In this case, the Petitioner’s
representative admitted that the Petitioner carried the burden of proof and the
Respondent’s representative agreed with the Petitioner. After a further review,
however, the Board determined that the assessed value of the Petitioner’s
property as a whole increased by more than 5% from the previous year’s
assessment.
Thus, under
Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2, the Respondent should have the burden to prove
the assessment was correct. But, because the Petitioner was represented by
counsel and Mr. Muenich agreed that the Petitioner had the burden at hearing,
the burden of proof will remain with the Petitioner and the Petitioner must
prove that the property’s 2006 assessment was incorrect.
…
The
Petitioner’s representative first argues that the subject property was assessed
too high based on sales of comparable properties. In making this argument, the
Petitioner is essentially relying on a sales comparison approach to establish
the market value-in-use of the property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the sales comparison approach
“estimates the total value of the property directly by comparing it to similar,
or comparable, properties that have sold in the market.”) In order to
effectively use the sales comparison approach as evidence in property
assessment appeals, however, the proponent must establish the comparability of
the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is
“similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative
evidence of the comparability of the properties being examined. Long,
821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the party seeking to rely on the sales comparison
approach must explain the characteristics of the subject property and how those
characteristics compare to those of the purportedly comparable properties. See
Id. at 470-71. They must explain how any differences between the properties
affect their relative market value-in-use. Id.
Here, the
Petitioner’s representative argues that the subject property was over-valued
based on the sale prices of other properties in the area. However, Mr. Muenich
and the Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Bochnowski, made little attempt to compare
any of the neighboring properties to the Petitioner’s property. Mr. Bochnowski
merely testified, for example, that the most comparable property, which he
referred to as the “southern side of the bowtie,” had the same “sort of
influences” as the subject property such as the same rise and ingress and
egress. And for the other properties, Mr. Muenich failed to present any
evidence of the properties’ comparability to the Petitioner’s property. Mr.
Muenich only provided the sale date and sale price of the properties in his
exhibits. Thus, while Mr. Bochnowski presented some evidence of the
comparability of one of the properties, the Petitioner’s evidence falls short
of the burden to prove that the subject property’s assessment was incorrect.
The
Petitioner also offered an appraisal of 9545 North Industrial Drive in an
attempt to show that the subject property was over-assessed. Generally the most
effective method to establish a property’s value is through the presentation of
a market value-in-use appraisal, completed in conformance with the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. Kooshtard Property VI, LLC v.
White River Twp. Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 501, 506 n. 6 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005).
Here, however, the appraisal that was presented by Mr. Muenich was for a
completely different property. While the Petitioner’s witness purported to use
the appraisal to show that the subject property was over-assessed, he did not
explain how the subject property was comparable to the appraised property.
Moreover, Mr. Bochnowski failed to make any adjustments to account for the
differences between the property that was the subject of the appraisal and the
Petitioner’s property that is the subject of this appeal. Thus, the
Petitioner’s evidence again falls short of the burden to prove that the subject
property’s assessment was incorrect.
Finally,
the Petitioner’s representative argued the subject property’s assessment was
too high based on its location and use. But the Petitioner presented no
evidence to support an argument that that the Petitioner’s property should have
a different land value than properties to the north except for Mr. Bochnowski’s
conclusory testimony that land values decrease as properties move south toward
St. John. Nor did the Petitioner show that the property was incorrectly
assessed as a commercial property. While the rules of evidence generally do not
apply in the Board’s hearings, the Board requires some evidence of the accuracy
and credibility of the evidence. Statements that are unsupported by probative
evidence are conclusory and of little value to the Board in making its
determination. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 704
N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); and Herb v. State Board of Tax
Commissioners, 656 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995).
Even if
the Petitioner had shown that different values should have been used for
different parts of the town or that the Petitioner’s property was assessed
improperly as a commercial property, the Petitioner failed to show that its
property’s assessment did not accurately reflect the property’s market value. A
Petitioner fails to sufficiently rebut the presumption that an assessment is
correct by simply contesting the method the assessor used to compute the
assessment. Eckerling v. Wayne Township Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 678
(Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); P/A Builders & Developers v. Jennings County
Assessor, 842 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (recognizing that the
current assessment system is a departure from the past practice in Indiana,
stating that “under the old system, a property’s assessed value was correct as
long as the assessment regulations were applied correctly. The new system, in
contrast, shifts the focus from mere methodology to determining whether the
assessed value is actually correct”). Thus, the Petitioner failed to
raise a prima facie case that its property’s assessed value should be lowered.
