Saturday, June 2, 2012

Board Finds the County Failed to Support the Assessed Value of the Petitioners' Property and the Petitioners Failed to Support a Further Reduction

Even if the Assessor had shown that the land value on Parcel 002 was assessed according to the county’s land valuation schedules, the Assessor presented no evidence that the county’s land values represented the market value-in-use of the Petitioners’ property. See Eckerling v. Wayne Township Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 678 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); P/A Builders & Developers v. Jennings County Assessor, 842 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (recognizing that the current assessment system is a departure from the past practice in Indiana, stating that “under the old system, a property’s assessed value was correct as long as the assessment regulations were applied correctly. The new system, in contrast, shifts the focus from mere methodology to determining whether the assessed value is actually correct”). Thus, the Respondent failed to raise a prima facie case that the land value for Parcel 002 was correct for the March 1, 2007, assessment date. Therefore, the property’s land assessment must be reduced to the previous year’s assessed value, or $55,900, under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2.

That does not end the Board’s inquiry, however, because the Petitioners contend the value of the one-acre homesite should be lowered to $25,000 based on the sales of two similar properties. The Petitioners rely on the sale of an adjacent 20.78 acre property, which sold for $519,500, or $25,000 an acre, in March of 2006 and the sale of 35.41 acres of agricultural land that sold on December 17, 2004, for $5,535 per acre. In making this argument the Petitioners essentially rely on a sales comparison approach to establish the market value-in-use of their property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the sales comparison approach “estimates the total value of the property directly by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the market.”). In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach as evidence in a property assessment appeal, the proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of the properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the proponent must identify the characteristics of the subject property and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the proponent must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id. This the Petitioners did not do. Mr. Austgen merely testified that the comparable properties were vacant, agricultural land and argued that improving the parcels with a driveway, a well and a septic system would have “minimal” cost. This falls far short of the burden to show comparability between the properties. Thus, the Petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case for a further reduction in the land assessment for Parcel 002.

Similarly, for Parcel 001, the Respondent argues that the property was assessed correctly. According to the Respondent’s representative, all of the land on Parcel 001 was assessed as tillable land with one acre for farm buildings. Mr. Metz also testified that the farm buildings were assigned a D grade and fair condition. In support of this contention, Mr. Metz presented the property record card for the subject parcel and an excerpt from the residential and agricultural cost schedules in the Guidelines. Like its case for Parcel 002, however, the Respondent presented no evidence that the property’s assessed value represented the property’s market value-in-use. Because the Respondent must do more than merely assert that it assessed the property correctly, the Respondent failed to raise a prima facie case that the assessed value of Parcel 001 was correct for the March 1, 2007, assessment date. See Canal Square, 694 N.E.2d at 808. The property’s March 1, 2007, assessment must therefore be reduced to its 2006 assessed value of $36,900.

Again, however, the Petitioners contend the assessed value of Parcel 001 should be further reduced because the improvements have no value and the land’s assessed value does not take into consideration the negative effects of surrounding properties on the subject property. The burden of proving a lower assessment therefore lies with the Petitioners.

The Petitioners first contend that the farm buildings on Parcel 001 have no market value-in-use to a prospective purchaser of the land because the buildings are not appropriate for large, modern farm machinery and cropping and storage methods. However, the Petitioners presented no evidence to support this allegation. Statements that are unsupported by probative evidence are conclusory and of no value to the Board in making its determination. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); and Herb v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 656 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995). In fact, the Petitioners’ photographs show structurally sound buildings that could serve a number of purposes including equipment storage, grain storage and animal housing. Whether the Petitioners use the buildings for any purpose or whether a future purchaser would use the buildings does not alter the fact that the buildings exist on the property and add value to the property. Thus, the Petitioners failed to raise a prima facie case that the buildings on Parcel 001 should be assessed as having no value.

The Petitioners also contend that their land is improperly classified and that the assessed value of their land does not reflect the negative impact that the development of surrounding properties has had on their property.
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While the Petitioners’ letter from Torrenga Engineering reports that various developments have altered drainage patterns in the area of the Petitioners’ property resulting in several parcels draining run-off onto the Petitioners’ land, the Petitioners failed to present any evidence that repeated, wide-spread flooding occurs on the property. There were no logs of how often such flooding occurs or pictures or surveys of how much property the flooding covers. And the engineering report merely states that the drainage has caused the property’s farm pond to “expand beyond the intended banks during heavy rainfall episodes.” It is not enough for Mr. Austgen to testify that “flow reversal… floods our property” and identify the Pewamo and Elliott soils as impacted and contend that the county should apply a 50% influence factor. Thus, the Petitioners presented insufficient evidence to support the application of an influence factor to the Elliott or Pewamo soils or a reclassification of their lands as Type 41, Type 42, or Type 45 land.

Similarly, the Petitioners’ request for reclassification of 9.56 acres as woodland/pasture with an 80% influence factor is unsupported by the evidence presented. The agricultural land assessment formula involves the identification of agricultural tracts using data from detailed soil maps, aerial photography, and local plat maps. Each variable in the land assessment formula is measured using appropriate devices to determine its size and effect on the parcel’s assessment. Uniformity is maintained through the proper use of soil maps, interpreted data and unit values. GUIDELINES, ch. 2 at 99. Mr. Austgen merely contends that the 9.56 acres identified as Blount soils are woodland or pasture areas and that five acres might be a “reasonable estimate” of the woodland area. And while the Petitioners provided an aerial map of the parcel, the map is not sufficiently detailed to identify the soil classifications or to determine the size of various features such as woodlands on the lot. This falls short of the burden to quantify the amount of land that should be reclassified.