That does not end the Board’s inquiry,
however, because the Petitioners contend the value of the one-acre homesite
should be lowered to $25,000 based on the sales of two similar properties. The
Petitioners rely on the sale of an adjacent 20.78 acre property, which sold for
$519,500, or $25,000 an acre, in March of 2006 and the sale of 35.41 acres of
agricultural land that sold on December 17, 2004, for $5,535 per acre. In
making this argument the Petitioners essentially rely on a sales comparison
approach to establish the market value-in-use of their property. See MANUAL at 3
(stating that the sales comparison approach “estimates the total value of the
property directly by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that
have sold in the market.”). In order to effectively use the sales comparison
approach as evidence in a property assessment appeal, the proponent must
establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory
statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do
not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of the properties. Long,
821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the proponent must identify the characteristics
of the subject property and explain how those characteristics compare to the
characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471.
Similarly, the proponent must explain how any differences between the
properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id. This the
Petitioners did not do. Mr. Austgen merely testified that the comparable
properties were vacant, agricultural land and argued that improving the parcels
with a driveway, a well and a septic system would have “minimal” cost. This
falls far short of the burden to show comparability between the properties.
Thus, the Petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case for a further
reduction in the land assessment for Parcel 002.
Similarly, for Parcel 001, the
Respondent argues that the property was assessed correctly. According to the
Respondent’s representative, all of the land on Parcel 001 was assessed as
tillable land with one acre for farm buildings. Mr. Metz also testified that
the farm buildings were assigned a D grade and fair condition. In support of
this contention, Mr. Metz presented the property record card for the subject
parcel and an excerpt from the residential and agricultural cost schedules in
the Guidelines. Like its case for Parcel 002, however, the Respondent presented
no evidence that the property’s assessed value represented the property’s
market value-in-use. Because the Respondent must do more than merely assert
that it assessed the property correctly, the Respondent failed to raise a prima
facie case that the assessed value of Parcel 001 was correct for the March 1,
2007, assessment date. See Canal Square, 694 N.E.2d at 808. The
property’s March 1, 2007, assessment must therefore be reduced to its 2006
assessed value of $36,900.
Again, however, the Petitioners
contend the assessed value of Parcel 001 should be further reduced because the
improvements have no value and the land’s assessed value does not take into
consideration the negative effects of surrounding properties on the subject
property. The burden of proving a lower assessment therefore lies with the
Petitioners.
The Petitioners first contend
that the farm buildings on Parcel 001 have no market value-in-use to a
prospective purchaser of the land because the buildings are not appropriate for
large, modern farm machinery and cropping and storage methods. However, the
Petitioners presented no evidence to support this allegation. Statements that
are unsupported by probative evidence are conclusory and of no value to the
Board in making its determination. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); and Herb v.
State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 656 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995). In fact,
the Petitioners’ photographs show structurally sound buildings that could serve
a number of purposes including equipment storage, grain storage and animal
housing. Whether the Petitioners use the buildings for any purpose or whether a
future purchaser would use the buildings does not alter the fact that the
buildings exist on the property and add value to the property. Thus, the
Petitioners failed to raise a prima facie case that the buildings on Parcel 001
should be assessed as having no value.
The Petitioners also contend
that their land is improperly classified and that the assessed value of their
land does not reflect the negative impact that the development of surrounding
properties has had on their property.
...
Similarly, the Petitioners’
request for reclassification of 9.56 acres as woodland/pasture with an 80%
influence factor is unsupported by the evidence presented. The agricultural
land assessment formula involves the identification of agricultural tracts
using data from detailed soil maps, aerial photography, and local plat maps.
Each variable in the land assessment formula is measured using appropriate
devices to determine its size and effect on the parcel’s assessment. Uniformity
is maintained through the proper use of soil maps, interpreted data and unit
values. GUIDELINES, ch. 2 at 99. Mr. Austgen merely contends that the
9.56 acres identified as Blount soils are woodland or pasture areas and that
five acres might be a “reasonable estimate” of the woodland area. And while the
Petitioners provided an aerial map of the parcel, the map is not sufficiently
detailed to identify the soil classifications or to determine the size of
various features such as woodlands on the lot. This falls short of the burden
to quantify the amount of land that should be reclassified.