The Petitioner’s argument that there were more than 5% increases depends on calculating from a substantially reduced valuation. But the settlement agreement to change the 2007 assessment to $159,300 does not support application of the burden shifting provision in Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2.
Judicial policy strongly favors settlement agreements. They allow courts to operate more efficiently and allow parties to fashion the outcome of their disputes through mutual agreement. Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he law encourages parties to engage in settlement negotiations in several ways. It prohibits the use of settlement terms or even settlement negotiations to prove liability for or invalidity of a claim or its amount. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 820 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. 2005). The strong policy justification for denying settlements precedential effect in a property tax case is that allowing parties to use the settlement would have a chilling effect on the incentive of the parties to resolve cases. Id. at 1228.
Coupled with Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2, these cases present an unusual scenario. Nevertheless, general principles about the limitations of settlements are persuasive. There are many reasons for parties to make such agreements. We will not speculate what those reasons might have been and we will not apply the settlement to other matters. Specifically, the settlement agreement for 2007 did not establish a new base line for purposes of the 5% rule in the burden shifting statute to the other appeals.
Accordingly, the Petitioner has the burden of proof for the 2008 and 2009 appeals because those assessments did not increase by more than 5% over the assessed value determined by the county assessor for the immediately preceding assessment date.
The Petitioner did not meet its burden of proof. The Petitioner did not offer any substantial market value-in-use evidence. According to Mr. Smith’s conclusory statement, the agreed 2007 assessed value of $159,300 should be carried forward to 2008 and 2009. But such unsupported conclusions do not help make a case.
In Indiana each year stands alone. See Thousand Trails Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001); Quality Stores, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 740 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000); Barth, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 699 N.E.2d 800, 805 n. 14 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). This principle is consistent with the fact that under Indiana’s current assessment system the valuation date for each assessment year is different.
