Saturday, April 6, 2013

Third Circuit Certifies Graduated Wagering Tax Question to Indiana Supreme Court in Racino Bankruptcy


The following question of law was certified to the Indiana Supreme Court for disposition:


Are the funds that racinos must distribute pursuant to Ind. Code § 4-35-7-12 included in “adjusted gross receipts received” for purposes of the Graduated Wagering Tax, Ind. Code § 4-35-8-1?
 

Excerpts of the Third Circuit Order follow:

The facts relevant to the question certified are as follows:

(a) Indianapolis Downs, LLC (“Indianapolis Downs”) is the operator of an Indiana racino and a debtor in the process of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Hoosier Park, LLP is also an operator of an Indiana racino and is present in this case as an intervenor-appellee. These two entities represent the entirety of the Indiana racino industry.

(b) In November 2010, Indianapolis Downs filed a tax refund claim with the Indiana Department of Revenue (“IDOR”) seeking a refund for the taxes it had paid on the set-aside funds in fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010 and part of 2011. IDOR denied the claim.

(c) Subsequently, while in Chapter 11 proceedings, Indianapolis Downs filed a Motion for a Determination of the Legality of Certain Taxes, which challenged the application of the Graduated Wagering Tax to the set-aside funds. The motion did not seek a refund for taxes already paid. Rather, it sought a determination of whether the Graduated Wagering Tax must be paid on set-aside funds in the future. After hearing argument, the Bankruptcy Court entered its opinion on October 26, 2011, holding that the Graduated Wagering Tax did not apply to the set-aside funds. IDOR appealed the opinion to the District Court, and Indianapolis Downs initiated a direct appeal to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158 (d)(2). We agreed to hear the direct appeal.

(d) Meanwhile, Indianapolis Downs filed both an action in the Indiana Tax Court and a refund proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court to pursue a refund. Indianapolis Downs immediately informed the Indiana Tax Court of the related proceedings and requested a stay, which was granted. IDOR requested that the Tax Court vacate the stay, but it declined to do so. IDOR then challenged the stay in the Indiana Supreme Court. IDOR also petitioned for direct review of the merits of the tax dispute by the Indiana Supreme Court. On June 20, 2012 the Indiana Supreme Court voted to affirm the stay and to deny IDOR’s petition for direct review.

(e) In fiscal year 2012, Indianapolis Downs paid approximately $70 million in Graduated Wagering Tax and distributed approximately $37 million as required by Ind. Code § 4-35-7-12. In accordance with the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion, it did not pay tax on the $37 million in set-aside funds. Indianapolis Downs paid $10.6 million less in Graduated Wagering Tax than it would have if it were required to include the set-aside funds in its taxable adjusted gross receipts.

IDOR argues to this court that the Graduated Wagering Tax is unambiguous and “adjusted gross receipts received” includes the set-aside funds. IDOR asserts that the term “received” is non-technical and, given its ordinary meaning, applies to any funds of which Indianapolis Downs takes possession. IDOR further contends that, in the context of the highly regulated racino industry, the state may tax the set-aside funds even if Indianapolis Downs has no beneficial interest in them. Lastly, IDOR argues that it is immaterial whether the Graduated Wagering Tax imposes double taxation because double taxation does not per se invalidate a taxation statute.

Indianapolis Downs argues that it never “receives” the set-aside funds for purposes of the Graduated Wagering Tax because it never receives the beneficial use of the funds. Rather, it is a mere conduit through which the funds flow to the entities designated by Ind. Code § 4-35-7-12. Indianapolis Downs contends that, under Indiana law, it may not be taxed on funds that simply pass through it to others. Indianapolis Downs also argues that, by IDOR’s reading, the Racino Statute results in double taxation, which Indiana law disfavors.
The Bankruptcy Court found the Racino Statute to be ambiguous. Turning to broader principles of Indiana law, the Court agreed with Indianapolis Downs that Indiana common law generally prohibits taxing funds for which a party is a mere conduit, and also disfavors double taxation. The Bankruptcy Court reasoned that, in the absence of a clear statutory directive to the contrary, set-aside funds should not be deemed “received” for purposes of the Graduated Wagering Tax.

This court has consistently refrained from certifying cases to state courts when we can confidently predict how the state court would decide the issue presented. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. DiBartolo, 171 F.3d 168, 169 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (declining to certify a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in part because the issue was not sufficiently difficult). In this case, however, we cannot predict with confidence how the Indiana Supreme Court would decide this issue. There are no decisions that we are aware of applying Ind. Code §§ 4-35-7-12 and 4-35-8-1.
Furthermore, we believe that the question of law certified is of such substantial public importance in Indiana as to require prompt and definitive resolution by your Honorable Court. The issue is significant both in terms of the amount in controversy and for future policy in the state. We have found certification to be “a useful vehicle . . . to give the state supreme courts an opportunity to elucidate an important issue of state law, thereby avoiding erroneous predictions that will confuse rather than clarify the issue.” Kendrick v. Dist. Attorney of Phila., 488 F.3d 217, 219 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007). While we are strangers to Indiana tax law and Indiana’s racino industry, the Indiana Supreme Court is the entity that can interpret the Racino Statute in the manner most consistent with Indiana’s law and policy. Because the Supreme Court of Indiana is uniquely qualified to decide this novel question of Indiana law, and because certification may “in the long run save time, energy, and resources and help[] build a cooperative judicial federalism,” Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974), we think that certification is warranted.

NOW, THEREFORE, the following question of law is certified to the Indiana Supreme Court for disposition according to the rules of that Court:

Are the funds that racinos must distribute pursuant to Ind. Code § 4-35-7-12 included in “adjusted gross receipts received” for purposes of the Graduated Wagering Tax, Ind. Code § 4-35-8-1?
 
This court shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal pending the resolution of this certification.


Background on this matter may be found here: