The Petitioner presented evidence about sales of several properties in downtown Aurora. One sale occurred in 2007, another in 2009, and one in 2010. The evidence offered by the Petitioner had no dates for the others. The Petitioner presented nothing to relate that sales data to the relevant valuation date. Therefore, those sales have no probative value here. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471.
Furthermore, in order to use comparable sales as evidence and draw any legitimate conclusion about the value of the subject property, the proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. The Petitioner was “responsible for explaining to the Indiana Board the characteristics of their own property, how those characteristics compared to those of the purportedly comparable properties, and how any differences affected the relevant market value-in-use of the properties.” Id. at 471.
According to the Petitioner, the actual value of his property is less because it is in a designated flood plain and it floods. Nothing in the record disputes the fact that the subject property is in the flood plain and has flooding issues. In fact, the Respondent admitted a negative influence factor had already reduced the assessed valuation for that very reason. The Petitioner presented no probative evidence to quantify any additional influence of flooding on the market value-in-use of the subject property. His unsubstantiated conclusions regarding the impact of the flooding do not constitute probative evidence. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). The evidence about flooding problems does not prove the assessed values for the subject property must be changed.
The Petitioner also complained about the presence of Wal-Mart and the many vacant commercial structures in Aurora resulting from that presence. He provided a list of 17 vacancies, primarily on Second Street and Third Street, in downtown Aurora as of October 24, 2011. But he provided virtually no other information about those properties, how they compare to the subject property, or even if they would actually compete for the same kind of potential buyers or tenants. Nothing in the record disputes the fact that these vacancies exist, although only the Petitioner’s conclusory testimony links those vacancies to Wal-Mart. More importantly, even if other vacancies reduce the value of the Petitioner’s property to some degree, he once again provided no probative evidence to quantify that impact on the market value-in-use of the subject property. Therefore, without more facts and explanation, the presence of Wal-Mart and the large number of vacant commercial structures does not help to prove the disputed assessed value is wrong. Similarly, they do not prove what a more accurate market value-in-use for the subject property might be.
