c. The Petitioner presented
evidence of the uninhabitable condition of the property. The Petitioner’s
evidence, however, shows the condition of the property in 2009 which is months
after the assessment date and almost a year and a half after the valuation
date. Brown contends the poor condition of the property had been ongoing for a
number of years, but the first environmental complaint documented in the
evidence is June 30, 2009, and the photographs of the property were taken in
August of 2009. Brown did not present any evidence in support of his opinion
that the subject property was uninhabitable as of the relevant valuation and
assessment dates. Statements that are unsupported by probative evidence are
conclusory and of little value to the Board in making its determination. Petitioner
Exhibits 1-5; Whitley Products, Inc. v. State
Board of Tax
Commissioners,
704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct.).
d. The Petitioner presented an
appraisal report prepared by Daniel Barrick. Barrick used sales of comparable
properties to establish a value for the subject property of $4,400, post
demolition. Barrick included his qualifications in his appraisal report, but nothing
in the report states that Barrick is an Indiana certified appraiser. While Barrick’s
assertions may not differ significantly from those made by a certified appraiser
in an appraisal report, the appraiser’s assertions are backed by his education,
training, and experience. The appraiser also typically certifies that he complied
with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). Thus,
the Board, as the trier-of-fact, can infer that the appraiser used objective
data where available to quantify his adjustments. And where objective data was
not available, the Board can infer that the appraiser relied on his education,
training and experience to estimate a reliable quantification. Here, however,
there is no evidence that Barrick is a certified appraiser. He did not
establish that he has any particular expertise in applying generally accepted
appraisal principles; and he did not certify that he complied with USPAP in
performing his analysis. Consequently, Barrick’s appraisal report lacks
probative value in this case. See Inland Steel Co. v. State Board of Tax
Commissioners, 739 N.E.2d 201, 220 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000) (holding that an appraiser’s
opinion lacked probative value where the appraiser failed to explain what a
producer price index was, how it was calculated or that its use as a deflator
was a generally accepted appraisal technique).
e. Additionally, the appraisal
report was prepared on November 18, 2010, after the residence was demolished.
The appraised value, therefore, is not indicative of the value of the property
as of the valuation date of January 1, 2008, nor can the appraisal substantiate
the condition of the property for the March 1, 2009, assessment date.
f. The Petitioner submitted a
purchase agreement and a sales disclosure form for the subject property showing
the property sold for $4,400 in August of 2011. The property sold as vacant
land and was not the same property that existed on the parcel as of March 1,
2009.
g. The Petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case. Where the Petitioner has not supported its claims
with probative evidence, the Respondent’s duty to support the assessment with
substantial evidence is not triggered. Lacy Diversified Indus. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215,
1221-1222 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).
