power
to appoint would be meaningless without the concomitant power to discipline or
remove the employee.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 18).
Although cited by neither
party, we find a prior decision of our court particularly instructive. In Roberts
v. State ex rel. Jackson County Board of Commissioners, 278 N.E.2d 285, 287-88
(Ind. Ct. App. 1972), following the death of the county’s elected surveyor, the
board of commissioners requested that the deputy surveyor maintain operations
in the office pending the surveyor’s official replacement. Reasoning that the
deputy’s position had automatically terminated upon the surveyor’s death, the
county auditor refused to compensate the deputy. This court found that “[i]t is
elementary that there can be no deputy without there first being a principal;
the principal being the duly elected, qualified and acting official of the
county.” Id. at 290.
The general and well-affirmed
rule is that, in the absence of some statutory provision to the contrary, the
commission or appointment of a deputy officer runs or continues only during the
term of the officer making the appointment. Of course, in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, the principal has the right, at his pleasure, to
remove his deputy.
Id. (quoting Hord v. State, 79 N.E. 916, 922 (Ind.
1907)). “If the principal officer is re-elected or reappointed for another
term, his deputies must also be reappointed in order to continue them in
office.” Hord, 79 N.E. at 922 (holding Attorney General could not
contract on behalf of the State to employ an assistant attorney beyond
the Attorney General’s own term). Our court concluded in Roberts that,
because the board of commissioners had requested that the deputy keep the
surveyor’s office open out of necessity to the public interest—and the deputy
spent two months doing only “ministerial things” without “pretend[ing] to be
the County Surveyor”—the deputy was entitled to compensation as an employee
of the county. Roberts, 278 N.E.2d at 291-93.
In the present case, UAW
ardently insists that the Commissioners, rather than the Officials, have the
authority to appoint and discharge the deputies. We disagree. In Roberts,
the deputy was found to be employed by the county only after the
surveyor’s death and only for the period of time that he acted at the board of
commissioners’ behest to keep the office open in the public interest. The
statute in-force in Roberts provided:
[O]fficers may appoint deputies
and other assistants as may be necessary for the proper discharge of the
duties, and the number of such deputies and assistants shall be subject to the
board of commissioners, both as to full and part time employment, and the board
of commissioners shall make recommendations to the county council as to the
amount of salary that each shall receive.
Id. This statute parallels Section 4 and Section 8, which
enable the Officials to appoint as many “full-time or part-time deputies and
employees” as the Council authorizes. I.C. §§ 36-2-16-4; 36-2-16-8. “To provide
for independently elected officers but to deprive them of the ability to choose
and supervise their own employees would render elections meaningless and
convert the officers to mere department heads or functionaries” of the
Commissioners. (Appellee’s Br. p. 15). The Roberts court confirmed that
the right to appoint and discharge generally belongs to the elected officer,
but found the board of commissioners had appropriately acted to prevent
burdening the public.
Observing both Roberts and
the rule set forth by our supreme court in Hord, we conclude the
Officials are independently empowered to appoint and discharge their own
deputies at their discretion. Furthermore, we find that the Commissioners have
the power to hire an officer’s deputy in two instances: (1) a statutory
provision “expressly authorize[s]” the Commissioners to make such an appointment;
or (2) as in Roberts, the Commissioners determine that such employment
is “necessary to [serve] the public interest.” I.C. § 36-2-2-13(a).
B. Anti-Nepotism Statute
UAW next cites Indiana Code
Chapter 36-1-20.2 (Anti-Nepotism Statute) as indicative of the lack of
independence of the Officials with respect to their deputies. The Anti-Nepotism
Statute prohibits counties from employing two related individuals where one
would be directly supervised by the other and authorizes counties to implement
a “more stringent” policy. I.C. §§ 36-1-20.2-9 to -10. UAW claims that the
Officials conceded to the County’s employment authority because, following the
Commissioners’ enactment of a more extensive anti-nepotism policy than the one
promulgated by the General Assembly, the Assessor complied and terminated his
children’s employment.
The trial court concluded that
the Anti-Nepotism statute “provides a very narrow exception that proves the
general rule that in the absence of such express statutory authority, the county
bodies lack the power to dictate to elected officials who they can hire and
fire.” (Appellant’s App. p. 18). We agree. And while UAW fixates on the phrase
that related individuals may not be employed by the County, we find the
focus of the statute is to prevent conflict of interest-related
predicaments—not to partition the County from its Officials regarding the role
of “employer.” Furthermore, Section 16 of the Anti-Nepotism Statute and the
County’s policy both state that, annually, “[e]ach elected officer” must submit
a written certification to the Commissioners, swearing “that the officer has
not violated” the anti-nepotism mandate. (Appellant’s App. p. 84 (emphasis
added)). If, as UAW contends, the County is strictly the employer, this
provision would be illogical because the County—not the officer—would be
accountable to report hiring violations. Therefore, we conclude the
Anti-Nepotism policy does not negate the fact that the power to appoint and
discharge belongs to the Officials.
IV. Authority to Bind
Elected Officials to CBA
Lastly, UAW asserts that the
trial court erred by failing to conclude that the Commissioners and Council had
the requisite authority to enter into the CBA to regulate the personnel
policies affecting the Officials’ deputies. The trial court concluded “that the
CBA imposes impermissible restrictions on the ability of the . . . elected
officers to select, discipline, remove, and direct the work of their deputies
and employees.” (Appellant’s App. p. 17). UAW, however, argues that the CBA
does not interfere with the ability of the Officials to manage their offices
and should be enforced because the Commissioners and Council have inherent
authority, “well-established under Indiana law[,]” to set the employment
standards for all County deputies and employees. (Appellant’s Br. p. 38). It is
undisputed that the Commissioners may execute contracts on behalf of the
County, and the Council may appropriate funds to control the number of deputies
each officer may appoint. I.C. §§ 36-1-4-7; 36-2-5-3(b).
We have already concluded that
the Officials have complete discretion to hire and discharge their deputies and
employees, subject to certain limitations imposed by State law. UAW submits
that the CBA “simply establishes standards that create parameters within which
the [Officials] must operate when making their employment-related decisions”
and controls the County’s liability because elected officers “cannot be
expected to have a sophisticated knowledge of the multitude of applicable
employment laws.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 37-38). UAW relies on our court’s
holding in Nass v. State ex rel. Unity Team, Local 9212, 718 N.E.2d 757,
763-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, that it was “a reasonable
exercise of the Governor’s responsibility for the efficient operations of the
executive branch of government” to issue an executive order allowing executive
branch employees to join labor unions. UAW, however, fails to consider the
important “technical point” we noted in Nass. Id. at 763. There,
the Governor did not negotiate and sign an agreement that bound all executive
branch employees to specific terms and conditions; his executive order simply
“provided a framework by which collective bargaining could take place.” Id. In
actuality, the executive branch department heads negotiated the agreements for
the employees in their departments. Id. In distinction, the Officials in
the present case did not negotiate individual CBAs with UAW for their own
deputies and employees.
We agree with the trial court that,
unlike the policies in the County Personnel Handbook, which are “part and
parcel of” general County management, the CBA obstructs the independence of the
Officials to staff their offices as they deem best. (Appellant’s App. p. 18).
The CBA imposes a strict seniority system for hiring preferences, specifies the
manner and duration of advertising vacant positions, and “encourages internal
promotion and transfer of current employees.” (Appellant’s Supp. App. p. 85).
The CBA also compels protracted disciplinary and grievance procedures that
preclude an officer’s ability to remove and replace a problematic employee in a
timely and efficient manner. We conclude that the Commissioners and Council, by
entering into the CBA, exceeded their authority and encumbered the Officials’
right to appoint and discharge their deputies and employees.
