Monday, January 28, 2013

Board Finds Where Respondent Had Burden, Assessor Sufficiently Support Property's Assessed Value

Excerpts of the Board's determination follow:

Both parties agreed the 2006 assessment under appeal increased more than 5% from the assessor’s 2005 assessment. Therefore, the Respondent had the burden of proving that the 2006 assessment is correct. In other words, the Respondent needed to prove the 2006 assessed value is an accurate measure of market value-in-use. See Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 678 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006).

The Respondent presented evidence regarding the sales of four comparable properties located in close proximity to the subject property. All of the comparable properties are tourist homes like the subject and are located in the downtown Nashville area, except for one that is located up the hill approximately a half mile. One of the properties, 176 West Mound Street, sold twice. The first sale took place in February 2004, and the second sale was in July 2006. The respective adjusted sale prices were $182,500 and $197,500. Both of those values are greater than the subject’s assessed value.

Mr. Kelly’s sales analysis shows the similarities and the differences between each comparable and the subject property. All sales occurred from February 2004 to July 2006. The dates of the comparables sales are relevant because a party must explain how its evidence relates to the appealed property’s market value-in-use as of the relevant valuation date. See O’Donnell v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 854 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); see also, Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 NE2d 466, 471 (Ind. Tax Ct 2005). Otherwise, the evidence lacks probative value. Id. For March 1, 2006 assessments, the valuation date is January 1, 2005. 50 IAC 21-3-3 (2006). Therefore, the closer the comparable sale dates are to the valuation date, the more probative the evidence. Here, the comparable sale closest to the subject property had an adjusted sale price of $180,000 and sold in May 2004. The sale prices of the comparables were adjusted to demonstrate what affect the differences would have on value and to arrive at an adjusted sale price for each comparable. All of the adjusted sale prices are greater than the assessed value of the subject property. Mr. Kelly, therefore, presented market value evidence that indicates the subject’s assessment is below its market value-in-use.

The Respondent also argued that the subject property was assessed correctly based on the assessed values of eight other tourist homes in the county. Pursuant to Indiana Code §6-1.1-15-18(c), “To accurately determine market-value-in-use, a taxpayer or an assessing official may … introduce evidence of the assessments of comparable properties located in the same taxing district or within two (2) miles of a boundary of the taxing district….” The “determination of whether properties are comparable shall be made using generally accepted appraisal and assessment practices.” Id. In support of his contention, Mr. Kelly submitted a summary sheet and property record cards for the subject property and other tourist homes in the area that did not sell, within the time frame considered relevant to the January 1, 2005, valuation date. He based his comparison on an assessed value per square foot basis. This was purportedly evidence as to the subject’s market value. While it does demonstrate the subject tourist home was assessed at the low range of the other tourist homes used in the analysis and could have been persuasive to demonstrate the subject property is not over-assessed, the Respondent failed to successfully argue this point.

In order to effectively use a comparison approach as evidence in an assessment appeal, a party must first demonstrate that the properties being examined are comparable to each other. Conclusory statements that a property is similar or comparable to another property are not probative of the properties’ comparability. Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 470-471 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Instead, a party must identify the characteristics of the property under appeal and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. The party must also explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id.

The Respondent did not offer the type of analysis contemplated by the Indiana Tax Court in Long. The only similarities mentioned between the subject and the comparables is that they are all tourist homes characterized as residential and located in Nashville. Mr. Kelly did little to quantitatively or qualitatively show how the differences between the properties affect their relative values. The property record cards provide no way to compare the assessed values of each of the properties. The subject property was assessed for $162,500; whereas the “comparable” properties ranged from $123,000 to $350,700, with no explanation of how the assessor arrived at any of the values. This is not probative evidence that the subject’s assessed value was correct or too low.

As stated previously, the Respondent successfully established the comparability of the properties used in his sales comparison analysis. Mr. Kelly identified the characteristics of the subject property and explained how those characteristics compared to or differed from the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties and then made the necessary adjustments in order to reach the relative market values-in-use. Because the Respondent has made a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party to refute or disprove the evidence. See Meridian Towers East & West v. Washington Township Assessor, 805 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).

Here, the Petitioner focused his attention and argument on the fact that the effective age of the subject had been changed to adjust its assessed value. He opined that the assessor can change only the condition of property to bring it to or closer to the market value.

The Petitioner failed to offer substantial probative evidence about what would have been a more accurate market value-in-use. Mr. Smith merely focused on the use of changing the effective age to bring the true tax value closer to the market value-in-use. Essentially, he challenged the methodology used to develop the property’s assessed value. Evidence and arguments regarding strict application of the Guidelines, however, are not enough to prove that an existing assessment must be changed. See Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (stating “when a taxpayer chooses to challenge an assessment, he or she must show that the assessor's assessed value does not accurately reflect the property's market value-in-use. Strict application of the regulations is not enough to rebut the presumption that the assessment is correct.”) The Petitioner did not show how the assessor's methodology resulted in an assessment that fails to accurately reflect market value-in-use.

Mr. Smith presented the assessments of six purportedly comparable properties. While he stated that the effective age was different than the year built for each of the comparables, two of them actually had the same effective age as the year built. Beyond the fact that Mr. Smith failed to present any meaningful analysis demonstrating how the comparables are actually comparable to the subject, his argument was focused on methodology and not on the actual market value. Therefore, this was not probative evidence of a relevant point to the outcome of this case. See ¶15 (g) above.

The Petitioner stated that the IAAO requires equity within groups and between groups. He failed to explain, however, how this information affects the market value of the subject property. Mr. Smith illustrated that, like the subject property, many properties in downtown Nashville had their effective age changed to bring the true tax value closer to market value-in-use.

Mr. Smith presented a State Board of Accounts special examination of the 2002 reassessment. He failed to relate this examination of a state agency, which has no authority in the mass assessments process, to his contention that the current assessment is in error.

Finally, Mr. Smith introduced an email from Frank Kelly to the Respondent in which he recommends adjusting the effective age of many properties to obtain a better measure of true tax value. Mr. Kelly cautions that this should be done with proof of underlying property value, such as a sale or an appraisal. Again, Mr. Smith failed to relate this information to his contention that the current assessment is in error.