c. Here, the Respondent contends
the property is properly valued based on the sales of comparable properties. Respondent
Exhibits A, B and C. In making this argument, the Respondent relies on the
sales comparison approach. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the sales
comparison approach “estimates the total value of the property directly by
comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the
market.”). In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach as
evidence in a property assessment appeal, the proponent must establish the
comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a
property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute
probative evidence of the comparability of the two properties. Long, 821
N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the proponent must identify the characteristics of the
subject property and explain how those characteristics compare to the
characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471.
Similarly, the proponent must explain how any differences between the
properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id.
d. In support of her argument,
the Respondent submitted sales information for six properties that sold between
January 2008 and February 2009. Respondent Exhibits A, B. Yet the
Respondent made no attempt to show how the properties compared to the subject
property and offered no explanation as to how any differences may have affected
the properties’ values. Thus, the Respondent‘s evidence was not probative of the
subject property’s market value-in-use. See Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor,
821 N.E.2d 466, 471-72 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005) (holding that sales data lacked
probative value where taxpayers failed to explain how the characteristics of
their property compared to the characteristics of purportedly comparable
properties or how any differences between the properties affected their
relative market values-in-use).
e. Next, the Respondent claimed a
ratio study shows the assessments of the sold properties are relatively close
to their sales prices. Respondent Exhibit C. This study is of no value
in arriving at the correct assessed value for the subject property because the
Respondent offered no authority for her argument that a ratio study can be used
to prove that a property’s assessment reflects its market value-in-use. To be
sure, the International Association of Assessing Officers Standard on Ratio
Studies, which 50 IAC 27-1-4 incorporates by reference, says otherwise:
Assessors, appeal boards,
taxpayers, and taxing authorities can use ratio studies to evaluate the
fairness of funding distributions, the merits of class action claims, or the
degree of discrimination. . . . . However, ratio study statistics cannot be
used to judge the level of appraisal of an individual parcel. Such
statistics can be used to adjust assessed values on appealed properties to the
common level.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS STANDARD ON RATIO STANDARDS VERSION 17.03 Part 2.3
(Approved by IAAO Executive Board 07/21/2007) (bold added, italics in original).
f. The Respondent implied that
the subject assessment draws validity from the fact that the disputed
assessment is within an acceptable range for mass appraisals. But an appeal of
an individual assessment is an entirely different thing. The Respondent provided
no authority or substantial explanation for the conclusion that there is an acceptable
range for establishing the value of property. Unsubstantiated conclusions do
not constitute probative evidence. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E. 2d
1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998).
g. The Respondent did not support
the accuracy of the existing assessment with any meaningful market value-in-use
evidence. Accordingly, the Respondent failed to meet the burden of proof. In
other cases where the Respondent had the burden of proof and failed to carry
that burden, the Board has ordered that the assessment be returned to the
assessed value of the year before. Therefore, the parcel’s March 1, 2009,
assessment must be reduced to the 2008 assessed value of $215,000.
h. That, however, does not end the
Board’s inquiry because the Petitioners sought an even lower assessed value of
$190,000 for March 1, 2009. The Petitioners presented a comparative market
analysis to support the requested value. The comparative market analysis is not
dated and all the sales occurred in 2009 and 2010, well after the January 1,
2008, valuation date. Additionally, the real estate broker that prepared the analysis
did not make any adjustments to the sold properties to account for differences
between them and the subject property. For these reasons, the comparative
market analysis is not probative evidence for a reduction in assessed value.
i. Next, the Petitioners
presented a real estate listing for a property in their immediate neighborhood.
The property was advertised on January 12, 2014, which is almost six years
after the valuation date and is not indicative of the value of the subject
property for March 1, 2009.
j. Finally, the Petitioners
submitted a list of eight sales that occurred on their street, Crestwood
Avenue. These sales took place between April 2001 and March 2004. Again, the
sales are not within the required time frame for the March 1, 2009, assessment
date and the Petitioners did not make any meaningful attempt to compare the
properties to the subject property. The Petitioners failed to make a prima
facie case for a lower value.
