It has frequently been recognized that an arm’s-length sale of the subject property can be some of the best evidence of its value. And here there is no dispute about the fact that the subject property sold for $700,000. That price was the equivalent of $233,333 per acre. But that transaction was February 20, 2007, and the required valuation date for a 2010 assessment was March 1, 2010. To be relevant, the record must somehow establish how that sale price relates to the required valuation date. See O’Donnell v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 854 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); see also Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). It does not do so. The record fails to make the required connection between that 2007 selling price and a value as of March 1, 2010. Therefore, the selling price of the subject property does not help to prove an accurate assessed value.
The comparable sales method is another way to prove an accurate assessed value. But merely offering conclusory statements that another property is "similar" or "comparable" is not sufficient to prove actual comparability. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Specific reasons must be provided for why a property is comparable to the subject property. Id. When seeking to establish comparability of land, the relevant characteristics to compare include features such as location, accessibility, and topography. See Blackbird Farms Apts., LP v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 765 N.E.2d 711, 715 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2002) (holding that taxpayer failed to establish comparability of parcels of land where, among other things, taxpayer did not compare the topography and accessibility of parcels). The proponent also must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use. See Long at 471.
The Respondent presented evidence regarding two other vacant land sales from 2010 to support the disputed assessed value of $93,960 per acre. One of those sales (lot B) was for $138,790 per acre and the other (lot C) was for $109,400 per acre. Although neither of those sale dates exactly corresponds to the required valuation date, both April 27, 2010, and October 19, 2010, are close enough to March 1, 2010, to be relevant and probative without much substantial explanation.
Whether the Respondent did enough to actually establish a valid basis for comparing the relative value of those properties to the subject property, however, is a close question of the minimum requirements for making a case regarding unimproved land. The two parcels identified by the Respondent as comparables are in close proximity to the parcel under appeal—lot B is contiguous and lot C is just across the street. The Respondent focused almost entirely on proximity, size, the fact that all three parcels are unimproved, and the fact that the values are from actual sales. The aerial photograph (Respondent Exhibit C) shows this proximity. It is readily apparent in the aerial photograph that these three parcels have the same sort of general topography, except for the rear half of lot B, where the topography is obscured by vegetation. Similarly, the aerial photograph shows that the subject property has accessibility that is as good as (or perhaps even better than) the accessibility for lot B or lot C. Significantly, the Petitioner presented no substantial evidence to the contrary.
The relative sizes of the subject property, lot B, and lot C are clear. The subject property has 2.98 acres. Lot B has 10.81 acres and lot C has 1.34 acres. In other words, one comparable is about 3 times bigger than the subject property and the other is about half as big. It is also clear that lot B is used for agricultural purposes, while the subject property and lot C are not. The agricultural use of lot B may or may not have had an impact on its price, but ultimately that point does not affect the outcome of this case. The most significant point is that both lot B and lot C sold for more per acre than the per acre assessed value of the subject property.
The Petitioner challenged the PTABOA’s application of a 57% positive influence factor to the subject property while that influence factor was not applied to surrounding properties. But merely disputing the methodology used to calculate the assessment (i.e. the influence factor) does not prove a more accurate valuation. The Petitioners must show that the total assessment is not a reasonable measure of true tax value. Arguments based on strict application of the Guidelines are not sufficient to rebut the assumption that the assessment is correct. O’Donnell, 854 N.E.2d at 95; Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 841 N. E. 2d 674, 678 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006). Accordingly, the purportedly improper use of the positive influence factor is not significant so long as the bottom-line valuation is justified.
Comparing assessments and/or land base rates without relating those amounts to actual market value-in-use is not probative. It is not enough to show the subject property is assessed for more than other property. See also Westfield Golf Practice Center v. Washington Twp. Assessor, 859 N.E.2d 396, 399 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2007); P/A Builders & Developers, LLC v. Jennings Co. Assessor, 842 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (focus is on determining whether the assessed value is actually correct.) If the Petitioner was attempting to make a case based on lack of uniformity and equality, it did not do so. According to the Tax Court, ―when a taxpayer challenges the uniformity and equality of his or her assessment one approach that he or she may adopt involves the presentation of assessment ratio studies, which compare the assessed values of properties within an assessing jurisdiction with objectively verifiable data, such as sales prices or market value-in-use appraisals.‖ Westfield Golf, 859 N.E.2d at 399 n.3. Such studies, however, must be prepared according to professionally acceptable standards. See Kemp v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 726 N.E.2d 395, 404 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000). Such studies must be based on a statistically reliable sample of properties that actually sold. See Bishop v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 743 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (citing Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Markham, 632 So.2d 272, 276 (Fla. Dist. Co. App. 1994). The Petitioner failed to establish that the five other assessments it relied on satisfy that requirement.
Unfortunately, both parties failed to provide the kind of detailed comparative analysis that would assist the Board in reaching a conclusion in this case. But after weighing all the evidence, it is possible to reach a limited conclusion: The market value-in-use of the subject property is not less than the range established by the sales of lot B and lot C, which is somewhere between $109,400 per acre and $138,760 per acre. Most
importantly, as the Respondent pointed out, the entire range is more than the current assessment.
