The Petitioner’s case primarily
relies on an appraisal prepared by Sara Coers that estimated the value of the
subject property for the 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 assessment years and
the testimony of Ms. Coers. Ms. Coers is a credible witness and her work
appears to conform to generally accepted appraisal principles. She is an
Indiana certified appraiser who attested that she prepared the Petitioner’s
appraisal in accordance with USPAP. The appraiser used the income approach and
sales-comparison approach to value the property and estimated the property’s
value as of the correct valuation dates. Pet’r Ex. 2.
While the Respondent may have
impeached portions of Ms. Coers’ appraisal and her testimony, it did not
destroy the credibility or probative value of that evidence. Here, the
Respondent attempted to impugn the Petitioner’s appraisal by questioning the
appraiser’s methodology and sources. The Respondent argued that the
Petitioner’s appraiser used the wrong comparable properties to estimate the
subject property’s income or sales-comparison value. The Respondent believes
that Ms. Coers use of vacant properties was inappropriate, because vacant
properties should not be compared to the subject property as it is income
producing. Ms. Beckman stated that the use of vacant properties would be
appropriate when dealing with a short term lease, which is 3 to 5 years. The
subject has less than 5 years on the lease. The Respondent also argued that the
appraiser should never have averaged the results in order to reconcile her
values. The Respondent further stated that the Petitioner’s appraiser failed to
review all the available information, such as traffic counts. Credible
evidence, however, established that traffic counts were taken into consideration
in Ms. Coers’ analysis of location adjustments. The Respondent also contends
that Ms. Coers’ adjustments were excessive, thereby making the properties no
longer comparable. The Respondent, however, did not credibly establish that
these “flaws” invalidate the Petitioner’s evidence. “Open-ended questions” and
“conclusory statements” are not sufficient to rebut the Petitioner’s case. See
Hometowne Associates, L.P. v. Maley, 839 N.E.2d 269, 278 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2005). It is well within an appraiser’s expertise to choose the sales she deems
“most comparable” to the subject property or how best to value a property.
Based on everything that is in the record, the Board finds the method of
valuation and the comparable properties chosen by Ms. Coers are reasonable.
The
Petitioner’s expert witness determined that the gas station/convenience store
had no value. Ms. Coers testified that while Kmart may have received a minimal
amount of income from snacks and drinks sold in the tiny convenience store, the
Petitioner/owner received nothing additional by allowing the gas station to be
built on the property. Furthermore, an investor would get no use and would
receive no income from this gas station/convenience store, and an owner would
consider it to be a liability due to the presence of the underground gas tanks.
The underground gas tanks would likely need to be removed because of the
environmental problems they could cause. In response to the Ms. Coers’ analysis
of the gas station, the Respondent’s witness did not meet the burden of showing
that the gas station did, in fact, have value. Ms. Beckman testified that she
used five comparables. At no point in her analysis did Ms. Beckman describe the
differences between her comparables and the subject, nor did she explain any
adjustments that were made in order to reach her value conclusions. Although
the Board may have some doubt that the gas station/convenience store holds
absolutely no value, given the Respondent’s failure to provide the Board with
sufficient evidence concerning said value, the Board must find that the gas
station/convenience store holds no value.
Despite the
Respondent’s criticisms, the Petitioner made a prima facie case for a lower
assessment for each of the tax years at issue. See Meridian Towers, 805
N.E.2d at 479 (An appraisal performed in accordance with generally recognized
appraisal principles is often enough to establish a prima facie case that a
property’s assessment is over-valued).
In support of
the Respondent’s case-in-chief, Ms. Beckman stated that for her income approach
analysis, she considered sales from assessments she had done in the last few
years pertaining to big boxes. The information was given to her confidentially,
and therefore, Ms. Beckman could not legally share said evidence with the
Petitioner. There are procedures in place that allow a party to submit
confidential information as evidence in an administrative hearing, thereby
allowing the opposing party to view only the redacted version of said evidence.
See 52 IAC 2-7-5. When a witness relies on evidence to support her
conclusions, she cannot merely state that said evidence is “confidential” and
therefore cannot be shown to the opposing party. This argument essentially
destroys the credibility of the evidence relied upon by the witness.
The result of
this case essentially boils down to a credibility comparison between the
parties’ expert witnesses. While the analysis of Respondent’s witness may not
differ significantly from the calculations made by a certified appraiser in an
appraisal report, the assumptions of the Petitioner’s appraiser, a Member of
the Appraisal Institute, are backed by her education, training, and experience.
Ms. Coers certified that she complied with USPAP. Thus, the Board, as the
trier-of-fact, can infer that Ms. Coers used objective data, where available,
to quantify her adjustments. Where objective data was not available, the Board
can infer that Ms. Coers relied on her education, training and experience to
estimate a reliable quantification. On the other hand, Ms. Beckman did not
certify that she complied with USPAP in performing her valuation analysis. In
the final analysis, the Board finds the appraisal and testimony of Ms. Coers to
be more persuasive than the market value analysis and testimony of Ms. Beckman.
In further
support of the Respondent’s case, Ms. Beckman analyzed the subject property’s
value by using the sales-comparison approach. However, she did not offer a
summary of her analysis. Instead, Ms. Beckman pointed to an exhibit that
contains sale and listing information for 79 big box properties from throughout
Indiana, stating that she looked through the information and disregarded sales
that were inapplicable. The majority of the sales, however, were multi-property
sales or portfolio sales. Ms. Beckman stated that she researched other big box
properties, but did not bring any evidence to demonstrate said properties and
their pertinent information. The same type of process was used by Ms. Beckman
for the gas station/convenience store analysis. While she used significantly
less comparables, Ms. Beckman basically handed a packet of information to the
Board without explaining the similarities or differences between the subject
and the comparables or why certain adjustments were made to account for any
differences between the two. A party cannot merely hand raw data to the Board
and expect the Board to figure out to what it pertains or what argument it
proves. As stated previously, a party has a duty to walk the Board through
every element of the analysis. Indianapolis Racquet Club, Inc. v. Washington
Twp. Assessor, 802 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004).
The entirety
of the Respondent’s case was less detailed, more conclusory, and less credible
than the case offered by the Petitioner.
