Here
because the property’s 2007 assessed value did not increase by more than 5%
over the property’s assessed value in 2006, the Petitioner retains the burden
of proof. In contrast, the subject property’s assessed value in 2009 increased
by more than 5% over the property’s assessed value for 2008. Despite the fact
that the ALJ miscalculated the amount of the increase, the burden is shifted to
the Respondent for the March 1, 2009, assessment year.
…
Here,
the Petitioner presented MLS information for properties that sold in 1998, 2010
and 2011 to show that his property was over-assessed. In making this argument
the Petitioner essentially relies on a sales comparison approach to establish
the market value-in-use of the property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the
sales comparison approach “estimates the total value of the property directly
by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the
market.”) In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach as evidence
in a property assessment appeal, however, the proponent must establish the
comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a
property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute
probative evidence of the comparability of the properties. Long, 821
N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the proponent must identify the characteristics of the
subject property and explain how those characteristics compare to the
characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471.
Similarly, the proponent must explain how any differences between the
properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id. But while
many of the Petitioner’s comparable sales were of houses that were nearly
identical to his property, the sales all occurred in 2010 and 2011. The
Petitioner did not provide any explanation as to how these sales might
demonstrate or be relevant to a value as of January 1, 2006 – five years prior
to the Petitioner’s comparable properties’ sale dates. O’Donnell v. Dep’t of
Local Gov’t Fin., 854 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); see also Long
v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Thus, the
Petitioner’s sales fail to raise a prima facie case that his property was
over-valued for the 2007 assessment year.
The
Petitioner also contends that he applied for a disability deduction but the
auditor never applied it to his tax assessment. In support of this contention,
the Petitioner presented various medical records purporting to show he is
disabled. Petitioner Exhibit 2. However, Mr. Adams presented no evidence
that he filed for a disability deduction. More importantly, Mr. Adams failed to
offer evidence that he met the requirements of Indiana Code 6-1.1-12-11,
including that he was “eligible to receive disability benefits under the
federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.)” or that his disability was
“determined by using the same standards as used by the Social Security
Administration” and that his “taxable gross income for the calendar year
preceding the year in which the deduction is claimed did not exceed seventeen
thousand dollars ($17,000).”7 Therefore, the Petitioner failed to provide
sufficient evidence that he was entitled to a disability deduction for either
the March 1, 2007, or the March 1, 2009, assessment dates.
…
For
the 2009 assessment year, the Respondent presented MLS information and property
record cards for three properties that sold between October 20, 2006, and
December 16, 2009, to show that the property was assessed correctly. Like the
Petitioner, the Respondent here essentially relies on a sales comparison
approach to establish the market value-in-use of the property. And again, the
proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Long,
821 N.E.2d at 470. Here, Ms. Stone-Lucas presented a chart that purported
to value the differences between the subject property and her three comparable
sales. However, she provided no evidence of how those “adjustments” were
calculated. While the rules of evidence generally do not apply in the Board’s
hearings, the Board requires some evidence of the accuracy and credibility of
the evidence. Statements that are unsupported by probative evidence are
conclusory and of little value to the Board in making its determination. Whitley
Products, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119
(Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); and Herb v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 656
N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995). Thus, the Respondent’s comparable sales
analysis fails to support the property’s assessed value for the 2009 assessment
year.
The
Respondent failed to establish a prima facie case that the property’s assessed
value was correct for the March 1, 2009, assessment date. Therefore, the
property’s assessment must be reduced to the previous year’s assessed value of
$119,000 under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2.
…
