Excerpts from the Board's Determination follow:
The Petitioner first presented
sales disclosure forms for the 2011 and the 2012 sale of a property located on
the same street as the subject properties. The Petitioner contends that the
sales show a downturn in the market and the property’s sale prices have a
negative impact on the value of his properties. However, both sales of the
property occurred outside the time frame used for the March 1, 2010. 50 IAC
27-3-2 states that “county assessors shall use sales of properties occurring
after January 1, of the calendar year immediately preceding the March 1
assessment date in performing value calibration analysis and sales ratio
studies under this article for the county. For example, sales beginning on
January 1, 2009, shall be used for the March 1, 2010, assessment.” Here, the
first sale of the property occurred on September 9, 2011 – eighteen months
after the March 1, 2010, valuation date. The second sale occurred on March 9, 2012 – two years after
the valuation date. For the same reason, the sales of the four multi-family
properties submitted as Petitioner Exhibit C are not probative of the subject
properties’ values because all of the sales took place in 2012. Because the
Petitioner made no attempt to relate the various sale prices to the subject
properties’ market value-in-use as of the proper valuation date, Mr. Potter’s
comparable sales have little probative value.
In addition,
the sale of 2126-2136 Cliburn in 2011 was a sheriff’s sale and the sale in 2012
was part of a bulk sale from the bank that purchased the property at the
sheriff’s sale. In some cases, convincing evidence has established that forced
sales dominate a particular market. Under those circumstances, even forced
sales can be relevant. See Lake County Assessor v. U. S. Steel Corp, 901
N.E. 2d 85, 91-92 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2009) (finding the Board did not err in relying
on bankruptcy sales where the taxpayer proved such sales were the market norm
in the steel industry.) Here, however, the Petitioner did not prove that
distress sales were the norm for the subject properties’ neighborhood.
The Petitioner
also submitted assessment information for three comparable properties located
on public streets. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-18(c), “To accurately
determine market-value-in-use, a taxpayer or an assessing official may …
introduce evidence of the assessments of comparable properties located in the
same taxing district or within two (2) miles of a boundary of the taxing
district…” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18. The “determination of whether properties
are comparable shall be made using generally accepted appraisal and assessment
practices.” Id.
In his
assessment analysis, the Petitioner used data from Marshall Swift and American
Crushing to estimate a value of $4,500 for each parcel for their lack of city
utilities. Yet the Petitioner failed to sufficiently explain his valuation
method. Mr. Potter estimated a value reduction of $5,475.69 under Marshall and
Swift and $6,388.89 based on data provided by American Crushing, or an “average
value reduction” of $5,932 for water and sewer services. Attachment to Board
Exhibit A. In addition, he estimated a “loss of income to Scavenger
Service” of $1,500. Id. From those “losses in value,” Mr. Potter
estimated a value reduction of $8,333 and a “total value reduction” $14,226. Id.
The Board is unsure how these values were reached. Moreover, Mr. Potter
failed to show that the amortized cost of installing water and sewer lines was
equal to the value to the properties of having city control of those water and
sewer lines. And the Petitioner’s assumption that city waste disposal services
was worth $1,500 was wholly unsupported by any evidence. Thus, because “it is
the taxpayer's duty to walk the Indiana Board . . . through every element of
the analysis,” the Petitioner’s cost analysis is given little probative weight.
See Indianapolis Racquet Club, Inc. v. Washington Township Assessor, 802
N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004).
The Petitioner
also applied adjustments for the differences between the subject properties and
his comparable properties for their locations and the size of their living
areas. But again these adjustments are unsupported by probative evidence. For example,
on 3619 West Thornhill Circle, the Petitioner deducted $10,000 for its
“inferior location” and on for 3002 Butterfield Court and 2018 Bridgewater
Circle, the Petitioner deducted $15,000 and $18,000 respectively for their
“superior locations.” The same may be said regarding the Petitioner’s
adjustments for minor differences in size between the properties. Mr. Potter reports
that the duplex at 3619 West Thorndale is 32 sq.ft. smaller than his duplexes,
but subtracts $1,600 from the assessed value of the smaller structure. More
importantly, Mr. Potter provided no evidence that 32 sq.ft. of living space is
worth $1,600. Statements that are unsupported by probative evidence are
conclusory and of little value to the Board in making its determination. Whitley
Products, Inc. v, State Board of Tax Commissioners, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119
(Ind. Tax Ct. 1998).
Finally, the
Petitioner’s evidence shows that his “comparable” properties were assessed at
$151,300, $161,500, and $157,900, respectively, in 2010. Therefore, contrary to
the Petitioner’s contentions, Mr. Potter’s comparable properties’ assessed
values do not support a finding that his properties were over-assessed in 2010.
And, in fact, support the properties’ assessed values of $150,500.
Ultimately,
the Petitioner’s issue is with the subdivision’s location on a “private drive”
and the lack of city services the properties receive as a result of that
designation. However, that was a choice the developer of the subdivision made
that was memorialized in the properties’ covenants years before the Petitioner
purchased the subject properties. While the Petitioner may be unhappy with that
designation, the classification of Cliburn Road as a private drive was public
knowledge at the time of his purchase. Regardless, the Board has no
jurisdiction over the provision of city services to the Petitioner’s
properties.
