Here,
the undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Skish purchased the subject properties
at a tax sale on March 31, 2001, for $1,669. Moreover, the evidence shows that
tax sales are common in the properties’ neighborhood and may, in fact,
represent the market in that area. In addition, the Board lowered the
properties’ assessments for the 2002 assessment year from $7,400 to $1,700 a
parcel. The 2002 assessment date is based on a valuation date of January 1,
1999. 50 IAC 21-3-3.
Mr.
Skish argues that “trending” the properties’ 2001 purchase price, or the value determined
in the Board’s Final Determination on the properties’ 2002 values, supports a
value of $1,700 per parcel because the fact that the assessor used the properties’
original 2002 assessed values for the properties’ 2006 assessments shows that
the assessor saw “no change in the market” between 1999 and 2005. Moreover, Mr.
Skish argues that “this is confirmed by the subject’s neighborhood trending
factor of 1.01 utilized by the assessor for the 2006 reassessment.” But the
Petitioner failed to offer any evidence that the trending factor was 1.01 or
that the “neighborhood factor” was related to trending the properties’ values
from 1999 to 2005. And the Petitioner presented no evidence that the value of
properties did not change between 1999 and 2005.
The
Petitioner characterizes the assessments as being “restored” in 2006 to their
2002 value before the Board’s determination lowering the value. But it is also
possible that the assessor determined the properties’ values increased from
$1,700 to $7,400 in the six years between valuation dates. However, the
assessor failed to appear to argue its position or present any evidence to
support such a finding. Thus, the Board gives some weight to the Petitioner’s
argument that because the assessor originally valued the properties at $7,400
in 2002 and again valued the properties at $7,400 in 2006, property values in
the area did not significantly change during the relevant time period.
The
Petitioner also contends that sales of comparable properties support his
argument that the purchase price of the subject properties reflects the
properties’ values for the 2006 assessment year. In making this argument the
Petitioner essentially relies on a sales comparison approach to establish the
market value-in-use of the property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the
sales comparison approach “estimates the total value of the property directly
by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the
market.”) In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach as evidence
in a property assessment appeal, however, the proponent must establish the comparability
of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is
“similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative evidence
of the comparability of the properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470.
Instead, the proponent must identify the characteristics of the subject
property and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics
of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the
proponent must explain how any differences between the properties affect their
relative market values-in-use. Id.
In
support of his argument, the Petitioner presented five vacant lots that sold
for prices ranging from $.20 to $.72 a square foot. According to the
Petitioner, the properties were comparable to the subject properties in their
topography, lack of a sewer system and the requirement for a septic tank and
leach field installation. But despite the fact that the Petitioner’s list of
sales showed that at least seven properties sold in 2004 and 2005, only one of
Mr. Skish’s comparable sales fell within the time frame used for the March 1,
2006, assessment date. See 50 IAC 21-3-3(a) (“The local assessing official
shall use sales of properties occurring between January 1, 2004, and December
31, 2005, in performing sales ratio studies for the March 1, 2006, assessment
date.”). Three of his comparable properties sold in 2003 and one sold in 2002.
However, again, the assessor failed to appear or submit evidence of other sales
that occurred during the relevant time period. Thus, while those additional
sales might have supported the properties’ assessed values, the only evidence
before the Board supports the Petitioner’s requested values.
Once
the Petitioner establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
assessing official to rebut the Petitioner's evidence. See American United
Life Ins. Co. v. Maley, 803 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004). Here the
assessor failed to appear or submit any evidence in support of the properties’
assessed values. Thus, the Respondent failed to impeach or rebut the
Petitioner’s admittedly minimal prima facie case.
