14.
The Assessor made a hearsay objection to Petitioner’s Exhibit 1—Mr. Coulson’s appraisal
report. The Assessor pointed out that Mr. Coulson was not at the hearing and therefore
could not be cross-examined about whether his opinion had any limiting conditions
or assumptions or why he used only the sales-comparison approach. Wallenfang
objection.
15.
The Assessor is correct that the appraisal report is hearsay. See Ind. Evidence
Rule 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement that “(1) is not made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”) Evid. R. 801(c). But the
Board’s procedural rules allow it to admit hearsay, albeit with a significant
caveat: if an opponent properly objects to the hearsay and it does not fall
within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the Board cannot base its
determination solely on that hearsay. 52 IAC 3-1-5(b).
16.
The Board therefore overrules the Assessor’s objection. The Board has admitted
hearsay appraisal reports in many appeals, and where those reports were not
objected to, it has relied on them in reaching its determination. Because the
Assessor objected to Mr. Coulson’s report and Mr. Wilkins did not lay a
foundation to qualify the report under any generally recognized exception to
the hearsay rule, however, the Board cannot base its determination solely on
that report.
…
a. Indiana
assesses property based on its true tax value, which is the market value-in-use
of a property for its current use, as reflected by the utility received by the owner
or similar user, from the property. Evidence in a tax appeal must be consistent
with that standard. For example, a market value-in-use appraisal prepared
according to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice will
often be probative. See Kooshtard Property VI, LLC v. White River Township
Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 501, 506 n. 6 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). The actual sale price
or construction costs for a property under appeal, sales or assessment
information for comparable properties, and any other evidence compiled
according to generally accepted appraisal principles may also be probative.
b.
Here, Mr. Wilkins relied almost exclusively on Mr. Coulson’s hearsay appraisal report,
which estimated the property’s value at $22,000 as of January 17, 2011. As explained
above, however, the Board cannot rely solely on that report in reaching its determination.
The only other evidence that Mr. Wilkins offered was his testimony about other
unidentified properties from the subject property’s neighborhood. That testimony
is too vague to have any probative value. Mr. Wilkins therefore failed to make
a prima facie case for reducing the subject property’s assessment.
