In this case, the Petitioner’s representative testified that the Petitioner was a 501(c)(3) organization. However, the grant of a federal or state income tax exemption does not entitle a taxpayer to a property tax exemption because an income tax exemption does not depend so much on how property is used, but on how money is spent. See Raintree Friends Housing, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of Revenue, 667 N.E.2d 810,813 (Ind. Tax Ct.1996) (non-profit status does not automatically entitle a taxpayer to tax exemption). Thus, the Board must look at the use of the subject property to determine whether the property is entitled to a full exemption.
According to the Petitioner’s representative, the Petitioner is a non-profit organization whose purpose is to develop, finance, implement and execute a variety of programs for the benefit of “retarded and otherwise developmentally disabled citizens.” Carney testimony; Petitioner Exhibit 2. The Petitioner’s representative testified that the use of the subject property is in furtherance of the purposes for which KCARC was incorporated, which includes, among other things, the employment and training of people with disabilities. Id.
However, the only evidence the Petitioner offered of any “services” that the Petitioner provides is that people with disabilities worked at the subject property and the work done by disabled individuals was supervised by people without disabilities. Carney testimony. The Petitioner’s representative did not provide any evidence of how many individuals with disabilities were employed at the subject property or how many of those employed by the Petitioner were able to seek gainful employment elsewhere having learned employment skills at the subject property. Nor did the Petitioner’s representative provide any details of its employment of disabled individuals, such as length of employment with the Petitioner, the compensation received by these individuals or the requirements for employment. More importantly, the Petitioner’s representative failed to provide details regarding any “training programs” that took place at the subject property. Thus, while the Petitioner provided some evidence that it employed disabled individuals, simply employing disabled individuals does not prove a charitable intent. The Petitioner needed to show that it was providing services to disabled individuals “different from the everyday purposes and activities of man in general.” College Corner, L.P. v. Department of Local Government Finance, 840 N.E.2d 905, 908 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006).
Further, while the Respondent admitted that the Petitioner uses the subject property to earn money “to do all these other programs that they have,” the Petitioner failed to provide any meaningful evidence of its programs other than vague references to “employment and training” occurring at the subject property and references to a “group home” operated by the Petitioner. Thus, while it is a noble act to provide services to individuals with disabilities, and the subject property may, in fact, be used to support a comprehensive program for the benefit of disabled individuals, the Petitioner’s case failed to provide evidence of the scope of KCARC’s programs or services. See Indianapolis Racquet Club, Inc. v. Washington Township Assessor, 802 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004) (“[I]t is the taxpayer's duty to walk the Indiana Board . . .through every element of the analysis.”).
Finally, the Petitioner’s representative argued that KCARC has not made a profit on the subject property for the last two years. However “the failure to make a profit does not convert a business into a charitable institution.” Cullitan v. The Cunningham Sanitarium, 16 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ohio 1938). See also Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Shawnee County, Kansas, 402 P.2d 802, 807 (Kan. 1965) (“we recognize that the failure to make a profit does not convert a business into a charitable institution.”), reversed on other grounds, Lutheran Home, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Dickinson County, Kansas, 505 P.2d 1118 (Kan. 1973).
Here the Petitioner has only shown that it employs disabled individuals in its manufacturing facility. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence of any comprehensive work training program or that its commercial endeavors provides the funding for other programs and services that it offers to disabled individuals. After considering all of the evidence presented by the parties, the Board finds that the Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that its property was owned, operated and used for a charitable purpose for the 2011 assessment year.
