Monday, July 15, 2013

Board Finds County Failed to Rebut Taxpayer's Appraised Value and Purchase Price

Excerpts of the Board's Determination follow:

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c. There is no dispute about the fact that the Petitioner bought the subject property for $195,000 on August 19, 2011. There also is no dispute that the subject property was appraised for $230,000 as of September 13, 2011, and the fact that the appraiser is an Indiana Licensed Residential Appraiser who certified that she prepared the appraisal in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP).

d. In this case, the Petitioner’s purchase and the appraisal were within six months of the assessment date. They both are close enough in time to be probative evidence for this case. The Petitioner made a prima facie case through either one. Consequently, the Board must consider how effectively the Respondent rebutted or impeached the Petitioner’s case.

e. The Respondent started by attempting to prove the assessments totaling $365,200 are correct because these properties were listed with one realtor for a combined asking price of $399,800 for more than a year and subsequently they were listed with another realtor for an additional period with a combined asking price of $389,900. But they did not sell during either of these listings. These unsuccessful listings probably indicate an accurate valuation would be something less than $389,900. But that fact is irrelevant. It does nothing to establish that $365,200 actually is an accurate valuation. Ultimately, the Respondent offered no substantial evidence that the existing assessed values correspond to the actual market value-in-use of the subject property. Instead, the Respondent primarily focused on attacking the credibility of the Petitioner’s purchase price and the appraisal.

f. The Respondent claimed the appraisal is flawed and should be given little or no weight because it contains misleading statements and errors. The main attack on the appraisal related to the land value adjustments for the comparables. According to Mr. Simoni, the appraiser stated that typical lake frontage is between 50 feet and 100 feet, with excess front footage valued at $500-$1,000 per front foot. According to Mr. Simoni, the appraiser’s adjustments for the comparables were not enough. (The appraiser explained her adjustments in the Supplemental Addendum. She used $500 per front foot. She adjusted less per front foot because the subject had excess frontage and she deemed a minimal adjustment of $500 necessary.) Mr. Simoni purported to recalculate the appraiser’s land adjustments on the comparables using $1,500 a front foot. He substituted his opinion of land value to arrive at a higher range of values based on the same comparables. Nothing in the record indicates that his attempt to redo part of another appraiser’s work to correct it (thereby reaching a higher range of values) is consistent with USPAP or generally accepted appraisal principles. Although he is an appraiser, Mr. Simoni clearly stated that he did not do an appraisal of the subject property and he was not attempting to provide an opinion of its value. It is clear that Mr. Simoni did not testify as an unbiased appraiser in this case. Accordingly, his attempt to redo calculations in another appraiser’s work and use those to support a higher conclusion of value regarding the subject property has little or no probative value.

g. Similarly, the Respondent attempted to attack the appraisal because it was prepared for refinancing purposes. Conclusory evidence and argument was offered on this point, however, it provided very little, if any, reason to conclude the appraiser’s opinion of value was wrong.

h. But Mr. Simoni criticized other aspects of the appraisal as well. For example, he noted a substantial mistake in the lake frontage of comparable #8 and a small mistake the lake frontage of the subject property. In final analysis, these errors diminish the credibility and weight of the appraisal because they indicate the appraiser was not as careful as she should have been.

i. Even though the Petitioner paid $195,000 for the subject property, the Respondent argued that price is not a reliable indication of market value-in-use. The Respondent claimed the transaction did not meet the definition of market value because the definition requires allowing a reasonable time for exposure on the open market. The Respondent claims this requirement was lacking, but the Board disagrees. Before the Petitioner bought the subject property, these parcels were exposed on the market for a long time by two different realtors with an asking price of almost $400,000. The Respondent’s claim that there would have been more potential buyers if the asking price had been lower. And perhaps a significantly lower asking price would have been better by encouraging more offers. But the Board will not base a final determination on that kind of speculation. The lengthy marketing time for the subject property with a series of realtors cannot be disregarded simply because the final selling price was only about half of the asking price. (Of course, differences between asking price and an offer to purchase are common. Negotiating and resolving those differences to reach a final selling price is also common practice.) Nothing in the record indicates the sale was made under duress or that it was not an arm’s-length transaction. Therefore, this point is not a substantial reason to disregard the Petitioner’s purchase price.

j. The Respondent also argued the Petitioner’s purchase price was not valid for trending purposes because it was an outlier. In other words, the Respondent claims that the Petitioner somehow bought the subject property for substantially less than other people have paid for comparable properties. But the Respondent failed to support this conclusory testimony with substantial, probative evidence.

k. The Respondent offered several purportedly comparable sales. In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach, however, the proponent must establish comparability. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” are not enough. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. The proponent must identify the characteristics of the subject property and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the proponent must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id.

l. The Respondent presented no substantial evidence to show that the other properties actually are comparables. The record contains no meaningful analysis of size, location, age, condition, or other specific factors that must be considered to draw any kind of meaningful conclusion from a comparison. Because the Respondent failed to identify or value the differences between the properties, the other sales have no probative value. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan v. Jennings Co. Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 1075, 1082 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005) (“the Court has frequently reminded taxpayers that statements that another property ‘is similar’ or ‘is comparable’ are nothing more than conclusions and conclusory statements do not constitute probative evidence. Rather, when challenging an assessment on the basis that the comparable property has been treated differently, the taxpayer must provide specific reasons as to why it believes the property is comparable. These standards are no less applicable to assessing officials.” (citations omitted and emphasis added)).

http://www.in.gov/ibtr/files/Binkley_75-008-11-1-5-09800_etc.pdf