Saturday, September 1, 2012

Board Finds Respondent's Purchase Evidence More Persuasive than Petitioners' Appraisal

The Respondent established a prima facie case that the property’s assessments were correct for the March 1, 2007, and March 1, 2009, assessment years. The Petitioners presented rebuttal evidence, but the weight of the evidence supports the property’s assessed values. The Board reached this decision for the following reasons:

Here the Respondent’s representative argues that the Petitioners’ property’s 2007 assessed value was correct based on the Petitioners’ purchase of the lot. Spearman argument. In support of this contention, Ms. Spearman presented the sales disclosure form showing the property was purchased on September 20, 2005, for $102,500. Respondent Exhibit 4. The purchase of a property is often the best evidence of a property’s value. See Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks County Assessor., 938 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010) (The Board’s determination assigning greater weight to the property’s purchase price than its assessed value was proper and supported by the evidence)…

Although the Petitioners’ purchase of the property was too far removed from the January 1, 2008, valuation date for the March 1, 2009, assessment, the Respondent’s representative contends that the Petitioners’ property’s assessed value was correct for 2009, based on the purchase prices of other lots that sold in 2007 and 2008 in the Petitioners’ property’s neighborhood. Spearman argument. In making this argument, the Petitioner essentially relies on a sales comparison approach to establish the market value-in-use of the property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the sales comparison approach “estimates the total value of the property directly by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the market.”) Here, Ms. Spearman testified that five properties, 233 Knightbridge Place, 409 Knightbridge Place, 10100 New Devon, 216 Mayfair Way, and 10033 New Devon Place sold for an average price per square foot of $7.16, resulting in a value of $110,374.66 for the Petitioners’ property. Id. While the Respondent presented little evidence regarding the comparability of the neighboring lots, the Petitioners’ representative testified that the lots in the property’s neighborhood were virtually identical and, in fact, the Petitioners’ appraiser used other lots in the Petitioners’ neighborhood without adjustment…

Once a party has made a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party to refute or disprove the evidence. See Meridian Towers East & West v. Washington Township Assessor, 805 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003). Here, the Petitioners first submit a land appraisal report prepared by Howard O. Cyrus, an appraiser, which valued the property at $72,640 as of January 1, 2006. Mr. Cyrus used four vacant lots located in the Petitioners’ neighborhood. An appraisal performed in conformance with generally recognized appraisal principles is often enough to establish a prima facie case that a property’s assessment is over-valued. Meridian Towers, 805 N.E.2d at 479.

The price paid for a property and an appraisal are both acceptable alternative approaches to determining a property’s market value-in-use. Further, both the valuation date of the appraisal and the purchase of the property were sufficiently contemporaneous with the statutory valuation date to be probative. The Board must, therefore, weigh the evidence presented by both parties and determine the most persuasive evidence of the property’s value.

An appraisal represents an estimate of a property’s value based on the opinion of an appraiser. In contrast, the actual purchase of a property is not an estimate, but rather is direct evidence of how a buyer and seller valued the utility of the property. Moreover, the Petitioners’ appraiser failed to certify that he performed his appraisal in conformance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. Thus, the Board finds that the property’s 2005 purchase price is more persuasive than its appraised value. Therefore, the Board holds that the weight of the evidence supports the $101,200 assessed value for 2007.

The Petitioners’ appraisal was not timely for the March 1, 2009, assessment, and the Petitioners made no attempt to adjust the appraised value to the January 1, 2008, valuation date for the 2009 assessment. However, the Petitioners contend that their property was over-valued based on the offers they received in 2010 and the ultimate sale price of the property. But like their appraised value, the Petitioners failed to present any evidence that would relate their 2010 sale price, or the various offers they received that year, to the property’s value as of the January 1, 2008, valuation date for the 2009 assessment. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471 (holding that an appraisal indicating a property’s value for December 10, 2003, lacked probative value in an appeal from a 2002 assessment).

[Additional arguments were made by the Taxpayer and addressed in the Board's Final Determination]