c)
Here, the Trust relies mainly on the fact that it bought the subject property
for $16,000 on March 30, 2006. True, a property’s sale price can be compelling
evidence of its market value-in-use. But in this instance, Mr. Kollar admits
the Trust purchased the property from Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company, out of
foreclosure.
d)
The Manual provides the following definition of “market value”:
The
most probable price (in terms of money) which a property should bring in a
competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the
buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the
price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified
date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
i.
The buyer and seller are typically motivated;
ii.
Both parties are well informed and advised and act in what they consider their
best interests;
iii.
A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;
iv.
Payment is made in terms of cash or in terms of financial arrangements
comparable thereto;
v.
The price is unaffected by special financing or concessions.
MANUAL
at 10.
e)
It is apparent from the Manual’s definition that a property purchased out of foreclosure
may not reflect its market value for reasons such as a lack of exposure to the
open market or the seller (i.e., the bank) not being typically motivated.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the party relying upon that sale to offer
specific evidence to allay these concerns. See Lake County Assessor v. U.S.
Steel Corp, 901 N.E.2d 85, 91-92 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2009) review denied (approving
of the use of bankruptcy sales when taxpayer established that such sales were a
market norm).
f)
While Mr. Kollar offered evidence that the property had been listed on the open
market, the listing he submitted spanned from March 27, 2002, to August 30,
2002. Not only is that time period well before the valuation dates in question,
the listing itself bears no relationship to the Trust’s 2006 purchase of the
property. Mr. Kollar, in fact, offered no evidence that the property had been
listed on the market when he bought it. Thus, this argument lacked probative
value.
g)
Mr. Kollar also offered a study completed by the City of South Bend that was published
in 2013. Mr. Kollar argued that this study provides proof that the subject property
is located in a “blighted area.” However, the study was published over five years
after the nearest valuation date in question, and Mr. Kollar failed to prove
how this study related to the relevant valuation dates in question. The Board
finds no probative evidence in the study that conclusively proves that
foreclosure sales were the market norm for the subject property’s neighborhood
as of January 1, 2007, and January 1, 2008. And Mr. Kollar failed to point the
Board to any such evidence. See Indianapolis Racquet Club, Inc. v. Washington
Twp. Assessor, 802 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004) (“[I]t is the
taxpayer's duty to walk the Indiana Board through every element of the
analysis”).
h)
Consequently, the Board finds that the Petitioner failed to make a prima facie
case that the 2008 and 2009 assessments are incorrect. Where a Petitioner has
not supported its claim with probative evidence, the Respondent’s duty to
support the assessment with substantial evidence is not triggered. Lacy
Diversified Indus. LTD v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215, 1221-22
(Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).
