c) First, regarding the Respondent’s claim that an
assessment is acceptable if it is within 10% of the property’s market
value-in-use, it appears she may have confused that with the requirements of a
mass-appraisal ratio study. An appeal of an individual assessment, however, is
an entirely different matter. Further, the Respondent failed to provide any
authority for her contention that an individual assessment is correct if it falls
within 10% of the value.
d) In any case, the Respondent’s evidence does little to
prove the subject property’s value. Regarding her offering of purportedly
comparable sales, the Respondent recognizes that one can estimate the value of
a subject property by analyzing the sales of comparable properties. A party
offering such evidence must show that the properties are generally comparable
to each other, and also must show how any relevant differences affect the
relative values. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470–71 (holding that, in applying the
sales-comparison approach, the taxpayers needed to explain how any differences
between their property and the properties to which they sought to compare it
affected the properties’ relevant market values-in-use). Here, the Respondent
did little to prove that the other properties were actually comparable to the
subject property, as many of the purportedly comparable properties are not even
located on the same lake. Moreover, she offered nothing to explain or account for
any differences in the properties, and how those differences affected the respective
values. Her evidence lacked the type of analysis contemplated by Long.
e) Her comparison to neighboring properties’ assessments
similarly lacks probative value. True, a party to an appeal proceeding may
introduce evidence of assessments of comparable properties located in the same
taxing district or within two miles of the boundary of the taxing district. See
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18. But just as with the sales-comparison approach, the
determination of whether the properties are comparable shall be based on
generally accepted appraisal and assessment principles. Once again, the
Respondent failed to offer a meaningful comparison of the parcels in terms of
characteristics that would affect their respective market values-in-use.
f) Because the Respondent did not offer probative evidence
to show the market value-in-use, she failed to make a prima facie case that the
2012 assessment is correct. Therefore,
the Petitioner is entitled to have that assessment returned to its 2011 level of
$230,300. The Petitioner, though, sought an even lower assessment. The Board now
turns to the Petitioner’s evidence.
18. The Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for
reducing the subject property’s assessment below the 2011 value.
a) The Petitioner offered
assessment data for a nearby property and argued that his land assessment
should be no higher than that property. Again, when comparing assessments, a
party must both prove comparability and account for any differences between the
properties by using generally accepted appraisal practices. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18.
The Petitioner’s evidence lacks any of that type of analysis. And while the
Petitioner offered evidence that his lot is heavily sloped, merely establishing
the existence of something that may affect a property’s value is not enough to
require changing the assessment. To make a case, the Petitioner was required to
offer probative evidence about what a more accurate valuation would be. See
Talesnick v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 765 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2001). Here, the Petition failed to offer probative evidence of what the
accurate valuation should be.
b) Further, the Petitioner argued that, for various reasons,
his house was overvalued, and that a more accurate value would be between
$10,000 and $12,000. But he offered no probative evidence to support that
argument. Thus, his contention amounts to little more than a conclusory
statement. Conclusory statements do not constitute probative evidence. Whitley
Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d at 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 1998).
c) The Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for
lowing the subject property’s 2012 assessment below the 2011 assessed value.
