The parties agree that two
parcels were purchased together in 1993, and the third parcel, the subject
property of Petition No. 90, was originally common area and later quitclaimed
to the Props in 1995. The aerial map shows that the subject property is located
directly behind the residence, has no street access, and is of insufficient
size to build a residence. Respondent Exhibit C. Mr. McAbee testified
that he considered the three parcels as one property with the subject property
as an extension of the “backyard.” McAbee testimony. Mr. Smith failed to
offer rebuttal evidence of how the Props actually use the property, other than
that they mow it. Mr. Smith opined that the subject property could be sold
separate from the two parcels containing the residence, perhaps to a contiguous
property owner. Smith testimony. The weight of the evidence supports the
conclusion that the three parcels constitute a single economic use as a
residence.
29. To decide whether Ind. Code §
6-1.1-15-17.2 shifts the burden of proof to the Assessor, the Board compares
the total assessment of the three parcels to the amount that the Assessor determined
for the previous year. The Assessor property record cards indicate that in 2008
the three parcels were assessed at $19,500 (Parcel 004), $1,780,000 (Parcel
005), and $15,900 (Parcel 008), for a total of $1,815,400. For 2009, the three
parcels were assessed at $82,400 (Parcel 004), $1,718,300 (Parcel 005), and
$67,200 (Parcel 008), for a total assessed value of $1,867,900. The increase is
approximately 2.89%. Because the total assessment of the subject property
represents an increase of less 5% from the preceding year, the Props have the
burden of proof.
…
d. Mr. Smith cites to the
original construction cost of $811,000. But the subject property was constructed
sixteen years before the relevant valuation date. He does not introduce sufficient
evidence to relate the construction cost to the January 1, 2008, valuation
date, and therefore, the construction cost carries no probative value.
e. Mr. Smith argues that, based
on the construction cost of the house, the grade factor of AA-1 is overstated.
The Indiana Tax Court has consistently rejected arguments that simply contest
the methodology used to compute the assessment. Eckerling v. Wayne Township Assessor,
841 N.E.2d 674, 677 (Ind. Tax 2006). Instead, a party must show the
assessment does not accurately reflect the subject property’s market value-in-use.
Id.; see also P/A Builders & Developers, LLC, 842 N.E.2d at 899, 900
(“the focus is not on the methodology used by the assessor, but instead on
determining whether the assessed value is actually correct”). Mr. Smith’s
testimony regarding grade presents no probative evidence about the market
value-in-use of the property.
f. Mr. Smith contends that from
2007 through 2013 property values in the subject property’s neighborhood have
been declining. Specifically, the trending factors in the neighborhood dropped
from 129% in 2009 to 119% in 2010 and dropped again in 2013 to 89%, which resulted
in a lower assessed value for 2010 and 2013 on the subject property. But each assessment
and each tax year stands alone. Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners,
747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (citing Glass Wholesalers, Inc.
v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 568 N.E.2d 1116, 1124 (Ind. Tax Ct.
1991)). Thus, evidence as to a property value in one tax year generally is not
probative of its true tax value in a different year. Mr. Smith provides no data
or evidence to show that property values in the subject property’s neighborhood
were declining. Statements that are unsupported by probative evidence are
conclusory and of little value to the Board in making its determination. Whitley
Products, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119
(Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); and Herb v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 656 N.E.2d
890, 893 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995).
