The Assessor did not meet her
burden of proving that the subject property’s assessed value was correct for
2011. The Board reached this conclusion for the following reasons:
...
Here, the Assessor relied on
her analyses of residential home sales and agricultural land sales in Union
Township. The sales-comparison approach is a generally accepted appraisal
methodology that “estimates the total value of [a given] property directly by
comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the
market.” MANUAL at 3. In order to effectively use a sales-comparison
analysis as evidence in a property assessment appeal, however, the proponent must
show that the properties on which that analysis is based are truly comparable
to the property under appeal. Conclusory statements that a property is
“similar” or “comparable” to another property do not suffice. Long v. Wayne
Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d at 470 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Instead, the
proponent must identify the appealed property’s characteristics and explain how those characteristics
compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id.
at 471. Similarly, she must explain how any differences between the
properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id.
The Assessor’s
sales-comparison analyses did not meet the threshold requirements for those
analyses to carry probative weight. True, in her residential sales-comparison
analysis, the Assessor examined how her four properties compared to the subject
property in some areas. For example, she compared the homes in regard to the
number of bedrooms and bathrooms; by whether the house had a fireplace or
garage; and by foundation type and finish, age, condition, and size. And she
made adjustments to account for differences in those characteristics. But she
did not establish how she determined the amounts for those adjustments.
While the
adjustments in the Assessor’s analysis may not differ significantly from those
made by a certified appraiser in an appraisal report, the appraiser’s
assertions are backed by his education, training, and experience. The appraiser
also typically certifies that he complied with USPAP. Thus, the Board, as the
trier-of-fact, can infer that the appraiser used objective date, where
available, to quantify his adjustments. And where objective data was not
available, the Board can infer that the appraiser relied on his education,
training, and experience to estimate a reliable quantification. Here, there is
no evidence that either the Assessor or Ms. Newsome are certified appraisers.
Moreover, the Assessor did not certify that she complied with USPAP in
performing her analysis. The Board therefore finds that the Assessor’s
sales-comparison analysis is insufficiently reliable to be probative of the
property’s market value-in-use.
And the
Assessor’s agricultural land sales analysis fares no better. In fact, the
Assessor made no adjustments whatsoever to her purported comparable properties
in that analysis. Thus, the Board finds that the subject property’s assessment
must revert back to its March 1, 2010, level of $178,700.
The Kissells
failed to meet their burden of proving that the subject property’s assessment
should be reduced below its March 1, 2010, level. The Board reached this
conclusion for the following reasons:
Like the
Assessor, the Petitioners here also offer a sales-comparison analysis. But the
Kissells’ analysis suffers from the same problems as the Assessor’s evidence.
Other than explaining that all of the properties are Cape Cod or two-story
homes located on rural tracts, the Kissells’ did little to show how the four
properties on which they based their analysis actually compared to the subject
property. And like the Assessor, while the Kissells adjusted the sale prices of
their comparable properties for the size of the house and lot and whether the
property had outbuildings, they offered no explanation for the amount of their
adjustments. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470.
Further, a
party must explain how its evidence relates to the property’s market
value-in-use as of the relevant valuation date. O’Donnell v. Dep’t of Local
Gov’t Fin., 854 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006), see also Long,
821 N.E.2d at 471. Otherwise, the evidence lacks probative value. Id.
Here, the relevant valuation date was March 1, 2011. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-4.5(f)
(2011). But only the Kissells’ first sale, which was March 11, 2011, bears any
relationship to that valuation date. The Kissells’ second and third sales
occurred on June 19, 2009, and August, 6, 2009, respectively – which are more
than a year and a half before the valuation date. And their fourth sale
occurred on October 27, 2011 – which is more than ten months after the
valuation date. Without some explanation of how the sales related to the March
1, 2011, valuation date, the Kissells’ sales-comparison analysis lacks
probative value. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471 (holding that an appraisal
that estimated a property’s value for December 10, 2003, lacked probative value
in an appeal from a 2002 assessment). Thus, the Petitioners’ sales comparison
analysis fails to raise a prima facie case for a further reduction in the value
of their property.
The
Petitioners also argue that their property was over-assessed based on the
Assessor’s measurements of their house. This too fails to raise a prima facie
case for a reduction in the assessed value of their property. The Petitioners
presented some evidence that their house had 2,294 or 2,296 square feet of
living area. The property record card, however, indicated that their house’s
first floor was assessed with 1,568 square feet of living area and the upper
level was assessed with 1,425 square feet of living area, for a total living
area of 2,993 square feet. But the upper level was assessed as a “half story.”
According to the Guidelines, assessors are to “measure the exterior of each
full or partial floor.” GUIDELINES, Chap. 3 at 9. Thus, the exterior
measurement of the second floor would arguably be equal to the area of the
floor below that it covers, regardless of the fact that some of the area would
not be useable living space. The difference in value then is made up for in the
cost tables where a “half upper story” is valued significantly lower than a
full upper story. See GUIDELINES, App. C., Sch. A. Therefore, the
Board cannot determine from the evidence that the Assessor erred in assessing
the Petitioners’ house.
Even if the
Kissells had sufficiently shown that the Assessor erred in assessing the living
area of their home, the Board notes that a petitioner fails to sufficiently
rebut the presumption that an assessment is correct by simply contesting the
method the assessor used to compute the assessment. Eckerling v. Wayne
Township Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 678 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); P/A Builders
& Developers v. Jennings County Assessor, 842 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 2006) (recognizing that the current assessment system is a departure from
the past practice in Indiana, stating that “under the old system, a property’s
assessed value was correct as long as the assessment regulations were applied
correctly. The new system, in contrast, shifts the focus from mere methodology
to determining whether the assessed value is actually correct”).
