I.
IndyGo
acknowledges that neither Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18.5-16, nor any DLGF
regulation, prescribes a method for calculating a property tax revenue
shortfall. (See Pet’r Br. at 7-8, Oral Argument Tr. at 17.) Despite this lack
of guidance, IndyGo explains that the methodology used to calculate a property
tax revenue shortfall must comport with the “clearly stated” legislative policy
set forth in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18.5-16(c): that collections of property tax
payments due and payable in earlier years should not be counted as actual
collections for the “shortfall” year. (See Pet’r Br. at 7, 24-25.)
IndyGo argues
that the DLGF did not provide evidence to show that it complied with this
legislative policy in calculating IndyGo’s 2007 shortfall (or lack thereof).
(See Pet’r Br. at 22, 26.) As support for this argument, IndyGo points to the
DLGF’s $15,315,394 collections number as it is “not consistent” with the
$14,458,957 collections number IndyGo computed using the Marion County
Treasurer’s records. (Pet’r Br. at 26.) See also supra note 2. Furthermore,
IndyGo questions what the DLGF included in calculating its $15,315,394 number
because no evidence specifically “identified or described [its computation] as
[being] limited to property taxes assessed and levied for assessment year 2006
(payment year 2007).” (Pet’r Br. at 19 (emphasis omitted).) “[T]he only logical
conclusion” for the difference in the numbers, IndyGo therefore asserts, is
that the DLGF erroneously included delinquent property tax collections in its
2007 shortfall calculation and, as a result, it “did not follow the correct
statutory procedure under [Indiana Code] § 6-1.1-18.5-16[.]” (Pet’r Br. at 26.)
As the party
challenging the DLGF’s final determination, IndyGo bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is either contrary to law or an abuse of discretion. See
Scopelite, 939 N.E.2d at 1145. To meet this burden, IndyGo must show that the
DLGF’s final determination “violates a[] statute, constitutional provision,
legal principle, or rule of substantive or procedural law” or “is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” of the case. See
Shelbyville MHPI, LLC v. Thurston, 978 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013)
(citation omitted); Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks Cnty. Assessor, 938 N.E.2d
311, 315 n.5 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010) (citation omitted). Here, IndyGo has done
neither. Rather, it has merely invited the Court to reweigh the evidence in its
favor or to hold that the DLGF should have provided more, different, or better
evidence to support its collections number.4 But
see Grant Cnty. Assessor v. Kerasotes Showplace Theatres, LLC, 955 N.E.2d 876,
880 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2011) (explaining that in reviewing administrative agency
final determinations, this Court will not reweigh the evidence presented during
the administrative proceedings nor will it assess the credibility of any
witnesses who testified at the administrative hearing). Accordingly, the Court
will not overturn the DLGF’s final determination on this basis.
II.
In the
alternative, IndyGo claims that the DLGF’s final determination is not supported
by the evidence because it “denied [the] 2007 [request] even though the
computation methodology used by IndyGo was the same as the methodology
implicitly approved by the [DLGF] for 2006.” (Pet’r Br. at 18-19.) (See also
Pet’r Br. at 29 (arguing that the DLGF’s failure to provide any rational
explanation for approving one appeal but denying the other “falls far short of
[] due process requirements”).) The Court disagrees.
A final
determination is not supported by the evidence if, in reviewing that evidence,
the Court determines that a reasonable mind would not accept the evidence as
adequate to support the conclusion at issue. Amax Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax
Comm’rs, 552 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1990). In reviewing the evidence
contained in the administrative record, however, a reasonable mind would not
conclude that the DLGF “approved” the methodology used by IndyGo to calculate
its shortfall in budget year 2006. Indeed, the administrative record reveals
that the DLGF subtracted the actual property tax collections in 2006 from the
2006 certified levy figure to determine that IndyGo suffered a property tax
revenue shortfall for that year in the amount of $469,535. (See Cert. Admin. R.
at 70-71, 126.) In its shortfall appeal for 2006, however, IndyGo only asked
for $344,478. (Cert. Admin. R. at 1, 3.) Accordingly, the DLGF simply used
IndyGo’s requested amount as its starting point and then reduced that amount by
$125,479 to account for IndyGo’s receipt of too much levy for budget year 2008.
(See Cert. Admin. R. at 70-71, 75.) The Court is therefore not persuaded by
IndyGo’s alternative argument.
