Here, the Assessor relied on her analyses of residential home sales and agricultural land sales in Union Township. The sales-comparison approach is a generally accepted appraisal methodology that “estimates the total value of [a given] property directly by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the market.” MANUAL at 3. In order to effectively use a sales-comparison analysis as evidence in a property assessment appeal, however, the proponent must show that the properties on which that analysis is based are truly comparable to the property under appeal. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not suffice. Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d at 470 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Instead, the proponent must identify the appealed property’s characteristics and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, she must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id.
The Assessor’s sales-comparison analyses did not meet the threshold requirements for those analyses to carry probative weight. True, in her residential sales-comparison analysis, the Assessor examined how her four properties compared to the subject property in some areas. For example, she compared the homes in regard to the number of bedrooms and bathrooms; by whether the house had a fireplace or garage; and by foundation type and finish, age, condition, and size. And she made adjustments to account for differences in those characteristics. But she did not establish how she determined the amounts for those adjustments.
While the adjustments in the Assessor’s analysis may not differ significantly from those made by a certified appraiser in an appraisal report, the appraiser’s assertions are backed by his education, training, and experience. The appraiser also typically certifies that he complied with USPAP. Thus, the Board, as the trier-of-fact, can infer that the appraiser used objective date, where available, to quantify his adjustments. And where objective data was not available, the Board can infer that the appraiser relied on his education, training, and experience to estimate a reliable quantification. Here, there is no evidence that either the Assessor or Ms. Newsome are certified appraisers. Moreover, the Assessor did not certify that she complied with USPAP in performing her analysis. The Board therefore finds that the Assessor’s sales-comparison analysis is insufficiently reliable to be probative of the property’s market value-in-use.
And the Assessor’s agricultural land sales analysis fares no better. In fact, the Assessor made no adjustments whatsoever to her purported comparable properties in that analysis. Thus, the Board finds that the subject property’s assessment must revert back to its March 1, 2010, level of $178,700.
The Kissells failed to meet their burden of proving that the subject property’s assessment should be reduced below its March 1, 2010, level. The Board reached this conclusion for the following reasons:
Like the Assessor, the Petitioners here also offer a sales-comparison analysis. But the Kissells’ analysis suffers from the same problems as the Assessor’s evidence. Other than explaining that all of the properties are Cape Cod or two-story homes located on rural tracts, the Kissells’ did little to show how the four properties on which they based their analysis actually compared to the subject property. And like the Assessor, while the Kissells adjusted the sale prices of their comparable properties for the size of the house and lot and whether the property had outbuildings, they offered no explanation for the amount of their adjustments. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470.
Further, a party must explain how its evidence relates to the property’s market value-in-use as of the relevant valuation date. O’Donnell v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 854 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006), see also Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471. Otherwise, the evidence lacks probative value. Id. Here, the relevant valuation date was March 1, 2011. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-4.5(f) (2011). But only the Kissells’ first sale, which was March 11, 2011, bears any relationship to that valuation date. The Kissells’ second and third sales occurred on June 19, 2009, and August, 6, 2009, respectively – which are more than a year and a half before the valuation date. And their fourth sale occurred on October 27, 2011 – which is more than ten months after the valuation date. Without some explanation of how the sales related to the March 1, 2011, valuation date, the Kissells’ sales-comparison analysis lacks probative value. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471 (holding that an appraisal that estimated a property’s value for December 10, 2003, lacked probative value in an appeal from a 2002 assessment). Thus, the Petitioners’ sales comparison analysis fails to raise a prima facie case for a further reduction in the value of their property.
The Petitioners also argue that their property was over-assessed based on the Assessor’s measurements of their house. This too fails to raise a prima facie case for a reduction in the assessed value of their property. The Petitioners presented some evidence that their house had 2,294 or 2,296 square feet of living area. The property record card, however, indicated that their house’s first floor was assessed with 1,568 square feet of living area and the upper level was assessed with 1,425 square feet of living area, for a total living area of 2,993 square feet. But the upper level was assessed as a “half story.” According to the Guidelines, assessors are to “measure the exterior of each full or partial floor.” GUIDELINES, Chap. 3 at 9. Thus, the exterior measurement of the second floor would arguably be equal to the area of the floor below that it covers, regardless of the fact that some of the area would not be useable living space. The difference in value then is made up for in the cost tables where a “half upper story” is valued significantly lower than a full upper story. See GUIDELINES, App. C., Sch. A. Therefore, the Board cannot determine from the evidence that the Assessor erred in assessing the Petitioners’ house.
Even if the Kissells had sufficiently shown that the Assessor erred in assessing the living area of their home, the Board notes that a petitioner fails to sufficiently rebut the presumption that an assessment is correct by simply contesting the method the assessor used to compute the assessment. Eckerling v. Wayne Township Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 678 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); P/A Builders & Developers v. Jennings County Assessor, 842 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (recognizing that the current assessment system is a departure from the past practice in Indiana, stating that “under the old system, a property’s assessed value was correct as long as the assessment regulations were applied correctly. The new system, in contrast, shifts the focus from mere methodology to determining whether the assessed value is actually correct”).
