c) First, the Board turns to the
Petitioners’ purchase of the subject property. True, the Petitioners purchased
the property for $31,000 in July 2011. That purchase occurred only eight months
before the March 1, 2012, which normally would lead the Board to conclude that
their purchase price gives at least some indication of the property’s value on
the assessment date. But here, the Petitioners’ purchase was most likely not a
reliable indication of the true value of the subject property on the open
market. The Board does not need to look any further than the Petitioners’ own
appraisal of the property to draw that conclusion.
d) The Petitioners hired Mr.
Reith, certified appraiser, who performed an appraisal in accordance with
USPAP. Mr. Reith estimated the subject property’s value at $60,000 as of
December 31, 2011. An appraisal performed in conformance with generally
recognized appraisal principles is often enough to establish a prima facie case
that a property’s assessment is over-valued. See Meridian Towers, 805
N.E.2d at 479. Further, the appraisal’s effective date is only two months
removed from the assessment’s valuation date. Thus, the Board finds that the
Petitioners raised a prima facie case for reducing the assessment to $60,000.
e) Once the Petitioner
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the assessing official to
rebut the Petitioner’s evidence. See American United Life Ins. Co. v. Maley,
803 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004). The assessing official must offer evidence
that impeaches or rebuts the Petitioner’s evidence. Id.; Meridian Towers, 805
N.E.2d at 479.
f) The Respondent first attempted
to impeach the Petitioners’ appraisal. Specifically, she claimed that the
appraiser chose invalid sales in his sales-comparison analysis. However, the
Respondent offered no actual evidence that the appraiser was biased or that the
appraisal was flawed. It is well within an appraiser’s expertise to choose sales
he deems most comparable to the property under appeal and apply adjustments to
those comparable properties to value the differences between them. Absent probative
evidence to the contrary, the comparable properties the appraiser chose, and
the adjustments he made in a USPAP-compliant appraisal will be deemed reasonable.
Conclusory statements that the appraiser used invalid sales are not sufficient
to rebut the Petitioners’ case. See Hometowne Associates, L.P. v. Maley,
839 N.E.2d 269, 278 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005) (“In none of these exchanges, however,
did Mr. McHenry offer evidence rebutting the validity of Mr. Russel’s
calculations. Rather, he merely made conclusory statements”). The Respondent,
therefore, failed to rebut or impeach the Petitioners’ evidence that their
property was over-valued for the 2012 assessment year.
g) The Respondent also tried to
rebut the appraisal by offering a competing sales comparison analysis for one
property, located a mile away from the subject property. She argued that this
property was a better comparable because it was not a foreclosure or distress
sale. The Respondent failed to make a meaningful comparison of the subject
property to this comparable property. Conclusory statements that a property is
“similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative
evidence of the comparability of the properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at
470. Instead, the proponent must identify the characteristics of the subject property
and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly
comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the proponent must explain
how any differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use.
Id.
h) The Respondent did make a few
adjustments to the sales price on her comparable property. Those adjustments
are not explained. While the appearance of her analysis may not differ
significantly from one made by a certified appraiser in an appraisal report,
the appraiser’s assertions are backed by his education, training, and experience.
The appraiser also typically certifies that he complied with USPAP. Thus, the
Board, as the trier-of-fact, can infer that the appraiser used objective data, where
available, to quantify his adjustments. And where objective data was not available,
the Board can infer that the appraiser relied on his education, training and experience to estimate a reliable
quantification. There is no evidence that the Respondent is a licensed
appraiser in Indiana. Moreover, she did not certify that her analysis complied
with USPAP. The Board therefore finds that the Respondent’s sales-comparable
analysis is insufficiently reliable to be probative of the property’s market
value-in-use.
i) The Respondent did not support
the assessment with substantial evidence.
j) In the alternative, the Board
finds the creditability of the appraisal offered by the Petitioners to outweigh
the Respondent’s evidence of value.
