Here, the bulk of the Smiths’ evidence is clearly intended to
discredit the Assessor’s accuracy, methodology, and defense of the subject
property’s current and previous assessments. As just one example, the Smiths
point to the Assessor’s inclusion of two different properties as comparable
properties with the same address identified for both. Because the Board’s
proceedings are de novo, however, the effectiveness of the Assessor’s
case at the hearing below is of no significance. See Ind. Code §
6-1.1-15-4(m). Similarly, errors in previous years’ assessments have little
bearing on the present appeal. Each assessment and tax year stands alone. Fleet
Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2001) (citing Glass Wholesalers, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 568
N.E.2d 1116, 1124 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991)).
The Smiths also question, albeit in mostly general terms,
the Assessor’s methodology of determining their property’s assessment. The
Smiths, for example, argue that the Assessor put the subject property in the
wrong "house grouping" for trending purposes, and also touched on the
property’s grade and abnormal obsolescence percentage as they relate to certain
other properties. A taxpayer, however, does not rebut the presumption that an
assessment is correct simply by contesting the assessor’s methodology in
computing the assessment. See Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 841
N.E.2d 674, 678 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006). Instead, the taxpayer must use
market-based evidence to show that the assessor’s methodology yielded an
assessment that does not accurately reflect the assessed property’s market
value in-use. Id.
And the Smiths provided some market-based evidence in an
attempt to disprove the accuracy of subject property’s assessment – and in the
process, prove what the correct assessment of their property is. Specifically,
they offered market and assessment data from five purportedly comparable
properties. The Smiths’ requested assessment of $135,400 appears to be loosely
based on the average of the sale prices and assessments of the five properties
they chose to compare with the subject property. In making this argument, the
Smiths essentially rely on a sales comparison approach to establish the market
value-in-use of their property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the sales
comparison approach "estimates the total value of the property directly by
comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the
market."). In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach as
evidence in a property assessment appeal, however, the proponent must establish
the comparability of the properties being examined. Long v. Wayne Twp.
Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 470 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Conclusory statements
that a property is ―similar‖ or ―comparable‖ to another property do not
constitute probative evidence of the comparability of the properties. Id. Instead,
the proponent must identify the characteristics of the subject property and
explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the
purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the proponent
must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative
market values-in-use. Id. The Smiths’ evidence lacks any of that type of
analysis.
Interestingly, the Smiths were quick to recognize that
deficiency in portions of the Assessor’s evidence. Specifically, the Smiths
argued that the Assessor’s trending analysis – which simply groups properties
by the year they sold and computes an average sale price for each year – proves
little more than that cheaper properties may have sold in 2006 than in 2010.
The Smiths attempt at a sales-comparison analysis suffers from much the same
problem: absent any meaningful comparison of the properties, the Smiths’s may
have simply selected cheaper properties to compare to their property. Further,
the Smiths’ contention that other properties in their neighborhood have not
sold for as much as theirs is demonstrably wrong because the Assessor offered
evidence of several properties that sold for over $155,000.
Additionally, the Smiths compared their property’s
assessment to other assessments in the area, and even questioned the integrity
of the appeal process based on the results of another property’s appeal. The
Board infers this to be a claim that assessments in the property’s neighborhood
are not uniform and equal. But the Smiths’ evidence does not suffice to make a
prima facie case for either claim. The Indiana Tax Court has held that it is
not enough for a taxpayer to show that its property is assessed higher than
other comparable properties. Instead, the taxpayer must present probative
evidence to show that its property’s assessed value does not accurately reflect
the property’s market value-in-use. Westfield Golf Practice Center, LLC v.
Washington Twp. Assessor, 859 N.E.2d 396 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2007).
Related to that point, the Board finds nothing improper
with the Assessor’s lowering of the assessed value for the property located at
8514 Creek Side Place. Based on the Smiths’ own characterization of that case,
the property’s owner simply offered probative market-based evidence—an
appraisal—and the Assessor lowered the assessment based on that evidence. In
fact, the Board finds no difference between that case and the Smiths’ own 2006
appeal. As the Smiths’ evidence shows, they filed an appeal, offered an
appraisal as evidence, and the Assessor consequently agreed to lower the
Smiths’ assessment—by over $25,000. And the Smiths noted nothing improper
regarding their own case.
It is undisputed that the Smiths bought the subject
property for $148,000 in June 2006. It is also undisputed that the property
appraised for $142,500 at roughly the same time. Even if the Board were to
consider the lower appraised value to be the property’s June 2006 value, all of
the analyses on the record that were used to trend that value—including the
paired-sales analysis offered by the Smiths—suggest that the subject property’s
value increased between June of 2006 and March 1, 2011. The resulting March 1,
2011, assessment computation, no matter which trending evidence the Board would
use, is therefore higher than the Assessor has conceded to. Thus, while the
evidence suggests that the subject property’s assessment should be increased
from $140,800 for 2011, the Board declines to do so in light of the Assessor’s
concession that the assessment should be $139,400. The Board accepts that
concession as the new assessment of record for the March 1, 2011, assessment
date.
