In its
Petition, Washington Park acknowledges that it has not yet received a final
determination from the Indiana Board. (See Pet’r Pet. ¶ 4; Pet’r Br. Supp. Pet.
Enjoin Collection Tax at 3.) Accordingly, Washington Park admits that its case
is not yet ripe to file a petition for an original tax appeal. (See Pet’r Br.
Supp. Pet. Enjoin Collection Tax at 3.) Nonetheless, Washington Park maintains
that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to rule on its Petition for
three reasons.
I.
Washington
Park first argues that
[b]y
requiring a summary of the issues that Petitioner “will raise” in the original
tax appeal, [Indiana Code § 33-26-6-2(b)] contemplate[s] the filing of an
injunction request prior to the filing of an original tax appeal because if an
original tax appeal had been filed, that filing would suffice to have “raised”
the issues. There would be no need to recite issues that “will be” raised
because those issues would have already been raised upon the filing of an
original tax appeal.
(Pet’r Br.
Resp. Mot. Dismiss (“Pet’r Br.”) at 2.) In addition, Washington Park argues
that
the
legislature has organized Indiana Code § 33-26-6-2 into separate and distinct
sections to deal with the separate and distinct petitions that may be brought
before this Court – a petition to set aside a final determination, on the one
hand (Indiana Code § 33-26-6-2(a)); and a petition to enjoin the collection of
tax, on the other hand (Indiana Code § 33-26-6-2(b)). The [injunction] petition
. . . is not the same as the petition required to initiate an original tax
appeal under Indiana Code § 33-26-6-2(a). If it were, there would be no need to
refer separately to the injunction petition described in in subsections (b) and
(c). (Pet’r
Br. at 2.) Washington Park, however, has read Indiana Code § 33-26-6-2(b) in a
vacuum.
When
confronted with a question of statutory construction, the Court’s function is
to determine and implement the intent of the legislature in enacting that
statutory provision. See Johnson Cnty. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n v. Indiana Dep’t
of State Revenue, 568 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991), aff’d by 585 N.E.2d
1336 (Ind. 1992). In general, the best evidence of this intent is found in the
actual language of the statute itself, as chosen by legislature. See id. at
581. To this end, the Court will endeavor to give meaning to each and every
word used in a statute, as it will not be presumed that the legislature
intended to enact a statutory provision that is superfluous, meaningless, or a
nullity. See Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 761 N.E.2d
909, 916 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2002), review denied. Additionally, the Court will give
those statutory words and phrases their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. See
Johnson Cnty. Farm Bureau, 568 N.E.2d at 581. Finally, the Court must read the
statute as a whole, and not sections or parts of it piecemeal. See State v.
Adams, 583 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Indeed, “[e]ach
part [of a statute] must be considered with reference to all other parts [of
the statute].” Id. (citation omitted).
Indiana
Code § 33-26-6-2(a) states that
II.
the
nature of preliminary injunctive relief typically seeks an order from the Court
BEFORE the full presentation of evidence on the merits, not AFTER. By
authorizing this Court to grant injunctive relief and by authorizing this Court
to hold an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining whether to grant equitable
relief, the legislature has authorized this Court to hear evidence BEFORE a
dispute has been fully litigated at the [Indiana Board.] (Pet’r Br. at 4.)
Washington Park, however, asks the Court to exert power where it has none. As
just explained, the Tax Court may grant injunctive relief only if an original
tax appeal is pending.
III.
Finally,
Washington Park argues that the principle of stare decisis requires the Court
to follow its rationale and holding in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.
Indiana, 512 N.E.2d 920 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1987). (See Pet’r Br. at 5-7.) While the
rationale and holding in American Trucking does indeed support Washington
Park’s position, this Court declines to follow it.
In its
Petition, West Ohio acknowledges that it has not yet received a final
determination from the Indiana Board. (See Pet’r Am. Pet. ¶ 5; Pet’r Br. Supp.
Am. Pet. Enjoin Collection Tax at 1.) Accordingly, West Ohio admits that its
case is not yet ripe to file a petition for an original tax appeal. (See Pet’r
Br. Supp. Am. Pet. Enjoin Collection Tax at 1-2.) Nonetheless, West Ohio
maintains that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to rule on its
Petition for three reasons.
I.
[b]y
requiring a summary of the issues that Petitioner “will raise” in the original
tax appeal, [Indiana Code § 33-26-6-2(b)] contemplate[s] the filing of an
injunction request prior to the filing of an original tax appeal because if an
original tax appeal had been filed, that filing would suffice to have “raised”
the issues. There would be no need to recite issues that “will be” raised
because those issues would have already been raised upon the filing of an
original tax appeal.
When
confronted with a question of statutory construction, the Court’s function is
to determine and implement the intent of the legislature in enacting that
statutory provision. See Johnson Cnty. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n v. Indiana Dep't
of State Revenue, 568 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991), aff’d by 585 N.E.2d
1336 (Ind. 1992). In general, the best evidence of this intent is found in the
actual language of the statute itself, as chosen by legislature. See id. at
581. To this end, the Court will endeavor to give meaning to each and every
word used in a statute, as it will not be presumed that the legislature
intended to enact a statutory provision that is superfluous, meaningless, or a
nullity. See Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 761 N.E.2d
909, 916 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2002), review denied. Additionally, the Court will give
those statutory words and phrases their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. See
Johnson Cnty. Farm Bureau, 568 N.E.2d at 581. Finally, the Court must read the
statute as a whole, and not sections or parts of it piecemeal. See State v.
Adams, 583 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Indeed, “[e]ach
part [of a statute] must be considered with reference to all other parts [of
the statute].” Id. (citation omitted).
Indiana
Code § 33-26-6-2(a) states that
[a]
taxpayer who wishes to initiate an original tax appeal must file a petition in
the tax court to set aside the final determination of the department of state
revenue or the Indiana board of tax review. If a taxpayer fails to comply with
any statutory requirement for the initiation of an original tax appeal, the tax
court does not jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
II.
Next, West
Ohio asserts that
(Pet’r Br.
at 4.) West Ohio, however, asks the Court to exert power where it has none. As
just explained, the Tax Court may grant injunctive relief only if an original
tax appeal is pending.
III.
Finally,
West Ohio argues that the principle of stare decisis requires the Court to
follow its rationale and holding in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.
Indiana, 512 N.E.2d 920 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1987). (See Pet’r Br. at 5-7.) While the
rationale and holding in American Trucking does indeed support West Ohio’s
position, this Court declines to follow it.
