The
Respondent acknowledged that the assessed value increase was more than 5%. According to Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2, the
Respondent has the burden to prove the total assessed value of $636,500 is
correct.
…
The
Respondent did not attempt to make a prima facie case supporting the assessment
of $636,500 and admitted the assessment should be reduced to the prior year’s
valuation, which was $592,000. This change is consistent with other Board final
determinations where the Respondent failed to satisfy the burden imposed by
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2. To the extent
the Petitioner requested an even lower valuation, the Petitioner has the burden
of proof.
The
Petitioner did not provide substantial, probative evidence to support her claim
that the 2009 assessment should be anything less than $592,000.
…
The
Petitioner’s conclusory testimony about declining housing prices in 2006 and
2007 is not substantial, probative evidence to support her claim. She
attributed her statement to an unspecified article from the Expedia website.
Assuming, arguendo, that there was such a general trend, that fact does
not prove an accurate value for the subject property because the Petitioner
failed to establish specifically how such a general trend might have affected
the value of the subject property. In addition, the record contains nothing
relating that evidence to the required valuation date, January 1, 2008.
Accordingly, this evidence is not probative. Long, 821 N.E.2d 471.
It
has frequently been recognized that an appraisal of the subject property can be
a very good way to prove an accurate valuation in an assessment appeal. But
again, the Petitioner failed to provide any substantial evidence to relate
either the appraised value as of September 1, 1998, or the appraised value as
of April 21, 2006, to the required valuation date, which was January 1, 2008.
Therefore, neither of the appraisals is probative evidence for this case. Id.
The
Petitioner attempted to support her alleged valuation with several years of
insurance invoices. This evidence shows that the subject property was insured
as a 1-family brick rental. In 2005 the limit of liability was $275,300. This
limit increased over the next several invoices. The most recent documents show
it increased to $399,000 in December 2009 and $475,215 in December 2012. The
Respondent also admitted that the house was not brick—it is stone and frame
construction. While those documents perhaps are some evidence of a minimum
market value for the house, nothing shown on the documents supports the
Petitioner’s claim that ―insurance experts‖ determined those limits of
liability were market values of the property. Nothing in the record explains
the basis for those values, how they were determined, or the qualifications of
the individuals who made the determinations. Nothing in this evidence precludes
the possibility that the Petitioner simply elected to insure less than the
actual market value of the house. The insurance documents do not help to prove
the Petitioner’s claim.
The
Petitioner also acknowledged that none of the insurance figures included land
value, which she claimed was approximately $40,000. While she testified about
facts that probably have some kind of negative impact on the land value of the
subject property, she failed to provide any substantial evidence to quantify
the impact of those facts on the market value of her property.2 Ultimately, the
Petitioner’s testimony that the land value was only $40,000 is merely an
unsupported conclusion. It does not help prove her case. See Whitley
Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 1998).
There
was no dispute that the subject property is used as a rental. As previously
noted, the income approach is a generally recognized and used technique to
value property. It is also commonly called income capitalization. For income
producing property, appraisers frequently consider this approach. If they had
been for a relevant time, the leases for the subject property might have been a
starting point for using the income capitalization approach in this case. But
the Petitioner did nothing to establish that using these leases, which are
several years old, would be consistent with generally accepted appraisal
principles. Furthermore, the Petitioner offered absolutely no calculations that
even begin to resemble the income capitalization approach to valuation. The
Petitioner simply testified in a conclusory manner that normal value for a
property is 1% of the rental rate. She made no attempt to explain the basis or
validity for such a rule. Again, such bald conclusions do not help prove a
case. Id.
Finally,
the Petitioner and the Respondent both addressed the fact that over the past 4
years the Petitioner has attempted to sell the subject property with asking
prices ranging from $799,000 down to $599,000. Those efforts have been
unsuccessful. From the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the asking
prices have been too high. The Respondent, however, has agreed to a valuation
that is even less.
