In this case, the Petitioner
submitted an appraisal, valuing the subject property at $930,000 as of February
28, 2012. Pet’r Ex. G. During the informal hearing with the Respondent,
the Petitioner presented a different appraisal, valuing the property at
$925,000 as of August 15, 2012. Resp’t Ex. 6. The Board affords great
weight to the February 28, 2012 appraisal as market value-in-use evidence of
the subject property on March 1, 2012. In addition, while the August 15, 2012
appraisal valued the property a few months after the relevant valuation date in
this case, the two appraisals, prepared by two different appraisers, support
each other by arriving at similar conclusions of value in 2012. Accordingly,
the Board concludes that the Petitioner provided sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case that the parcel should be assessed for $930,000.
Once the Petitioner establishes a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the assessing official to rebut the
Petitioner’s evidence. See American United Life Ins. Co. v. Maley, 803
N.E.2d 276, 281 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004). The assessing official must offer evidence
that impeaches or rebuts the Petitioner’s evidence. See id. at 282; Meridian
Towers, 805 N.E.2d at 479.
The Respondent presented evidence
that local building permits indicate that the property’s improvements cost
$1,027,000 to construct in March of 2009. Resp’t Ex. 4. No explanation
was offered, however, to relate this amount to the valuation date of March 1,
2012. This evidence, therefore, has no probative value. Long, 821 N.E.2d
at 471.
The Respondent also presented two
grid reports. The first grid report reviewed a property in the Petitioner’s
subdivision that was listed for $1,250,000 on April 15, 2013. The Respondent
determined that the listing price per square foot for that property was
$256.00. The Respondent applied the $256.00 per square foot price to the
subject property to arrive at an assessed value of $1,278,315.1 Resp’t Ex.
4A and 5A (footnote added).
The second grid report identifies
twelve other properties that sold during 2010- 2012 and concludes the average
square foot value of those properties was $224.00. Resp’t Ex. 5.
In order to use a
sales-comparison approach as evidence in an assessment appeal, one must first
show that the properties being examined are comparable to each other. Conclusory
statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property are
not probative of the properties’ comparability. Long, 821 N.E.2d at
470-471. Instead, one must identify the characteristics of the property under
appeal and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of
the purportedly comparable properties. Similarly, one must explain how any
differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id.
Here, both the 2013 and 2010-2012
grid reports offer only a minimal description of the homes’ features. Further,
although the 2010-2012 report showed sales prices ranging from $685,000 to
$2,200,000, the Respondent offered no additional comparison of the properties
or an analysis of the wide range of value differences among them.
Instead, the Respondent merely
showed the average sales price per square foot and listing price per square
foot of other properties. The Respondent applied those prices to the subject
property, without any explanation or evidence demonstrating that the properties
were actually comparable to the subject property. Further, the Respondent
failed to show how those prices related to the March 1, 2012, valuation date.
Thus, the grid reports do not constitute probative evidence of the property’s
market value-in-use for the March 1, 2012, assessment.
The Respondent failed to present
any meaningful market value-in-use evidence to support the accuracy of the
existing assessment. Accordingly, the parcel’s March 1, 2012 assessment must be
reduced.
