The Respondent argues that the Petitioners lack standing to
appeal the 2006 assessments because they merely held tax sale certificates and
did not have an ownership interest in real property. Therefore, the subject properties did not
constitute “the taxpayer’s tangible property” when the Petitioners initiated
their appeals. According to the
Respondent, until a tax sale buyer gets or records a tax deed, Ind. Code §
6-1.1-15-1 and 15-3 do not provide that a tax sale buyer may obtain review of a
property’s assessment because it is not yet the taxpayer’s tangible
property. Furthermore, according to the
Respondent, Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-13 does not provide for review because these
tax sale buyers were not billed for the 2006 pay 2007 taxes (tax bills would
have been sent to the record owners of the subject properties, not to tax sale
buyers).
Although the word “taxpayer” is used many times throughout
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15, the legislature provided no specific definition or
meaning for the word in the context of assessment review rights. There are several instances where “taxpayer”
is specifically defined in the context of other statutes, e.g., Ind. Code §
6-1.1-12.2-8 and Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.3-11.
Neither party, however, argued that those instances are analogous or
provide meaningful guidance for this case.
The Board finds no relevant statutory definition for this case. Accordingly, the word “taxpayer” must be
given its commonly understood meaning:
“Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain, or ordinary and usual,
sense.” Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1(1); see
Johnson Co. Farm Bureau Coop v. Indiana Dep’t of State Rev., 568 N.E.2d 578,
581 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991) (stating that “[i]t is axiomatic in Indiana that the
plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of non-technical words in a statute is
defined by their ordinary and accepted dictionary meaning.”) Dictionaries generally define “taxpayer” as a
person or entity who pays or is liable for a tax. In addition to the statutes providing for a
taxpayer’s right to obtain review of an assessment, the Board’s Procedural
Rules provide that a “party” in such a matter may include the owner of the
subject property or the taxpayer who is responsible for the property taxes on
the subject property. 52 IAC
2-2-13. Therefore, a petitioner is a
“taxpayer” to the extent that that petitioner paid the 2006 pay 2007 taxes on
the property he, she, or it bought at tax sale.
See Geller v. Meek, 496 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (“[A] tax
sale purchaser is … a lienholder for the amount of taxes paid.”).
The Board reached a similar conclusion where a buyer
purchased a property after an assessment date, but subsequently had to pay the
tax liability resulting from that earlier assessment date. One such case, Nelson Whitt v. Delaware Co.
Assessor, Petition No. 18-003-06-1-5-01166 (Aug. 5, 2009), was cited by the
Petitioners. When Mr. Whitt bought the
property in 2007 the assessment had not been determined for March 1, 2006. At the closing the seller gave Mr. Whitt some
money for the 2006 pay 2007 property taxes.
But when the 2006 assessment was determined and the tax bill was
calculated, the seller’s contribution did not cover the entire liability. Therefore, Mr. Whitt paid the difference with
his own funds. He then initiated the
appeal process by filing a Form 130 on July 11, 2007. In spite of the Assessor pointing out that
Mr. Whitt did not own the property on March 1, 2006, the Board determined that
these circumstances established a proper status for purposes of his appeal of
the 2006 assessment.
Being the taxpayer, however, is not the only statutory
requirement for standing to appeal. Both
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-1 and Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-3 provide for review of the
“taxpayer’s tangible property.”
According to the Respondent, just holding the tax sale certificates
during the redemption period does not satisfy that requirement. The Respondent
is correct in characterizing the interest represented by a tax sale certificate
as an intangible. Consequently, holding
a tax sale certificate for the subject property does not constitute an interest
in tangible property.
The tax sale statutes, together with case law applying those
statutes, establish that one who holds a tax sale certificate during the
redemption period is not a legal or equitable owner of the property. See Geller v. Meek, 496 N.E.2d at 106-107
(explaining that at a tax sale a buyer acquires a lien on the subject real
estate, but does not get legal or equitable title). “The tax sale creates a lien against the
property that may ripen into full ownership at some later time by the issuance
of a tax deed.” Id. at 107 (quoting
Fields v. Evans, 484 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
The fact that the Petitioners’ lien interests eventually
ripened into full ownership and tax deeds were issued while these appeals were
pending does not cure the defect that existed when the appeals were
initiated—at that time the subject property was not the taxpayer’s tangible
property. Where the appeal process was
initiated (filing a Form 130 petition) before a Petitioner got an interest in
the tangible property (issuing the tax deed) the Petitioners did not have
standing under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-1 or Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-3 to obtain
review of the 2006 assessments on the subject properties. The record establishes that lack of standing
for all the cases except two: Petition
No. 18-003-06-1-5-01339 and Petition No. 18-003-06-1-5-01344. In those two cases, the date of the tax deed
was not established as an undisputed fact, which is a situation that precludes
summary judgment.
Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-13 could be the basis for initiating
these cases, if the right to appeal was triggered by the receipt of a tax
bill. The Respondent, however, filed a
Declaration of County Assessor James Carmichael (designated Respondent’s
Exhibit B) precluding this possibility.
Paragraph 5 of that Declaration states, Attached hereto and made a part
hereof as Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate copy of the screen shots of data
compilations maintained by the tax billing system in Delaware County, showing
the person billed for the 2007 tax billing date as to each of the parcels
listed in Attachment A. These records
show that neither Mr. Terry nor any of the referenced companies were
responsible for or billed for the pay 07 taxes.
The Petitioner did not contest the fact that the Petitioners
were not billed for the 2006 pay 2007 taxes on the subject properties. Therefore, Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-13 does not
provide a basis for the Petitioners’ standing in these cases.
