Although they mentioned their purchase price, the Petitioners primarily relied on the Mauntel Appraisal to make their case. And many cases have recognized that the most effective method to show the value assigned by the assessor is incorrect is often through the presentation of a market value-in-use appraisal, completed in conformance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). O’Donnell v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 854 N.E.2d 90, 94 n. 3 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006), Kooshtard Property VI, LLC v. White River Township Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 501, 506 n. 6 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). But not all appraisals satisfy that standard. Such a failure is a problem that seriously impacts credibility and probative value of an opinion of value. It is a fundamental problem for the Petitioners in this case.
Mr. Mauntel admitted that he is not a licensed appraiser and that his appraisal does not conform to USPAP. The appraisal contains no certification that generally accepted appraisal methods were used to arrive at his opinion of market value. With these serious weaknesses, it was incumbent upon either Mr. Mauntel or the Petitioners to provide substantial, detailed evidence or explanation to support the appraisal’s conclusion about the value of the subject property. The totality of what was provided, however, is insufficient to establish the credibility or reliability of his opinion the subject property had a value of only $187,000.
The appraisal is based on three sales of purportedly comparable properties. According to Mr. Mauntel they were selected based on size and age criteria. He testified his computer program made adjustments, but he was unable to provide a substantial, meaningful explanation of the specific adjustments made to those comparables. The appraisal itself simply shows adjustments for "living area: $43.50 $/sqft." Although the appraisal made adjustments to the comparable sales, what they specifically covered is unclear. Mr. Mauntel did not identify what software program was used. He did not provide any information about the nature or reliability of that program. This effort falls short of the Tax Court’s requirement to explain the differences in the properties and their impact upon value. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470-71. Consequently, the appraisal’s estimated market value has no weight or credibility. See Inland Steel Co. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 739 N.E.2d 201, 220 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000) (holding that an appraiser’s opinion lacked probative value where the appraiser failed to explain what a producer price index was, how it was calculated or that its use as a deflator was a generally accepted appraisal technique); see also Canal Square Ltd. Partnership v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 801 (Ind. Tax 1998) (obsolescence quantifications based on the witness’s "experience" are not probative.)
The three comparables selected for the appraisal are 2011 sales. Again, the valuation date for the March 1, 2009, assessment date was January 1, 2008. Although Mr. Mauntel testified in a conclusory manner that property values were very similar in 2008 and 2011, after considering his appraisal and all of his testimony that conclusion simply is not credible. (At one point Mr. Mauntel also testified, "later on, 2010-2011, which we are not even concerned with, actually property values went down.") Because the Petitioners failed to establish the 2011 valuation is relevant to value as of January 1, 2008, the Petitioners’ evidence fails to raise a prima facie case. See Long, 821 N.E.2d at 471 (holding that an appraisal indicating a property’s value for December 10, 2003, lacked probative value in an appeal from a 2002 assessment because the taxpayer did not explain how it related to the relevant valuation date).
The Petitioners also introduced evidence about seven 2008-2009 sales of nearby properties. In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach as evidence in property assessment appeals, however, the proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is "similar" or "comparable" to another property do not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of the properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the party seeking to rely on a sales comparison approach must explain the characteristics of the property and how those characteristics compare to those of purportedly comparable properties. They must also explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market value-in-use. See Id. at 470-71. The Petitioners failed to establish that these properties are comparable to their own, instead presenting only cursory descriptions. They provided no meaningful explanation about how those selling prices support either the appraisal or the assessment they requested. The evidence relating to those other sales does not help the Petitioners make their case.
